From Principle to Practice: Why Eritrea Controls Its Ports

International law balances landlocked access with coastal sovereignty—Article 125 enshrines consent, not entitlement

By Alula Frezghi

The legal regime governing access to the sea for landlocked states is settled in treaty law. It is codified in Part X of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), specifically Article 125. Properly interpreted, that provision affirms two co-equal principles: facilitation of access for landlocked states and the preservation of the territorial sovereignty of coastal states. It does not create an automatic right to port use, nor does it authorize unilateral demand.

Article 125(1) recognizes that landlocked states “shall have the right of access to and from the sea” for the purpose of exercising the freedoms of the high seas and other lawful uses of the oceans. That clause establishes the normative objective of access. However, the mechanism for implementation appears in Article 125(2): transit “shall be exercised on terms agreed between the land-locked States and transit States concerned through bilateral, subregional or regional agreements.” Article 125(3) further provides that transit states retain full sovereignty over their territory and may adopt measures necessary to protect their legitimate interests.

Read as a whole, the structure is deliberate. Access is acknowledged as a legal interest; execution depends on consent. The Convention does not create a self-executing entitlement to specific ports, routes, or facilities. It requires agreement.

This distinction is decisive in assessing claims regarding Eritrean ports. Ethiopia, as a landlocked state, is fully entitled under UNCLOS to seek negotiated transit arrangements. But the Convention does not empower it to designate a preferred coastal outlet, to dictate commercial terms, or to override the sovereign discretion of a coastal neighbor. There is no compulsory allocation mechanism and no servitude imposed on coastal infrastructure by virtue of another state’s geography.

International practice confirms this interpretation. Transit corridors and port facilities used by landlocked states worldwide operate pursuant to negotiated treaties, memoranda of understanding, and commercial contracts. They reflect reciprocal economic interest, not unilateral legal entitlement. Part X of UNCLOS codifies and stabilizes this practice; it does not displace it.

The preservation of sovereignty within Article 125 must also be understood against the broader architecture of international law. The principle of sovereign equality, affirmed in Article 2(1) of the Charter of the United Nations, establishes that no state may subordinate the territorial authority of another absent clear and express legal obligation. Nothing in UNCLOS creates such an obligation with respect to port access. The Convention encourages cooperation but conditions implementation on agreement.

Accordingly, Eritrea retains full jurisdiction over its ports, territorial sea, and associated infrastructure. Decisions regarding access to Assab or any other Eritrean facility fall within its sovereign competence. Eritrea may negotiate, set conditions, pursue reciprocal arrangements, or decline to enter into particular frameworks. That discretion is not hostility; it is sovereignty as recognized by treaty law.

At the same time, UNCLOS does not isolate landlocked states. It provides a legal avenue for access through negotiation and good-faith engagement. Ethiopia retains broad commercial options consistent with this structure: diversification of transit routes, regional trade agreements, and competitive port arrangements elsewhere. The Convention facilitates these outcomes by providing a legal basis for structured cooperation. It does not authorize unilateral preference or political pressure as substitutes for agreement.

Interpretation principles reinforce this conclusion. Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, treaty provisions must be read in good faith according to their ordinary meaning in context and in light of their object and purpose. The ordinary meaning of “on terms agreed” is unequivocal: agreement is a precondition. The object and purpose of UNCLOS include both facilitating maritime commerce and safeguarding coastal state sovereignty. An interpretation that converts the right of access into a compulsory right to specific port usage would upset that equilibrium and contradict the text.

The legal position is therefore neither maximalist nor rhetorical. Article 125 establishes a balanced regime: access through consent, transit through agreement, sovereignty preserved. It does not create automatic entitlement to particular infrastructure, nor does it impose an obligation on a coastal state to grant facilities absent mutually accepted terms.

In this framework, the governing rule is straightforward. Landlocked states possess a treaty-recognized right to seek access. Coastal states retain the sovereign authority to determine whether, and on what conditions, such access is structured. The bridge between the two is mutual consent.

Where consent exists, access is lawful and secure. Where it does not, no enforceable claim arises under UNCLOS. Sovereign discretion remains intact.

That is the architecture of Part X of the Convention. It reflects equilibrium, not hierarchy and it leaves the ultimate decision in the hands of the coastal state concerned.