by David Yeh
The Red Sea, stretching roughly 2,250 km (1,400 miles) from Suez to the Bab el-Mandab, widening to about 306–355 km (190–220 miles) along the Eritrean coast and narrowing to just 26–29 km (16–18 miles) at the strait of Bab el Mandab, has always been far more than a body of water separating Africa from the Arabian Peninsula. It is a crossroads of civilizations, a bridge between continents, and one of the most vital arteries of global commerce. Yet despite its centrality to world trade, security, and energy flows, the Red Sea has long been treated as a peripheral space monitored by distant powers, managed through external interventions, and too often viewed as a zone of crisis rather than a region with the capacity to shape its own future.
It is time to recognize a simple but powerful truth: the Red Sea is not a playground. It is not a chessboard for global competition. It is not an empty stage waiting for foreign fleets to perform. It is the shared inheritance of the people who live along its shores, and its future must be determined by them.
A Region Defined by its Littoral States
Seven states line the coast of the Red Sea: Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia, Yemen, Sudan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. Each of these nations has a unique history, culture, and political trajectory, yet all are bound together by the same water. Their ports, economies, and security interests are interconnected in ways that transcend borders. Every spike in shipping insurance affects them all; every act of piracy or instability reverberates from Suez to Bab el-Mandab. Despite these shared interests, cooperation among the littoral states has historically been limited to disjointed efforts, bilateral deals, or ad-hoc alliances rather than a unified regional framework. This fragmentation has created openings for external actors to step in, often with competing agendas. But relying on distant fleets and foreign security umbrellas is neither sustainable nor desirable. Outsiders can police waters, but they cannot build genuine regional stability. They can respond to crises, but they cannot cultivate the long-term trust, economic integration, or political alignment required for lasting peace and prosperity.
Why External Security Models Are Not Enough
In recent years, multiple navies from Europe, Asia, and North America have deployed warships to protect commercial vessels transiting the Red Sea. These operations address immediate threats, but they do not address the structural vulnerabilities that make the region volatile in the first place. Foreign naval presence can deter piracy, but it cannot resolve regional political tensions. It can guard shipping lanes temporarily, but it cannot create the economic incentives and political frameworks necessary to prevent conflict. And it cannot deliver the kind of affordable, predictable security that regional economies depend on. True maritime stability emerges when those with the most at stake take collective responsibility for their shared waters.
The Case for a Red Sea Security & Development Council
The Red Sea is among the world’s most strategically significant maritime corridors. This slender body of water has long been a crossroads of trade, cultures, and geopolitical interests. Because of its economic value and proximity to multiple regions, North Africa, the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, and the Horn of Africa, it is also a zone of overlapping ambitions and fragile security arrangements. Understanding why some actors argue that countries outside this region should refrain from involvement requires an exploration of the region’s internal dynamics, historical sensitivities, and the consequences of great-power competition in such a strategically essential yet politically volatile space.
Regional Complexity and Internal Security Dynamics
The Red Sea’s politics are deeply intertwined with the domestic fragilities of its coastal states. Yemen’s protracted conflict has resulted in disruptions to maritime security, including attacks on shipping lanes. Sudan, meanwhile, faces internal fragmentation and civil war, which weakens the government’s ability to manage coastal security or participate in coordinated regional frameworks. Eritrea and Djibouti maintain a mildly tense though stable relationship, each hosting or having hosted multiple foreign military bases that reflect broader geopolitical tensions.
Eritrea, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, three of the more influential Red Sea states, play significant roles in shaping the region’s security architecture. Their interests are primarily focused on ensuring the safety of maritime commerce, deterring piracy or non-state threats, and reducing instability along their vulnerable southern flanks. At the same time, other countries consider the waterway vital for trade, security, and strategic depth. These localized concerns generate a complex mosaic of interests among the littoral states interests that are not always aligned and are often influenced by internal political priorities.
Historical Legacies and the Sensitivity to Foreign Influence
The Red Sea region carries a long memory of Ottoman and European colonial rule, Cold War interventions, and external manipulation. European colonial powers once sought to dominate the trade routes connecting Asia and Africa via the Red Sea. Later, during the Cold War, the region became a stage for rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union, with both sides supporting various governments and movements to secure strategic footholds.
These historical experiences have shaped a broad sense of caution regarding external influence. Many states in the region view foreign military deployments, infrastructure investments, or political interference through the lens of sovereignty and self-determination. For countries such as Sudan, Eritrea, and Yemen whose recent histories include fight for independence, civil wars or external interventions, there is heightened sensitivity to actions that might appear as infringements on national autonomy. Even the more stable states, like Eritrea, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, often emphasize the importance of regional solutions led by regional actors, rather than externally imposed frameworks.
Arguments Against Outside Involvement
- Sovereignty and Regional Ownership
One of the strongest arguments against external involvement is the desire to preserve regional sovereignty. Littoral states contend that, because they are the ones who bear the direct consequences economic, environmental, and security-related, they should have primary authority over decision making in the region. External actors, whether they be Western powers, Asian powers, or other non-littoral states, may prioritize global strategic competition over the interests of local populations. This mismatch in priorities can lead to decisions that undermine regional ownership and marginalize local voices.
- Risk of Escalating Great-Power Rivalries
The Red Sea already hosts military installations from a wide array of global powers, particularly in Djibouti, where the United States, China, France, and others maintain bases. While these bases may be justified in terms of counterpiracy operations or trade protection, they also create a dense concentration of military assets backed by powers with competing global agendas. The presence of these forces increases the risk of miscalculation, escalation, or entanglement in broader geopolitical conflicts that have little to do with the core concerns of the Red Sea states themselves.
- Politicization of Maritime Security
The protection of commercial shipping is often cited as the primary reason for external naval deployments in the Red Sea. However, security issues can become politicized when non-regional actors use maritime operations to project power or influence regional politics. For instance, foreign naval escorts, sanctions enforcement, or military strikes may be perceived as violations of sovereignty, even when conducted under the banner of international security. This can further complicate diplomatic relations and create instability.
- Economic Dependency and Strategic Leverage
External involvement often comes in the form of infrastructure investment ports, special economic zones, or railway links financed by foreign powers. While such projects can stimulate economic development, they may also create dependencies that undermine a state’s long-term autonomy. Debt leverage, preferential access agreements, or military basing rights tied to economic projects can enable external powers to shape political and economic decisions in ways that may benefit the investor more than the host country.
- The Fragmentation of Regional Institutions
The Red Sea states have made various attempts to establish regional frameworks for cooperation. One notable example is the Council of Arab and African States bordering the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. However, external involvement can weaken these institutions by encouraging states to form bilateral partnerships with powerful outside actors instead of working through collective regional structures. This fragmentation undermines the potential for coherent, long-term regional solutions to shared challenges.
Balancing Regional Sovereignty With Global Interests
It is important to acknowledge that the Red Sea is not only a regional space but also a global maritime artery. The economic dependence of Europe, Asia, and the Gulf on Red Sea shipping lanes means that external involvement is, to some extent, inevitable. International maritime law under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) recognizes the rights of global shipping and the responsibilities of states to ensure safe passage. Thus, the debate is not about whether external actors have legitimate interests, but about the appropriate extent and form of their involvement. Ideally, involvement should occur in ways that respect regional sovereignty, support rather than replace regional institutions, and avoid militarization or geopolitical competition.
The time has come for the littoral states to establish a Red Sea Security and Development Council, a robust, permanent body tasked with managing maritime security, harmonizing economic development, and fostering cooperation across political divides.
Such a council would not be a symbolic forum but an operational one, grounded in real responsibilities and binding commitments. Its mandate could include: Joint maritime patrols and coordinated naval doctrine, Shared intelligence and early-warning systems, Port development strategies and logistical integration, Standardized shipping policies and customs regulations, Environmental protection and sustainable fisheries management, and Conflict prevention and crisis de-escalation mechanisms.
Rather than turning to outsiders whenever tensions rise, the littoral states could rely on themselves reducing dependence, improving cost efficiency, and strengthen sovereignty.
Ports That Rise Together or Fall Together
The major ports of the region Djibouti, Assab, Massawa, Hodeidah, Port Sudan, Jeddah, and Suez are the backbone of global maritime circulation. They connect East Africa with the Arabian Peninsula, the Indian Ocean with the Mediterranean, and regional producers with global markets. But these ports do not operate in silos. What affects one affects all. When instability erupts in Yemen, freight prices surge across the sea. When piracy flares near Somalia, insurance premiums spike region wide. When shipping slows in Suez, every port southward feels the ripple effect.
The Red Sea does not allow for isolated success. Either these ports rise together, or they all share the burden of instability. A coordinated development strategy supported by investment partnerships, shared training programs, and integrated logistics chains would unlock enormous potential. It would allow the Red Sea states not only to protect their waters, but to transform their coastlines into engines of growth.
A Vision for Shared Prosperity
A Red Sea Littoral States Pact would represent a new chapter in regional history, a shift from fragmentation to unity, from dependency to agency, from crisis response to long-term planning. Such a pact would not erase political differences or eliminate regional rivalries, but it would provide a structured platform through which states can manage disagreements while advancing mutual interests. It would institutionalize dialogue, reduce the risks of escalation, and create a collective identity rooted in geography and shared destiny.
In a world where the Red Sea’s importance to global trade continues to grow, the littoral states have an opportunity and a responsibility to shape the future of the region. This is not merely a strategic imperative but a moral one. The millions who depend on these waters for livelihood, food, employment, and stability deserve a security architecture designed by those closest to the issues, not imposed from afar.
A Call for Leadership and Vision
The Red Sea region stands at the intersection of regional fragility and global strategic importance. Its littoral states are grappling with domestic challenges, security threats, and economic ambitions that shape their outlook on who should manage the waterway and how. The arguments against outside involvement stem from a desire to preserve sovereignty, avoid great power rivalry, prevent economic dependency, and promote regional solutions over foreign intervention.
As long as the Red Sea remains central to global trade and geopolitics, outside actors will continue to show interest. The challenge for the region is to assert a coherent regional framework that safeguards its autonomy while navigating the realities of international economic interdependence.
The Red Sea is too important, too central, and too vulnerable to be left to the whims of external powers or the uncertainties of uncoordinated national policies. Its littoral states must rise to the moment, set aside narrow political rivalries, and recognize the power of collective action.
The world will continue to depend on the Red Sea but its future should be determined by the nations that border it.
It is time for Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia, Yemen, Sudan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia to build a shared future. It is time to create a Red Sea Security and Development Council. It is time for a Red Sea Littoral States Pact.
Discover more from Red Sea Beacon
Subscribe to get the latest posts sent to your email.
