Operation Fenkil: The Beginning of the End for Ethiopian Occupation in Eritrea

by Adulytes, from (February 8, 2025)

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Introduction 

On February 10, 1990, Operation Fenkil delivered a crushing blow to Ethiopia’s military occupation, liberating the strategic port city of Massawa and setting the stage for Eritrea’s final victory. Just over a year later, on May 24, 1991, Eritrea would achieve total independence, permanently breaking free from Ethiopia’s illegal annexation.

The name Fenkil, ፈንቅል meaning “uproot” in Tigrinya, was a fitting symbol for the operation. It did not just reclaim Massawa, it uprooted Ethiopian proxy colonial rule, shattered the Derg’s military stronghold, and dismantled the myth of Ethiopian control over Eritrean land and sea. More than just a military triumph, Operation Fenkil was the embodiment of Eritrea’s unwavering resistance against oppression. Eritreans do not surrender; they fight, they endure, and they win.

Massawa’s liberation was not a mere territorial victory. It was the definitive proof that Ethiopia’s claim to the Red Sea was an illusion, one that was erased in just 59 hours by the disciplined and battle-hardened forces of the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF). From the trenches of Nakfa, to the stunning victory at Afabet, to the decisive strike at Massawa, Eritrean history has consistently taught a single lesson: invaders are not reasoned with; they are buried.

Operation Fenkil was not just a battle; it was a defining moment in Eritrean history, a triumph of will over firepower, of strategy over brute force. The liberation of Massawa cut off Ethiopia’s last remaining supply line to Asmara through the Red Sea, dealing a fatal blow to the Derg regime. The psychological impact of this victory shattered Ethiopian morale, accelerating the total collapse of Mengistu Haile Mariam’s government just over a year later.

Massawa was not given; it was taken by blood and sacrifice. It was not a matter of negotiation; it was a matter of victory. Eritrea’s sovereignty, forged in fire and cemented by the courage of its fighters, remains unshakable.

Ethiopia’s leaders, past, present, and future, should remember the lesson of Fenkil: Eritrea’s ports were never Ethiopia’s to lose, and they will never be Ethiopia’s to take. Those who dare challenge this truth will meet the same fate as the Derg, defeated, humiliated, and erased by history.

Breaking the Chains of Colonialism

Massawa, one of the most vital ports on the Red Sea, had long been a target for colonial and imperial ambitions, from the Ottomans and Italians to the British and Ethiopians. When Emperor Haile Selassie annexed Eritrea in 1962, Ethiopia claimed Massawa as its own, attempting to rewrite history. However, the people of Eritrea refused to accept colonial rule and waged a thirty-year armed struggle to reclaim their land.

Operation Fenkil was the decisive moment that severed Ethiopia’s grip on Eritrea’s coastline. In 1977, the Ethiopian army in Massawa narrowly escaped defeat under the hands of the EPLF, thanks to the intervention of the Soviet Union and its navy. By 1990, the EPLF was resolute in ensuring that the events of 1977 at Salina (the salt fields of Massawa) would not be repeated. The Ethiopian army, long believed to be Africa’s strongest and backed by Soviet firepower and Western diplomatic support, was humiliated in Operation Fenkil. Over 18,000 Ethiopian soldiers were either killed or captured as their defenses crumbled. Massawa’s liberation crushed Ethiopia’s colonial ambitions, proving once and for all that Eritrea was not a land to be conquered.

Massawa’s liberation was more than a military victory; it was a death knell for the Derg regime. By capturing Massawa, the EPLF cut off Ethiopia’s last major supply route to Asmara, choking off the Derg’s ability to reinforce its forces in Eritrea. Ethiopia had relied on Massawa for trade and military logistics, but with its fall, the Derg was left isolated and weakened.

Beyond its military and economic implications, the fall of Massawa delivered a devastating psychological blow to Ethiopia. For the first time, the Derg realized its defeat was inevitable and its days were numbered. The victory at Massawa accelerated the collapse of Mengistu Haile Mariam’s government, which would crumble just over a year later. The message was clear: Eritrea’s ports were never Ethiopia’s, and they would never be.

Massawa was not handed to Eritrea; it was won through the blood and sacrifice of its fighters. Every square inch of land was paid for in martyrdom, ensuring that no foreign power would ever again set foot on Eritrean soil without facing dire consequences. The thousands of heroic Eritrean sons and daughters who fell before, during Operation Fenkil, at the Ghindae Front, and in subsequent battles cemented Eritrea’s sovereignty with their lives.

Ethiopia’s leaders, past and present, should remember the fate of those who tried to seize Eritrean land and sea. If history did not teach them in 1961-1991, in 1998-2000, and again in 2020-2022, then any future attempt will only end in another crushing defeat. The ghosts of Nadew, Fenkil, Badma, Egri Mekhel, Adi Begio, and Bure, still haunt Ethiopia, whispering a clear warning: Eritrea does not bow, does not surrender, it fights, it wins, and it keeps what is rightfully its own.

Overview of Ethiopia’s Fortification of Massawa

Understanding Massawa’s strategic importance, Ethiopia’s 606 Corps was tasked to defending it. To this end it had transformed the city into a military fortress with three layers of defense. The corps consisted of three divisions—the 22nd, 10th, and 6th—comprising 14 infantry brigades reinforced by mechanized units. 

1. The 6th Division comprised five infantry brigades (500, 83, 113, 112, and 21), reinforced by the 66th Tank Battalion, which was equipped with 12 tanks. Additionally, it was supported by the 67th Artillery Battalion, armed with eleven 122mm artillery guns, and the 68th Anti-Aircraft Battalion, which operated five 37mm guns and four 23mm guns.
2. The 44th Tank Brigade was equipped with 61 tanks, twelve 122mm artillery guns, twenty 57mm artillery guns, and 75 additional heavy weapons.
3. The 302nd Motorized Brigade operated eight heavy guns, four anti-tank missiles, 151 Bren guns, and 1,288 light arms.
4. The 106th Tank Battalion was armed with 11 tanks.
5. The 92nd BM Battery Unit and the 262nd BM Battery Unit were each equipped with four BM rocket launchers.

Beyond the forces within the 606 Corps, several additional units operated under the direct command of the 2nd Revolutionary Army:

• The Zeray Derese 29th Mechanized Brigade, stationed at Gahtielay and Mai Wuuy, was equipped with 14 tanks, seven 85mm artillery guns, and five additional heavy weapons.
• The 27th Mechanized Brigade, responsible for defending Massawa and Foro, was armed with 68 different kinds of tanks, and eight 85mm artillery guns.
• Two brigades from the 3rd Mechanized Division were positioned at Dogali.
• Two brigades from the 106th Mechanized Division were stationed in Asmara as reserve forces.
• The Ethiopian Navy, with a force of 3,000 personnel, operated seven squadrons consisting of 30 large and small warships.
• The Ethiopian Air Force, based in Asmara and Debre Zeit, was equipped with a fleet of Soviet-supplied MiG fighter jets and attack helicopters.

In total, Ethiopia’s military arsenal included about 150 tanks, seventy 130mm and 122mm artillery guns, numerous BM rocket launchers, anti-tank missiles, anti-aircraft guns, and a total force exceeding 25,000 troops.

The Ethiopian army had spent years fortifying Massawa, believing it to be impenetrable. A 100 km-long defensive network, strengthened by concrete bunkers and trenches, stretched from Menteble in the foothills of the Semienawi Bahri escarpment to Emberemi on the Red Sea coast north of Massawa. The first defensive line ran from Emberemi, to the heights of Sekher, the Illa Gemed pass, and the Kentibay hills before extending to Shebah, Umskhur, Af-Ghergher, all the way to Menteble.

A second arc of defense—reinforced with landmines and tank traps—was constructed at Adi Ille (the command-and-control center of Ethiopia’s 6th infantry Division), Adi Shuma, Gahtielay, Digdigta, Mai Atal, Dogali, and Forto. With Ethiopian troops positioned on elevated terrain overlooking the vast plains below, every movement of the EPLF was monitored, making an assault appear nearly impossible.

The third and internal arc of defense was around the perimeter of Massawa’s islands and the Ethiopian Naval Base.

Fenkil : The EPLF’s Unstoppable Offensive

Against this heavily fortified enemy, the EPLF launched a daring and meticulously coordinated assault with 13,500 fighters. Its forces included three brigades from the 85th infantry Division, three from the 70th, two from the 61st, one from the 96th infantry Divisions, and three brigades from the 74th mechanized Division that was armed with 45 tanks, 31 mortars, four BM rocket launchers, and 20 anti-tank missiles. Though vastly outgunned, the EPLF’s superior strategy, discipline, and courage turned the tide of battle. Eritrea’s young navy, though small, played a crucial role with 10 speedboats supporting the operation.

At exactly 1:00 AM on February 8, 1990, Operation Fenkil began. The attack unfolded in four well-coordinated prongs:

1. The First Prong: EPLF forces targeted Ethiopian defenses at Menteble, Af-Ghergher, Seraq, and Marat, clearing the Shebah-Gahtielay road for mechanized movement. Their next objective was to cut off reinforcements from Filfil-Solomuna by seizing Tsehaflam and Debremeaar passes.
2. The Second Prong: A stealth force infiltrated enemy lines through the River Abha, bypassing the first defensive line without firing a single shot. They struck Ethiopian positions at Kentibay, Figret, and Umsukhur before rapidly capturing the 6th Division’s command center at Adi Ille and blocking the Asmara-Massawa road at Gahtielay. These objectives were completed by the end of February 8.
3. The Third Prong: By February 9th, Ethiopian positions along the coast from Kentibay to Emberemi had been completely neutralized, enabling EPLF forces to push forward toward Gurgusum . Meanwhile, a segment of the force that had cutoff the Asmara-Massawa Road at Gahtielay advanced swiftly towards Digdigta, while the other contingent cleared enemy resistance from the two Dongollos, effectively sealing off all Ethiopian reinforcement attempts from Asmara at Ghindae.
4. The Fourth Prong: Eritrea’s navy launched a two-pronged assault—one force striking Ethiopian warships around Massawa from Marsa Ibrahim from the north, while another stationed at Ingel were waiting to block reinforcements arriving by sea from Assab.

The Fall of Massawa and Ethiopia’s Catastrophic Defeat

On February 10, 1990, the final phase of Operation Fenkil began. EPLF forces advancing through Digdigta stormed and captured key Ethiopian strongholds, including Massawa Fort, Umkulu, Hutmlo, Amatere, Eidaga, and the outskirts of the Sigalet bridge. Simultaneously, another force advancing through Gurgusum crushed Ethiopian resistance, reaching the gates of Massawa (Mitsiwa).

By February 11, the Ethiopian naval base had fallen, resulting in the capture of over 1,000 Ethiopian soldiers, including two high-ranking generals at the base. Fearing total destruction, the remaining Ethiopian warships retreated to the Dahlak Archipelago. Meanwhile, EPLF tank units fought a fierce and relentless battle to breach the heavily fortified 900-meter-long Sigalet Causeway. Encouraged by the perceived strength of this defensive position an Ethiopian General entrenched himself on Twalet Island, taking the local civilian population hostage and refusing to surrender.

Between February 12 and 15, there was a pause of fighting in Massawa as the EPLF engaged in negotiations to secure the release of the hostages. When talks failed, EPLF launched a daring amphibious assault, transporting fighters by speedboat to neutralize the Ethiopian forces.  Realizing that the battle was finally lost, The hostage taking General and about 150 officers were killed in the battle of Twalet. The operation was a complete success.

Massawa was fully liberated, permanently severing Ethiopia’s hold on Eritrea’s coastline. The Ethiopian army endured devastating losses:

• 18,000 Ethiopian soldiers were either killed, wounded, or captured.
• 130 Ethiopian tanks fell into EPLF hands.
• Eight BM-21 rocket launchers were captured.
• Seventy artillery pieces (122mm, 85mm, and 76mm) were seized.
• Over 100 heavy anti-aircraft guns were also taken.

Ethiopian Savagery: Aerial Bombardment and Civilian Massacre

Following the EPLF’s liberation of Massawa in February 1990, the Ethiopian Air Force (EthAF) launched a brutal bombing campaign in a desperate attempt to reclaim the city and punish Eritrean civilians. The attacks were marked by indiscriminate bombings of residential areas, markets, and infrastructure, using cluster bombs, napalm, and conventional explosives. Key targets included the port, oil storage facilities, and civilian neighborhoods, while the historic Ottoman-era buildings in the old town were reduced to rubble.

Cluster bombs struck markets and displacement camps, killing hundreds, while survivors reported widespread use of napalm, which set fires across the city. The sustained bombardment between February and May 1990 saw nearly daily raids, with the EthAF focused on denying the EPLF use of the port and terrorizing civilians. The Ethiopian Air Force also targeted water supplies and food storage sites, aiming to induce famine.

• February 15–16, 1990: Over 30 sorties dropped incendiary bombs on residential districts, including the densely populated Emberemi and Gurgusum areas.
• March 1990: A bombing raid on a market killed approximately 200 civilians in a single strike.
• April 1990: Massawa was bombed 13 times throughout the month. Here is a sample:
  • April 4, 1990: In the Kutmiya section of the city, 35 civilians were killed, and 100 others were injured.
  • April 6, 1990: Inside the Batse area, 12 civilians were killed and 45 were wounded.
  • April 7, 1990: Bombings in Amatere, Twalet, and Ferovia killed 25 people and injured 75.
  • April 22, 1990: At 6:15 p.m., two cluster bombs exploded over a busy street in the heart of Massawa, near Cinema Aida and surrounding areas, as civilians had emerged from their bomb shelters and were on the streets. The bombing killed 50 people and injured 110, many with severe wounds. The attack was documented by Canadian filmmaker Ivan Patry and featured on ABC’s Nightline with Ted Koppel. The footage captured scenes so harrowing that many of the images, filmed by EPLF journalists, were too graphic to share with any audience that values human life.
• October 1990: A napalm attack on a fishing village near Massawa killed over 150 civilians.
• Around 80% of Massawa’s population fled to rural areas or EPLF-held zones to escape the bombings.

Massawa’s suffering under Ethiopian bombardment remains a somber chapter in Eritrea’s struggle, immortalized in the phrase: “They bombed the stones, but not our spirit.” The EthAF’s use of cluster bombs and heavy munitions in densely populated areas caused widespread death and devastation. These attacks were part of a broader strategy to terrorize the civilian population and disrupt the economy, including targeting food relief efforts.

The Ethiopian military used Soviet- and Israeli-supplied cluster bombs, designed to maximize civilian harm by scattering submunitions, and napalm to destroy homes and ignite fires. Survivors described the “sticky flames” as melting skin and causing horrific injuries.

As the EPLF advanced toward Asmara, Ethiopia intensified its air raids, with Soviet-made AN-12 bombers conducting nighttime strikes that often hit civilian shelters. Overall, between 2,000 and 3,000 civilians were killed directly by Ethiopian bombings, while over 10,000 were wounded, many maimed by cluster munitions or suffering severe burns from napalm. Despite the extensive destruction, the bombings failed to break Eritrean resolve. Instead, they exposed Ethiopia’s brutality and galvanized support from the Eritrean diaspora. The attacks highlighted Ethiopia’s reliance on collective punishment, a strategy that ultimately backfired, uniting Eritreans even further. 

The international community’s silence in the face of Ethiopia’s disregard for civilian safety and international humanitarian law exposed the hypocrisy of the world, particularly the Western powers, led by the United States, that failed to hold Ethiopia accountable for its actions.

Ghindae: The Unyielding Shield That Defended Massawa

Liberating Massawa was a monumental feat but holding it against relentless enemy offensives demands even greater sacrifice. After the liberation of Massawa, the EPLF established its defensive line at Ghindae, approximately 40 km from Asmara and 68 km from Massawa. In the three months between February 9 and May 11, 1990, the Ghindae Front became the site of some of the fiercest battles of the war, exacting a devastating toll on both sides.

Defending Massawa at the Ghindae Front cost the EPLF nearly 3,000 lives—three times the number of fighters martyred in the battle to liberate the city. However, the enemy suffered far greater losses, with over 30,000 Ethiopian soldiers killed. Desperate to reclaim Massawa, the Ethiopian army launched seven major offensives in an attempt to break through EPLF defenses before the EPLF’s southern front was fully opened in summer of 1990 with the liberation of Senafe, Adi Keyih, and the approach to Dekemhare. These offensives, documented in Ethiopian military records, included: The February 10-12 Assault, Operation Massawa, Operation Dem Melash ደም መላሽ (“Avenger”), Operation Gests-ገስጽ (“Reprimand”), Operation Adin ኣድን (“Save”), Operation Betis በጥስ (“Punch”), The Battle of Semienawi Bahri.

The sheer intensity of these battles was reflected in the scale of Ethiopia’s artillery bombardment. On a daily basis, the enemy rained down an estimated 5,000 shells, including 130mm, 122mm, 85mm, and 76mm artillery rounds, as well as BM-21 and BM-24 rockets. In addition, over 10,000 mortar rounds were fired in a desperate bid to crush Eritrean defenses.

Despite the overwhelming firepower and continuous offensives, the EPLF held its ground, ensuring that Massawa remained liberated. The sacrifices made at the Ghindae Front solidified the gains of Operation Fenkil, proving once again that Eritrea’s freedom was not simply won. It was fiercely defended at all costs.

A Warning to Would-be Invaders

Despite the false narratives propagated by Ethiopia ad nauseam, there is no historical evidence to support the presence of Abyssinians along the Red Sea following the collapse of the Axumite Empire in the 10th century CE. The only notable exception occurred during the proxy occupation of Eritrea from 1962 to 1991, driven by Cold War dynamics and the strategic significance of the Red Sea. Operation Fenkil firmly established that this historical reality would remain unchanged. Ethiopia’s aspirations to access Eritrean ports are mere illusions destined to end in failure. Eritrea’s coastline is not a negotiable asset; it is the lifeblood of Eritrea, fiercely protected by the sacrifices of its heroes.

The Eritrean coast of the Red Sea belongs to Eritrea and let this be a notice; no amount of falsified narrative, harangue about “emotional water”, threat of “we can cannibalize you”, and scheming and screaming in Addis Ababa will change that. Those who challenge this truth will find their ambitions buried in Massawa’s sands, just as the Derg’s forces were, and the TPLF forces  on the Bure Front in 1998-2000. Massawa and Assab stand as permanent testament to Eritrean resilience, monuments to the sacrifices of those who refused to give a square inch of their sovereign land.

Operation Fenkil should be Ethiopia’s wake-up call: a brutal reminder that Eritrea is not a land to be conquered but a fortress of resistance. Massawa’s liberation was not just about reclaiming a port; it was about proving that Eritrea’s sovereignty is absolute and irreversible.

Ethiopia’s leaders would be wise to study history before daring to covet Eritrean ports again. Fenkil shattered their empire, and any future attempt will meet an even swifter demise. Eritrea decides who uses its ports: never the invaders from the south, nor the beggars who plead for access.

Fenkil serves as a profound lesson etched in blood, one that Ethiopia must never forget. Eritrea’s independence is irrevocable, its determination steadfast, and its access to the Red Sea unassailable. Let history be the judge: those who aspire to claim even a square inch of Eritrea’s coastline, believing that sheer population size will shift the balance, should reflect on the lessons learned from the Derg.

Source

• Fenkil: Zantatat Temokuro Ghedli Vol. 3, Hdri Publishers, 2015.
• Mefetsemta: Zantatat Temokuro Ghedli Vol. 4, Hdri Publishers, 2016.