From Peace Laureate to Provocateur: The Bipolar Oratory of Abiy Ahmed on Eritrea

By B. Tekle

Executive Summary: The Paradox of Peace and War

The tenure of Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has been characterized by dramatic and contradictory policy shifts toward the State of Eritrea, manifesting as a high degree of geopolitical volatility. In 2019, Abiy Ahmed received the Nobel Peace Prize largely on the strength of his commitment to fully implement the 2000 Algiers Agreement, thereby ending two decades of “no war, no peace” with Eritrea. This action signaled a commitment to international law and regional stability. However, the period between 2023 and 2025 has seen a profound and rapid strategic reversal, wherein the same leader has adopted aggressive irredentist rhetoric, asserting an “irreversible” claim to the Red Sea coastline and implicitly threatening the sovereignty of Eritrea, particularly concerning the strategic port of Assab.

By condemning the very EPRDF government that brought him to power for making peace with Eritrea in 1991 and for recognizing the colonial treaty borders that define Eritrea, borders upon which the sovereignty of 53 African nations, including Ethiopia itself, rests and which remain a cornerstone of African unity, Abiy Ahmed is now openly threatening the use of force to reoccupy Eritrea in pursuit of access to ports. Citing 19th-century warlords as justification, Abiy claims that Eritrea and its coastline are Ethiopia’s natural territory, despite the historical record showing that neither Ethiopia nor its predecessor, Abyssinia, exercised control over the lands or coastline of present-day Eritrea after the fall of Axum in the seventh century CE.

This analytical report uses the term “apparent bipolar tendencies” to describe this high-risk oscillation between adherence to international treaties and politically motivated nationalist expansionism. The policy reversal is not merely a change in diplomatic approach; it represents a fundamental re-framing of Ethiopia’s national interests, driven by severe domestic pressures and failed post-conflict regional strategies.

The swift strategic reversal under Abiy Ahmed risks eroding the considerable diplomatic capital Ethiopia accrued in 2018. When a nation pivots from honoring international commitments to promoting expansionism that violates core regional principles (such as the sovereignty enshrined in the African Union Constitutive Act), international partners inevitably view that nation’s foreign policy as inherently volatile and unreliable. This lack of institutional trust significantly complicates any future efforts toward regional mediation or conflict resolution. Furthermore, the escalation has shifted the nature of the conflict entirely. It is no longer a technical dispute over the demarcation of the border (Badme), which was the cause of the 1998–2000 war, but a challenge to the fundamental sovereignty of Eritrea’s coastline. By characterizing its landlocked status as an “existential question”, Ethiopia has drastically elevated the stakes from a boundary disagreement to a conflict potentially threatening Eritrea’s national existence, which dramatically increases the likelihood of external regional actors intervening to balance the power structure. This strategic inconsistency threatens to collapse the fragile 2018 peace framework and reignite a devastating regional conflict.

Contextual Foundations: The Legal and Historical Nexus

Understanding the magnitude of Abiy Ahmed’s policy shift requires establishing the precise legal and historical parameters set by the foundational peace agreement between the two nations.

The Algiers Mandate and Legal Cornerstone

The armed conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia, which began in May 1998, was formally terminated by the Algiers Agreement, concluded on December 12, 2000. This agreement, mediated by the UN, the OAU, the EU, the USA and others, established the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC). The EEBC was mandated to delimit and demarcate the colonial treaty border based on pertinent colonial treaties (1900, 1902, and 1908) and applicable international law.

Crucially, in Article 4(1) of the Algiers Agreement, the Parties reaffirmed the fundamental principle of respect for the borders existing at independence, as established by the 1964 OAU Summit in Cairo—the principle of uti possidetis. This principle stipulates that post-colonial states must accept the borders inherited from the colonial era. The agreement is recognized as a “constitutional instrument” whose manifest objective was to bring the border dispute to a definitive end at the earliest possible date. The commitment to respecting the border, as determined, and the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the other party was non-negotiable.

The EEBC Decision and Virtual Demarcation

The EEBC issued its unanimous delimitation decision on April 13, 2002. This verdict, which famously attributed the contested town of Badme to Eritrea, was promptly rejected by the Ethiopian government at the time as “totally unjust”. This rejection paralyzed the second phase of the mandate—physical demarcation—for several years. Faced with Ethiopia’s sustained non-cooperation, the EEBC issued a final statement, dissolving itself in November 2007. The commission formally determined that the boundary would automatically stand as demarcated by the boundary points listed in the annex to its statement, meaning the established coordinates and map constituted the “only valid legal description of the boundary”.

The previous Ethiopian government’s 16-year delay (2002–2018) in implementing the final and binding EEBC decision created the political opportunity for future revisionism. Abiy Ahmed’s initial 2018 commitment was a direct, albeit temporary, repudiation of this long-standing TPLF-era rejection. When Abiy came to power, Ethiopia’s border was already legally fixed and defined under international law, and the country’s landlocked status was the recognized, internationally accepted consequence of Eritrea’s independence in 1993 and the binding Algiers Agreement framework (2000/2007).

Abiy’s subsequent rhetoric has deliberately blurred two distinct issues: Eritrea’s internationally recognized independence, which rendered Ethiopia landlocked, and the Eritrea–Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC) demarcation, which defined the precise border between the two countries. By framing the matter as an “existential” loss of sea access, he has shifted the focus from Badme, a border dispute legally settled by the EEBC, to Assab, a sovereignty issue that was never contested under the Algiers Agreement or in Ethiopia’s three formal submissions to the EEBC: the Memorial (June 30, 2001), the Counter-Memorial (September 22, 2001), the Reply (October 29, 2001) or the EEBC Hearings held at the Peace Palace in The Hague from 10 through 21, December 2001.

In reality, the Ethiopian government delayed the demarcation process in the western and central sectors but never objected to the eastern sector, and it explicitly authorized the EEBC to proceed with demarcation based on the 1908 treaty. Abiy’s current narrative seeks to undo these binding commitments by reinterpreting them through a nationalist and historical lens. By claiming that Ethiopia’s landlocked status was imposed without any “official record” or public consent, he attempts to delegitimize the legal foundation of Eritrea’s sovereignty over Assab—a calculated political step toward rationalizing future annexation efforts.

Phase I: The Rhetoric of Rapprochement (2018)

Upon assuming power, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed launched a major diplomatic initiative that represented a clear break from the previous government’s policy of non-compliance. This initial phase established the benchmark for cooperation and stability that has now been abandoned.

Unconditional Compliance and Peace Leadership

The Prime Minister explicitly and implicitly chastised the previous regime for failing to uphold the agreement, noting that the long-standing stalemate had severely hampered regional growth and national stability. In June 2018, Abiy Ahmed’s government publicly announced its readiness to “fully accept the December 12, 2000, Algiers Agreement, a peace agreement between the governments of Eritrea and Ethiopia, which established a special boundary commission.” This statement provided the foundation for the historic peace deal signed later that year with Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki in Asmara and two months later in Jeddah. In September of 2018, Abiy, before UN, AU, Saudi and UAE officials signed, the Jeddah Agreement that had specifically stated “The two countries [Eritrea and Ethiopia] will implement the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission decision.”

His actions were hailed as a major step toward restoring international law and regional diplomatic credibility. The initial rhetoric consistently centered on diplomacy, regional cooperation, and mutual prosperity, signaling a commitment to respecting Eritrea’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. These efforts were recognized globally, culminating in the award of the 2019 Nobel Peace Prize.

The Transactional Nature of the Peace

The peace was initially met with optimism on the Eritrean side, rooted in a genuine desire for a long-lasting peace and stability after decades of “no war, no peace,” following years of arrested development and suffering post-independence. Eritrea’s motivation was based on achieving durable stability; however, it rapidly became clear that the rapprochement was, for Abiy’s government, transactional in nature and driven by short-term political expediency. Abiy gained international legitimacy and neutralized a major external threat (Eritrea) at a critical time when he was facing a domestic power struggle, particularly against the TPLF. However, it became apparent to the Eritrean leadership that Abiy’s approach was fundamentally transactional, extending far beyond economic cooperation to demands for outright ownership or control over the strategic port of Assab, which Eritrea considered a non-negotiable threat to its national sovereignty. This was demonstrated when Eritrea declined proposals, including the offer of a 30% share of Ethiopian Airlines in exchange for the Assab port, confirming the irreconcilable difference between economic cooperation and territorial demand. When this alliance ultimately failed to deliver the long-term, desired outcome—specifically, assured access to or control over the Assab port—the transactional relationship dissolved, enabling the subsequent pivot back to aggressive antagonism.

Phase II: The Great Pivot to Irredentism (2023-2025)

Starting in late 2023, Abiy Ahmed initiated a dramatic reversal of the 2018 policy, replacing the rhetoric of peace and legal compliance with expansionist demands, thereby directly challenging the sovereignty he once vowed to uphold.

The Rhetoric of ‘Irreversibility’ and the Legal Vacuum

By October 2023, Prime Minister Abiy fundamentally altered the geopolitical narrative by asserting that access to the sea is a matter of “existence” and “survival” for Ethiopia’s expanding population, which now exceeds 130 million people. He characterized Ethiopia’s pursuit of Red Sea access as “irreversible” and something that “cannot be disregarded”.

To create a political and historical justification for this shift, Abiy explicitly challenged the legal integrity of the process by which Ethiopia became landlocked. He stated that there is “no official record or institutional decision” documenting how Ethiopia lost access to the Red Sea, adding, “If the people did not know, the parliament did not know, and the cabinet did not know — who, then, made the decision that stripped Ethiopia of its access to the sea?”. This claim completely disregards Eritrea’s three decades of internationally recognized sovereignty, achieved through the liberation of its territory and cemented by the 1993 referendum where 99.8% of Eritreans voted for independence. This rhetorical maneuver, often repeated in Amharic speeches to the parliament, implies that Eritrea’s full sovereignty over its coastline is based on an illegitimate, non-consultative decision made by a previous, unrepresentative Ethiopian elite.

The Targeting of Assab and Failed Deals

The focus of this expansionist push is unambiguously the strategic Assab Port, located in Eritrea’s southern Red Sea region, a critical flashpoint that Eritrea views as a direct threat to its sovereignty.

Evidence suggests that immediately following the 2018 peace deal, Ethiopia engaged in a series of efforts designed to leverage cooperation into control. Ethiopia renovated the road connecting its border to Assab, offered to extend electric power to Eritrea at its own expense, and sent construction machinery, including cranes and generators, to assist in making the port functional. However, the Eritrean side “showed no willingness” to advance cooperation under these terms. In a stunning revelation, Abiy disclosed that he even proposed giving Eritrea a 30% share of Ethiopian Airlines in exchange for access or ownership rights over the Assab port—a proposal Eritrea quickly declined.

The failure of these economic and diplomatic levers forced Abiy to resort to historical revisionism as justification. He argued publicly that the Red Sea is Ethiopia’s “natural boundary,” citing disputed historical evidence, including references to the words of the 19th century warlord, Ras Alula Aba Nega (who had never set foot on the Red Sea coast), and the extent of the Axumite Kingdom’s historical control. Critics of this policy, however, argue that such claims are built on contested historical myth, characterizing them as “pure historical fiction” and “irresponsible warmongering” designed to provide moral and political license for potential aggression. The Prime Minister himself revealed that his core geopolitical perspective on Assab had been clearly outlined in his 2023 book, Yemedemer Tiwild (የመደመር ትውልድ), and shared with the Eritrean leadership. Eritrea’s rejection of all proposals indicates that Asmara clearly understood the transactional, long-term objective embedded within the 2018 alliance, and refused to compromise its sovereignty, thereby compelling Abiy to revert to a position of open threat.

Contradictory Messaging: Peace vs. Force

The expansionist campaign is marked by a deep contradiction in tone. On one hand, Prime Minister Abiy insists he seeks a “peaceful solution” and has called for international mediation from powerful global bodies and states, including the African Union, the United States, China, Russia, and the European Union. This diplomatic appeal appears to serve as a mechanism of political coercion. By seeking international “mediation” while simultaneously labeling the underlying claim “irreversible,” the strategy is to leverage external powers to pressure Eritrea into violating its own sovereignty rather than genuinely seeking a compromise solution.

On the other hand, this diplomatic mask is severely undercut by menacing rhetoric. Abiy warned that the demand must be met “peacefully or otherwise”, and publicly stated to the House of People’s Representatives that if conflict were to erupt with Eritrea, “the result would be unambiguous,” asserting Ethiopia’s capabilities and assuring that no one could stop the country. Such statements are viewed by Eritrea as a direct threat to invade and seize its port.

The following table summarizes the radical nature of this strategic and rhetorical reversal:

Table 1: Policy Stance and Rhetorical Shift (2018 vs. 2023-2025)

Policy Axis	Phase I: 2018 (Rapprochement/Peace Laureate)	Phase II: 2023-2025 (Irredentist/Expansionist)
Border Status	Full acceptance and implementation of the Algiers Agreement/EEBC delimitation, respecting Eritrea’s colonial borders and sovereignty.	Claiming Ethiopia’s sea access is “irreversible”; Questioning the legal basis of Eritrea’s independence and Ethiopia’s landlocked status.
Target Territory	Focusing on demarcation of the established border (Badme).	Explicitly targeting the sovereign Eritrean coastline, specifically Assab Port.
Rhetoric	Chastising Ethiopian parliament/officials for past failure to comply with international law and border ruling.	Utilizing nationalist, historical revisionist, and existential language (“matter of survival,” “natural boundary of Ethiopia”).
Methods	Diplomacy, economic cooperation, peace treaty adherence (Nobel Prize awarded).	Calling for mediation, but simultaneously warning of “unambiguous” consequences, asserting demands will be met “peacefully or by force.”

Abiy’s use of the river-sharing analogy, in which he questioned why Ethiopia—a country whose rivers, such as the Blue Nile to Sudan and Egypt, and the Tekeze, which he falsely claims flows into Eritrea—should be “disgraced” for requesting access to the Red Sea, is a potent nationalist appeal but a serious legal distortion. In reality, the Tekeze River does not flow into Eritrea; rather, it joins several small and large rivers whose watersheds are in Eritrea (such as the Mai Tenne, Sittona, and Mai Teb), to form the Setit River which is part of the international Eritrea-Ethiopia border. Not a single drop of the Tekeze enters Eritrean territory.

By invoking this flawed analogy, Abiy attempts to equate the sharing of transboundary rivers, common natural resources governed by international water law, with sovereignty over land and ports, which are exclusive state rights. This rhetorical device reframes a settled question of territorial sovereignty into one of moral entitlement, providing an emotional but unfounded justification for potential aggression against Eritrea.

Analyzing the ‘Bipolar Tendency’: Strategic Inconsistency and Domestic Drivers

The profound shift in Abiy Ahmed’s policy is best understood not as a reflection of personal instability, but as a deliberate strategy of strategic volatility employed to manage simultaneous internal political and economic crises. The inconsistency is a calculated feature of crisis governance, allowing the regime to pivot dramatically to achieve tactical goals.

Internal Political Pressures

The timing of the aggressive irredentist pivot (late 2023) is directly correlated with a severe deterioration of Abiy’s domestic standing. His popularity has plummeted due to ongoing internal conflicts in Tigray (post-war instability), the persistent chaos in Oromia, and significant conflicts in the Amhara region.

The Red Sea push serves as a powerful nationalist distraction designed to divert public attention from these worsening domestic woes and security failures. By presenting the demand for sea access as a historical and “existential question,” the Prime Minister attempts to unify the population behind a single, powerful nationalist cause. This rhetoric of historical wrongs and national survival is explicitly designed to mobilize national support—a cynical strategy used to shore up a “fragile ethnoreligious sectarian regime” facing immense internal dissent.

Geopolitical Miscalculation and Alliance Collapse

The policy reversal is also a consequence of failed regional calculations following the conclusion of the Tigray War. Abiy’s post-war strategy involved seeking total federal control over western Tigray, leveraging hostile Amhara and Afar forces, and relying heavily on the continued antagonistic presence of Eritrea to the north to fully isolate the region. However, the unexpected and recent détente between the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and Eritrea post-2022 fundamentally neutralized Abiy’s regional leverage and left him strategically “cornered”. The subsequent expansionist policy, focused on Assab, is therefore a desperate maneuver to regain the initiative lost through these failed post-war calculations.

The failure to institutionalize peace and stability, relying instead on ad hoc, personalized initiatives, demonstrates the inherent instability of the 2018 peace framework. For Prime Minister Abiy, the peace was transactional, a means to isolate the TPLF and eventually gain control of the Assab port. When this core, transactional objective failed because Eritrea refused to compromise its sovereignty for Ethiopia’s benefit, Abiy’s policy instantly reverted to antagonism, proving that the entire peace structure was built on his unmet expectations rather than stable institutional mechanisms and Eritrea’s genuine desire for long-term stability.

The consistent policy flip-flop (the observed volatility) allows the government to align with whomever is politically expedient at the time—moving from an an alliance with Eritrea against the TPLF (2018-2022) to a position of antagonism fueled by Amhara/Oromo nationalist narratives against Eritrea (2023-2025). The central goal remains the pursuit of national consolidation and economic necessity, justifying any means necessary. External factors have further emboldened this shift; sources suggest that the United Arab Emirates (UAE) is acting as a key “enabler” of Abiy’s ambitions, backing Ethiopia as its Red Sea proxy, adding an external layer of support to the aggressive geopolitical posture.

Table 2: Key Contradictions and Drivers

Policy Axis	Evidence of Contradiction	Primary Geopolitical/Domestic Driver
Law vs. History	Adhered to the EEBC’s legally binding coordinates in 2018; Later claimed landlocked status resulted from an unrecorded, illegal historical act.	Justifying a breach of international treaty obligations using populist historical narratives to mobilize support.
Alliance vs. Aggression	Allied with Eritrea against TPLF (2020-2022); Pivot to threatening invasion of Eritrea (2023-2025).	Failed post-Tigray War leverage; Eritrea’s refusal to cede Assab port after the alliance dissolved.
Peace vs. Conflict	Received Nobel Peace Prize for ending the war with Eritrea; Now escalating military tensions and openly threatening conflict outcome.	Desperate need to divert public attention from severe domestic crises (Tigray aftermath, Oromia, Amhara).
Reciprocity vs. Sovereignty	Claimed the right to Assab based on “shared” river water flow; Refused to accept Eritrea’s sovereign right to its coastline.	Economic necessity (reliance on Djibouti) framed as moral and existential right to secure a port.

Geopolitical Implications and Risk Assessment

The aggressive push for Red Sea access carries immediate, severe geopolitical risks, fundamentally destabilizing the Horn of Africa.

Violating International Law and Sovereignty

Abiy Ahmed’s explicit threats to invade Eritrea, seize its port of Assab, or otherwise acquire coastline ownership constitute a flagrant violation of the most fundamental principles of international relations. Such actions contravene the prohibition on the threat or use of force stipulated in the UN Charter, the territorial integrity enshrined in the AU Constitutive Act, and the core tenets of the 2018 Joint Declaration of Peace and Friendship.

Ethiopia’s pursuit of Assab sets a highly dangerous precedent for the entire region by challenging the principle of uti possidetis. If a major regional power can successfully challenge a fixed, internationally recognized border and established sovereignty based solely on alleged economic “existence,” it fundamentally undermines the legal architecture stabilizing Africa’s post-colonial geography.

The Asymmetry of Stakes and Risk of Conflict

The current trajectory marks a dangerous shift from diplomatic “bluffing and brinkmanship into a shooting war”. The heightened rhetoric, coupled with the Prime Minister’s public confidence that any military outcome would be “unambiguous”, dramatically increases the probability of miscalculation.

The stakes are fundamentally asymmetrical: for Ethiopia, the acquisition of Assab is framed as an economic necessity crucial for the survival of its massive population. For Eritrea, preventing the annexation of Assab is literally a matter of preserving the core of its sovereignty and independence, as Assab is recognized as a vital strategic asset. This asymmetry ensures that Eritrea has zero political room for compromise on ownership or control. Ethiopia’s offer of a 30% airline share for Assab, for example, failed because it treated sovereign territory as a financial asset, fundamentally failing to recognize Eritrea’s non-negotiable priority. The inability of Ethiopia to renounce claims on Assab ensures that the port remains “the forever tension, the forever risk for conflict”.

Moreover, the risk of external intervention is high. Eritrea is already preparing defenses and is expected to seek support. Analysts have pointed specifically to the cautionary tale of Abiy’s earlier Memorandum of Understanding with Somaliland, which collapsed when Egypt intervened and asserted its commitment to defend Somalia’s territorial integrity. It is widely anticipated that Egypt, prioritizing stability along the Red Sea corridor and concerned about Ethiopian expansionism, would likely support Eritrea to defend Assab, dramatically raising the scale of a potential conflict. The current push risks reigniting a devastating regional conflict reminiscent of the 1998–2000 border war that killed tens of thousands.

Conclusion: A Volatile Future for the Horn

The analysis of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s policy trajectory reveals a dangerous pattern of strategic inconsistency driven by the clash between overwhelming domestic necessity and fixed international legal reality. The leader, once celebrated as a peace laureate for committing to international law and respecting the Algiers Agreement boundary, has fundamentally inverted his policy, evolving into the primary regional aggressor by prioritizing expansionist national ambitions over treaty obligations.

The “apparent bipolar tendencies” observed in Ethiopia’s policy—the rapid oscillation between compliance and irredentism—are not random. They are a manifestation of a regime attempting to manage profound internal crises (ethnic conflicts, instability, economic desperation) by generating external nationalist momentum. This strategy, however, has alienated key allies, provoked a sovereign nation (Eritrea), and forfeited the international goodwill earned in 2018.

The shift from seeking mere economic access to demanding territorial ownership of Assab has converted a border dispute into an existential regional crisis. This strategic volatility has eliminated the possibility of genuine diplomatic resolution, as Eritrea cannot, and will not, negotiate away its sovereignty. Having exhausted peaceful diplomatic options and failed to achieve its objectives through economic leverage, the Ethiopian government’s insistent, often menacing, rhetoric leaves military coercion as the increasingly probable, albeit catastrophic, last resort. This unstable trajectory signals a period of heightened insecurity and potential conflict for the entire Horn of Africa.