Reasserting Law Over Rhetoric: A Response to Ethiopia’s 7 February 2026 Communication to Eritrea’s Foreign Minister

By Aman Nebiat


The letter issued on 7 February 2026 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia to Eritrea’s Foreign Minister, Osman Salih, advances a set of allegations that are legally unfounded, historically selective, and strategically destabilizing.

Given the fragile security environment of the Horn of Africa, and Ethiopia’s worsening internal unrest, famine and growing inflation, such misguided assertions when presented as public diplomatic ultimatums demand a firm and principled response grounded on facts and in international law.

Allegations of “Occupation” and the Finality of the Boundary

Ethiopia’s claim that Eritrean forces are “occupying Ethiopian territory” directly contradicts binding legal determinations to which Ethiopia is a signatory.

Eritrea–Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC), established pursuant to the Algiers Agreement of 12 December 2000, rendered its delimitation decision in April 2002. That decision was explicitly designated as “final and binding” on both parties, without provision for appeal or reinterpretation. ¹ Eritrea fully accepted and implemented the ruling. Ethiopia, by contrast, has repeatedly sought to qualify, delay, or politically reframe its obligations under the decision.

In legal terms, the continued invocation of “occupation” reflects not a dispute over borders but an unresolved refusal to accept an adverse arbitral outcome, in which as the previous government led by EPRDF party, the current Ethiopian Prosperity Party is blindly following it as its foreign policy.

_International law does not permit the relitigation of settled boundaries through political correspondence.

Claims of Support for Armed Groups: Assertion Without Evidence_

The Ethiopian letter further alleges that Eritrea provides “direct material assistance and support” to militant or rebel groups operating within Ethiopia. These claims are presented without evidence, attribution, or reference to any independent verification mechanism.

Such allegations have been periodically advanced over the past two decades, often in moments of internal Ethiopian instability. None have resulted in substantiated findings by the United Nations Security Council or other competent international bodies in recent years.

Eritrea’s long-standing position of non-interference is not rhetorical; it reflects a strategic assessment shaped by its own experience as a victim of proxy warfare and regional destabilization as well as its core foreign policy based on its national charter. Eritrea is a peace maker and a trusted partner to its neighbors always lending a hand in conflict resolution and stability, hence it is always consulted by regional and global institutions to play its critical role of stabilization.

In contrast, the Ethiopian government has been accommodating anti-Eritrea factions such as Brigade N’Hamedu, a terrorist group that has inflicted terror upon Eritrean communities abroad, including attacks on law enforcement and causing property destruction throughout the US and Europe.

_In the absence of evidence, repetition does not confer legitimacy.

Mischaracterizing Defensive Posture as “Aggression”_

The Ethiopian government’s portrayal of Eritrean military posture as “acts of outright aggression” conflates lawful territorial defense with escalation.

Under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, states retain the inherent right to self-defense within their recognized borders. ² Eritrea’s security deployments fall squarely within this framework. Attempts to redefine defensive presence as aggression invert both legal logic and established norms, while contributing to unnecessary militarization of diplomatic discourse.

Conditional Diplomacy and the Question of Sea Access

The most consequential aspect of Ethiopia’s letter lies in its conditional offer of dialogue, explicitly tied to demands regarding Eritrea’s territory and sovereign assets, even as Eritrea and other neighboring coastal nations have faced threats of force from Ethiopia over the past two years should they decline to comply with its demands.

International law is unequivocal on this matter. Coastal access, ports, and territorial sovereignty are not negotiable entitlements of neighboring states, nor are they subject to pressure or coercion. ³ While landlocked states enjoy rights of access under international conventions, those rights are exercised through agreement and respect for sovereignty not through unilateral demands or securitized diplomacy. ⁴

Framing sovereign Eritrean territory as a bargaining instrument undermines the very foundation of peaceful interstate relations and completely bares the letter that the Ethiopian government wrote naked for its disingenuous and revisionist nature.

Conclusion: Law as the Only Sustainable Basis for Peace

Eritrea remains committed to peaceful coexistence and regional stability. However, peace cannot be constructed on selective memory, conditional legality, or public ultimatums designed for political signaling rather than resolution.

The Eritrea–Ethiopia relationship does not suffer from a lack of legal clarity; it suffers from the Ethiopian government’s inconsistent adherence to agreed legal outcomes. The path forward lies not in reopening settled questions, but in honoring commitments already made including the 2018 Agreement on Peace 5 signed by Pres. Isaias Afewerki and PM Abiy Ahmed.

International law is not optional. It is the minimum standard for responsible state conduct.

Footnotes

  1. Eritrea–Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC), Decision Regarding Delimitation of the Border between the State of Eritrea and the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 13 April 2002; Algiers Agreement, 12 December 2000, Article 4(2).
  2. Charter of the United Nations, Article 51.
  3. Charter of the United Nations, Article 2(1) and 2(4); Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States, UN General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV), 1970.
  4. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), Part X (Articles 124–132) on the rights of landlocked states
  5. Agreement on Peace, Friendship and Comprehensive Cooperation Between the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the State of Eritrea

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