Alternative Ports, Not Entitlement: Understanding Eritrea’s Port Sovereignty

By David Yeh

Article 125 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is often invoked in moments of geopolitical tension as if it were a coercive instrument, an enforcement mechanism capable of compelling access to specific ports regardless of sovereign consent. In contemporary debates, particularly those involving Ethiopia and its neighbors, the provision is sometimes misrepresented as conferring a legal entitlement to designated coastal facilities. This is a fundamental misreading of international law.

International law does not operate through imposition. It functions as a system of balance, designed to reconcile competing sovereign interests through mutual agreement. UNCLOS exemplifies this equilibrium, especially in its treatment of relations between landlocked and coastal states. Crucially, any discussion of transit rights under Article 125 presupposes an explicit and unconditional recognition of the coastal state’s full sovereignty over its ports, infrastructure, and territory.

As Attorney Yoel Kidanemariam has stated, “The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), actively invoked by Ethiopia, stands as one of the clearest expressions of that balance, particularly in its treatment of landlocked and coastal states.” His emphasis on balance is not rhetorical flourish; it reflects the structural design of the Convention itself. Article 125 guarantees access to and from the sea for landlocked states but it does so “by agreement between the States concerned.” That phrase is neither incidental nor procedural. It is foundational. It affirms that maritime access is realized through consent, not entitlement. It ensures opportunity without eroding sovereignty.

International law recognizes the economic reality that landlocked states require maritime access to participate fully in global trade. At the same time, it affirms that coastal states retain exclusive sovereignty over their territory, ports, infrastructure, and territorial waters. The bridge between these principles is agreement. Without consent, there is no automatic right to a specific port. Article 125 does not authorize unilateral designation. It does not mandate negotiation absent willingness. It does not override territorial jurisdiction. Instead, it establishes a cooperative model in which access is achieved through structured arrangements often involving alternative ports and diversified transit corridors.

Understanding this distinction is essential in discussions concerning Ethiopia’s maritime interests. Ethiopia, as a landlocked state, has legitimate economic incentives to secure reliable and cost effective sea access. International law protects its ability to pursue such arrangements. But protection of opportunity does not translate into entitlement to a particular Eritrean port, including Assab. Nothing in UNCLOS grants a landlocked state the authority to compel a neighboring coastal state to open specific infrastructure. The Convention guarantees access through peaceful agreement; it does not create unilateral expectations.

The existence of alternative ports and transit corridors is not a peripheral consideration; it is central to the legal architecture. Maritime access may be realized through different neighboring states, multiple corridors, and diversified commercial partnerships. Where alternatives exist, the Convention’s objectives are satisfied without compelling any single coastal state to relinquish sovereign discretion. Ethiopia has chosen that route in 1998 and still has that alternative choice. The flexibility embedded within Article 125 ensures that landlocked states are protected from exclusion while coastal states are protected from compulsion.

Global practice illustrates this principle with remarkable consistency. Switzerland, despite lacking direct sea access, maintains robust global trade networks through cooperative agreements with neighboring coastal states such as Germany and Netherlands. Swiss commerce flows through facilities including the Port of Rotterdam under treaty frameworks and commercial contracts. Switzerland does not assert unilateral entitlement to a chosen port; it operates within negotiated systems grounded in reciprocity and diversified access. Similarly, Austria secures maritime trade routes along the Danube corridor and through neighboring ports by agreement. Nepal relies on structured transit arrangements with India to reach seaports. In southern Africa, Zambia utilizes corridors through Tanzania, including access to the Port of Dar es Salaam, under formal agreements. Across continents, the pattern is identical: access exists because sovereign states agree to it, and because alternative routes provide practical flexibility.

Economic logic reinforces the legal structure. In international commerce, states seek competitive advantage, cost efficiency, and logistical reliability. Ethiopia may diversify its maritime routes and negotiate favorable port arrangements. That is ordinary economic diplomacy. Yet Eritrea possesses the same sovereign latitude. As a coastal state, Eritrea retains the authority to determine whether to offer port services, under what terms, and to which partners. Ports represent significant national investments and strategic assets. They involve customs oversight, maritime patrol, environmental regulation, and infrastructure management. Their utilization is not an obligation owed externally; it is a matter of domestic jurisdiction and national interest.

Security considerations further underscore this reality. Ports function as gateways into a nation’s territory. They implicate customs enforcement, border control, and maritime security. International law does not require a state to compromise its security assessments to accommodate another state’s preferences, particularly where political tensions or unresolved disputes exist. Sovereignty encompasses not only economic discretion but the authority to safeguard national integrity.

Article 125 was drafted with these realities in mind. Its language avoids coercion because international law rests upon voluntary compliance and sovereign equality. It does not subordinate coastal states to landlocked states, nor does it permit arbitrary denial of access. Instead, it constructs a cooperative model in which mutual benefit and consent guide arrangements. The requirement of agreement protects both sides: landlocked states gain structured pathways to global trade, while coastal states retain control over how and whether those pathways function within their territory.

The distinction between entitlement and negotiated alternatives is structural rather than semantic. Entitlement implies obligation independent of consent. Negotiated alternatives imply reciprocity, flexibility, and sovereign choice. UNCLOS adopts the latter model. It ensures that access arrangements arise from diplomacy rather than demand. It allows maritime commerce to flourish without destabilizing territorial sovereignty.

In debates surrounding Eritrea’s ports, clarity is therefore indispensable. Eritrea’s coastline along the Red Sea, its territorial waters, and its port infrastructure remain under Eritrean jurisdiction. No international instrument transforms those assets into shared property absent agreement. The broader architecture of international law including the Charter of the United Nations rests upon the principle of sovereign equality. States are juridically equal regardless of size, geography, or economic position. Landlocked status does not diminish sovereignty, but neither does it expand authority over the territory of neighbors.

Economic cooperation remains entirely possible within this framework. Consent does not signify refusal; it signifies choice. Eritrea may determine that certain transit arrangements serve mutual interests and pursue them accordingly. Agreements reached through mutual respect and clear terms are sustainable. Arrangements pursued through pressure or misinterpretation of legal obligations are not. The stability of international trade depends on the predictability of negotiated frameworks and the recognition that sovereignty is the organizing principle of state relations.

Ultimately, the conclusion returns to fundamentals. Article 125 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea guarantees that landlocked states may pursue maritime access, but it does so through agreement and through the availability of alternative routes. It does not create entitlement to a chosen port. It does not mandate negotiations absent consent. It does not override territorial sovereignty. Eritrea controls its ports not in defiance of international law, but in accordance with it. Sovereignty and access are not opposing forces; they are complementary principles carefully balanced within the Convention. Landlocked states are protected from exclusion, and coastal states are protected from compulsion. That equilibrium preserves stability in global trade and diplomacy.

In a rules-based international system, clarity matters. Consent is the foundation of obligation. Alternatives provide flexibility. Sovereignty ensures order. Eritrea’s administration of its ports reflects these enduring principles. Maritime access may be negotiated, alternative corridors may be pursued, and cooperation may flourish, but sovereignty endures.

Conclusion
The legal and structural clarity of Article 125 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea leaves little room for ambiguity. Landlocked states are guaranteed access to the sea, but that guarantee operates through agreement between sovereign equals. It does not create entitlement to a specific port, nor does it impose obligations independent of consent. The Convention was deliberately crafted to reconcile access with sovereignty, not to elevate one at the expense of the other.

As Attorney Yoel Kidanemariam has emphasized, UNCLOS embodies balance in its treatment of landlocked and coastal states. That balance is preserved through negotiated arrangements and the practical availability of alternative ports and transit corridors. Where alternatives exist, the objectives of maritime access can be fulfilled without compelling any single coastal state to surrender authority over its territory or infrastructure.

Eritrea’s control over its ports, including Assab, therefore reflects adherence to international law rather than deviation from it. Sovereignty over ports, coastline, and territorial waters is not a rhetorical assertion but a legally recognized status grounded in territorial integrity and political independence. At the same time, nothing within this framework precludes cooperation. Consent does not foreclose agreement; it ensures that agreement is voluntary, reciprocal, and sustainable.

In the end, the principle is straightforward: access is protected, entitlement is not. International law functions through consent, structured alternatives, and sovereign equality. Eritrea’s administration of its ports demonstrates that maritime access and territorial sovereignty are not conflicting claims but complementary pillars of a rules-based international order.