Final, Binding, and Settled:The Eritrea – Ethiopia Boundary Is Not Up for Re – Litigation

by David Yeh

Lately some Ethiopia’s Potemkin Party media foot soldiers’ argument rests on several misunderstandings of the Algiers Agreement, the EEBC mandate, and basic principles of state succession. Let’s address them one by one.

1. The EEBC’s decision is final and binding full stop
   Article 4(15) of the Algiers Agreement leaves no room for ambiguity. Ethiopia and Eritrea expressly agreed that “the delimitation and demarcation determinations of the Commission shall be final and binding.” Unlike arbitral awards that await separate ratification, this clause established automatic, unconditional, and immediate legal finality upon issuance of the EEBC’s decisions.
   
   Efforts by political elites to invent exceptions or implied caveats—none of which appear in the treaty text—cannot override the explicit consent both states gave. Nowhere does the Agreement say that the EEBC’s decisions are “final and binding within certain limits,” or “subject to later political negotiations,” or “contingent on a future cession treaty.” The mandate was clear, the terms were accepted, and the outcome was legally definitive.
   
   Both parties bound themselves in advance to accept the Commission’s determinations in their entirety. That commitment cannot be rewritten after the fact.

2. The EEBC did delimit the entire border, including the Eastern Sector
The claim that the Commission “stopped 60 km from the coast” ignores the basic distinction between territorial seas and land boundaries: The EEBC was mandated to delimit the land boundary, and it completed that duty. Land boundaries naturally terminate at the coastline. The Commission was not asked to delimit a maritime boundary because Ethiopia is not a coastal state after 1993; there was no maritime boundary to draw. Therefore, the absence of maritime delimitation is not a “gap” or “deliberate withholding”; it is a reflection of the geographic reality created by Eritrea’s internationally recognized independence in 1993.

3. “No physical pillars were erected” is irrelevant
Demarcation is a technical process. In international boundary law, the distinction is clear: delimitation is the legal determination of a boundary on a map, while demarcation is the physical marking of that already-established line on the ground. The Eritrea–Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC) completed delimitation and demarcation (virtual) in full. The legal boundary therefore exists and is binding irrespective of whether physical pillars have been placed.

This principle is universally recognized, as affirmed in the ICJ’s Burkina Faso v. Niger and Cameroon v. Nigeria decisions: the absence, imperfection, or delay of demarcation pillars does not alter the legal force of a delimited boundary. The line exists in law—and that is what determines sovereignty.

After completing its virtual demarcation, the EEBC declared unequivocally that “the boundary will automatically stand as demarcated by the boundary points listed in the Annex hereto, and the mandate of the Commission can then be regarded as fulfilled.” In other words, the coordinates were issued, as of November 30, 2007, the border became legally and finally demarcated. Ethiopia after 16 years of excuses, finally reaffirmed this obligation when Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali signed the Asmara Declaration in July 2018 and the Jeddah Agreement in September 2018, both of which commit Ethiopia to the full and unconditional implementation of the EEBC’s final and binding demarcated boundary, without qualifications, preconditions, or renegotiation.

Below are the coordinates of the demarcation of the Eastern Sector of the Eritrea-Ethiopia border governed by the 1908 colonial border treaty.

Moreover, the coordinates for the demarcation pillars have already been finalized. Although physical markers are useful, they are not legally necessary, and in the age of modern GPS technology, pinpointing the exact boundary requires no specialized expertise. A location that once required a professional surveyor can now be identified with precision by anyone carrying a standard smartphone.

4. The 2007 PCA Notice did not “terminate the process” it concluded it
The Permanent Court of Arbitration stated that: The Commission completed its mandate, The boundary legally exists, The Commission was closing its files, and This was not an admission of impotence. It was the formal conclusion of a completed process. Ethiopia’s refusal to implement demarcation does not erase the Commission’s work.

5. The claim that Ethiopia retains some “historic coastal entitlement” is legally baseless
Your argument assumes that Ethiopia somehow inherited: rights under UNGA Resolution 390(V) (1950), and access entitlements under Article 125 of UNCLOS, and treaty continuity under the 1978 Vienna Convention on Succession of States. Each of these is misrepresented.
A) UNGA Resolution 390(V)
This resolution created a federation, not a perpetual servitude. Federal arrangements are terminated by state dissolution, as recognized by: the UN, the OAU/AU, and Ethiopia itself in 1993.
The dissolution of a federation automatically terminates the federal conditions attached to it. Ethiopia accepted Eritrea’s independence without reserving any rights to coastal territory.
B) Vienna Convention on Succession of States (1978)
The PP ragtags claim Article 34 binds both states. It does not. Ethiopia is not a party to the Convention. Even if it were, Article 34 concerns treaty succession, not territorial rights.
No pre-1993 treaty ever granted Ethiopia sovereignty over Massawa, Assab, or any other coastal territory; it exercised sovereignty as part of a single federated state, not by treaty. One cannot “inherit” sovereignty over the territory of another state.
C) UNCLOS Article 125
This article concerns the right of transit for landlocked states not sovereign access, not territorial claims, and not port ownership. Ethiopia already enjoys: freedom of transit, access through Djibouti, and access through other regional agreements. UNCLOS does not grant Ethiopia any sovereign claim over Eritrean or Djibouti’s territory.

6. Eritrea’s borders were settled in 1993 after reclaiming independence and reaffirmed in 2002 after EEBC’s decision.
The most fundamental point: Eritrea entered the UN as a sovereign state with recognized territory, including its coastline, ports, and territorial sea. Ethiopia never objected. The border dispute process was initiated later and fully resolved by the EEBC. There is no outstanding territorial question regarding Assab or Massawa. Everything else is political rhetoric attempting to reopen a legally settled matter.

To close the case
PP’s argument hinges on: Misreading the Algiers Agreement, Misrepresenting the EEBC mandate, Confusing land and maritime delimitation, Inventing “historic entitlements” not rooted in international law, Misapplying the Vienna Convention and UNCLOS, and Attempting to revive a UNGA resolution tied to a federation that no longer exists. The legal position is straightforward: The EEBC border is final and binding. Eritrea’s sovereignty over its coastline is not in question. No instrument or doctrine gives Ethiopia a right to Assab, Massawa, or any other coastal territory.

Case closed, Everything else is noise.