Ahmed Ibrahim
The history of a coastline cannot be rewritten simply because a neighboring country has become landlocked. For Eritrea, the Red Sea is not merely a body of water on a map. It is geography, history, livelihood, identity, and sovereignty. From the ancient ports of Adulis to the modern cities of Massawa and Assab, Eritrea’s relationship with the Red Sea predates the Ethiopian state, the colonial era, and today’s political arguments over maritime access.
That history matters because a new political narrative has increasingly attempted to transform a legitimate question: “How can a landlocked Ethiopia obtain reliable access to the sea?” into a fundamentally different question: Does Ethiopia possess a historical right to sovereign territory on Eritrea’s Red Sea coast? These are not the same question. And history, international law, and the record of the twentieth century provide important distinctions.
The Red Sea Was Never an Ethiopian Inheritance
Long before modern colonial borders were drawn, the Red Sea coast of what is today Eritrea was part of a wider commercial world linking Africa, Arabia, Egypt, India, and the Mediterranean. The ancient port of Adulis, on Eritrea’s Red Sea coast, was an important center of commerce connecting the African interior with maritime trading networks. Eritrea’s geographical position made its coastline a strategic gateway between the African highlands and the Red Sea.
The very name Eritrea is associated with the ancient Greek designation for the Red Sea—Erythra Thalassa. The historical importance of the Eritrean coast therefore did not begin when Ethiopia became landlocked in the late twentieth century. It did not begin with the Italian period either. And it certainly did not begin with contemporary Prosperity Party (PP) officials’ hallucinatory political speeches about sea access. The coast existed as a geographical and historical reality long before modern political claims were formulated.
Colonial Borders Did Not Transform Eritrea into Ethiopia
The nineteenth-century era of European colonial expansion fundamentally reshaped the political map of the Horn of Africa. Assab entered this colonial process when Giuseppe Sapeto acquired territory there on behalf of the Rubattino Shipping Company for use as a commercial coaling station in 1869. The Italian government subsequently took over the company’s holdings, and Assab formally became an Italian possession in 1882. Italy expanded its presence along the Red Sea coast with the occupation of Massawa in 1885, Asmara in 1889 and in 1890 these and other territories were consolidated into the Italian colony of Eritrea, giving the territory a defined colonial political identity. The boundary between Eritrea and Ethiopia was subsequently addressed through a series of agreements between Italy and Ethiopia, most notably the treaties of 1900, 1902, and 1908, which became central legal instruments in the later determination of the modern Eritrea-Ethiopia boundary.
These agreements later assumed particular importance under the December 12, 2000 Algiers Agreement between Eritrea and Ethiopia. The Agreement required the boundary between the two states to be delimited and demarcated on the basis of the pertinent colonial treaties of 1900, 1902, and 1908 and applicable international law. Significantly, the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC) was expressly denied the authority to decide the boundary ex aequo et bono—that is, according to what it might consider fair or equitable. Its mandate was instead to apply the colonial treaties and relevant principles of international law. This historical and legal record is therefore highly consequential.
If the modern Eritrean-Ethiopian boundary were merely an artificial creation of Eritrea’s independence in 1993, there would have been little reason for the two states to anchor its legal determination in treaties concluded nearly a century earlier. Yet that is precisely what the Algiers Agreement required. The EEBC subsequently applied that mandate in rendering its final and binding delimitation decision and in the subsequent demarcation process.
The resulting boundary therefore did not create Eritrea’s separation from the Red Sea coast; it legally determined the course of an already existing international boundary by reference to the colonial treaties and applicable international law. One of its enduring geographical consequences is that Ethiopian sovereign territory remains separated from the western shore of the Red Sea by Eritrean territory—at its nearest point, by roughly 60 kilometers.
1952: Federation Was Not Annexation
One of the most frequently misunderstood chapters of Eritrean history concerns the federation established in 1952. In December 1950, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 390 A(V), providing for Eritrea to constitute an autonomous unit federated with Ethiopia. The arrangement established an Eritrean government with legislative, executive, and judicial authority over domestic affairs, while assigning specified matters—including defense, foreign affairs, currency and finance, foreign and interstate commerce, and external communications, including ports—to the federal government. When the federation formally came into effect on September 11, 1952, Eritrea therefore entered a constitutional relationship with Ethiopia; it was not simply absorbed as an Ethiopian province. Indeed, the federal arrangement itself preserved Eritrea as a distinct autonomous territorial and political unit, a distinction that would become increasingly important as the federal system was progressively dismantled during the following decade.
1962: The Federation Was Abolished
Over the course of the 1950s and early 1960s, Eritrea’s autonomous institutions were steadily weakened, culminating in 14 November 1962 with the termination of the federation and Eritrea’s incorporation into Ethiopia as a province. The abolition of the federal arrangement did not resolve the Eritrean question; rather, it occurred after armed resistance had already begun and was followed by an expanding conflict that would continue for decades.
What followed was far more than a temporary political dispute over administrative arrangements. The conflict developed into a thirty-year struggle during which generations of Eritreans experienced warfare, displacement, destruction, and enormous human loss. At its core was the unresolved question of decolonization and self-determination and whether Eritrea’s political status could be permanently determined through incorporation into Ethiopia rather than through the expressed will of its people.
Thirty Years of War and the Restoration of Eritrean Independence
The armed struggle for Eritrean independence began on September 1, 1961, and continued until 1991, profoundly reshaping the political landscape of the Horn of Africa. By the time forces of the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) took control of Eritrea in 1991, independence had moved from a political objective to a political reality awaiting formal determination through a referendum.
This was popularly affirmed in 1993, when Eritreans voted overwhelmingly for independence in an internationally observed referendum. Eritrea subsequently became a member of the United Nations, completing its emergence as an internationally recognized sovereign state. This sequence is important because Eritrea did not emerge as an abstract political entity detached from its historical territory. It became independent as a territorial state that included its Red Sea coastline, its ports, and the other territory within its recognized boundaries.
The Contemporary Debate: From Maritime Access to Territorial Claims
In recent years, Ethiopian PP officials have placed increasing emphasis on the country’s need for dependable access to the Red Sea, often invoking geography, history, population, and economic development in incoherently explaining why maritime access is considered a major national interest. Some Ethiopian commentators have gone further, advancing historical arguments concerning Assab and Ethiopia’s pseudo-historical relationship with the Red Sea.
These arguments raise two questions that should not be conflated. The first is whether Ethiopia, as a landlocked state, has interests and rights concerning access to maritime commerce. The second is whether those interests establish sovereign title to Eritrean coastal territory. International law treats access and territorial sovereignty as distinct issues.
Access Is Not Ownership
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea recognizes the right of landlocked states to access the sea and provides for freedom of transit through the territory of transit states. Article 125, however, also provides that the terms and modalities for exercising that freedom are to be agreed between the landlocked and transit states concerned, while preserving the sovereignty and legitimate interests of transit states. Maritime access is therefore principally a matter of negotiated transit and cooperation rather than an automatic transfer of territorial sovereignty.
This framework leaves considerable room for neighboring states to develop arrangements that serve their mutual interests. Ethiopia and coastal states (Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia and Kenya) can negotiate port access, transit corridors, customs arrangements, transportation infrastructure, logistics facilities, long-term commercial agreements, and other forms of economic cooperation. None of these arrangements, however, inherently establishes sovereign title to the territory through which access is provided. A landlocked state’s need for efficient maritime commerce and a coastal state’s sovereignty over its territory can coexist within the same legal and diplomatic framework.
Legal scholarship examining Ethiopia’s recent Red Sea arguments has similarly emphasized the distinction between maritime access and territorial sovereignty. In a 2024 article published in the Fordham International Law Journal, Vol. 47:3, Mahemud Eshtu Tekuya addresses Ethiopia’s claims concerning Assab and states unequivocally that “Ethiopia lacks a legitimate ownership claim over Assab or any parts of the Red Sea.” At the same time, he separately examines the rights available to Ethiopia under international law as a landlocked state seeking access to the sea. This distinction is fundamental: whatever historical, geographical, or economic connections to the Red Sea may be invoked, the right to seek maritime access and a claim of sovereign ownership are legally separate questions and should not be treated as interchangeable.
Assab and the Historical Record
Assab is sometimes portrayed in contemporary Ethiopian discourse primarily through the history of Ethiopian commercial use of the port. Its history, however, is considerably broader. Assab developed as a Red Sea coastal settlement before becoming part of Italian Eritrea, while Massawa likewise became a major port within the colonial territory from which the modern Eritrean state emerged. Ethiopia subsequently made extensive use of these ports during periods when Eritrea was federated with, and later occupied, but the commercial or administrative use of a port does not by itself settle the separate question of sovereign title.
The distinction matters because trade, transit, administration, military control, and territorial sovereignty are different legal and historical concepts. A state may depend heavily upon a foreign port, enjoy extensive commercial privileges there, or obtain guaranteed access through bilateral agreements without acquiring sovereignty over the territory in which that port is located. Historical evidence concerning Ethiopia’s use of Assab and Massawa should therefore be examined within the political and legal arrangements that existed at the relevant time rather than treated, by itself, as proof of contemporary territorial ownership.
Maritime Access Without Territorial Confrontation
The modern international order rests on principles that include the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and legal equality of states. Within that framework, Ethiopia’s landlocked position and its interest in efficient maritime access are significant economic and strategic concerns, but they do not need to be addressed by reopening questions of territorial sovereignty. The practical problem of access can instead be approached through diplomacy and negotiated arrangements with neighboring coastal states.
A wide range of possibilities exists, including commercial port agreements, guaranteed transit corridors, road and railway connections, customs and logistics arrangements, and broader regional trade agreements. Such arrangements could provide Ethiopia with dependable maritime access while preserving the territorial sovereignty of the coastal states involved.
The central distinction is therefore not between Ethiopian access to the Red Sea and Eritrean sovereignty over its coastline. Those objectives are not inherently incompatible. The more consequential distinction is between negotiated access and sovereign ownership. The former provides considerable scope for diplomacy, commerce, and regional cooperation; the latter raises fundamentally different questions of territorial sovereignty and international law. Keeping those issues separate provides a clearer basis for understanding both the historical record and the possibilities for peaceful economic cooperation in the Horn of Africa.
The Red Sea Should Be a Bridge, Not a Battlefield
The most compelling response to historical revisionism lies not in rhetoric, but in the historical and legal record. Eritrea’s admission to the United Nations in 1993 marked the culmination of its emergence as an internationally recognized independent and sovereign state. The international community was not admitting a temporary Ethiopian province to membership; it was recognizing Eritrea as a sovereign state with its own territory and internationally recognized boundaries. Because sovereignty is inherently tied to the territory over which a state exercises its authority, Eritrea’s independence necessarily encompassed its Red Sea coastline. Sovereignty over that coastline is therefore not a separate question that can be detached from Eritrean independence, but an integral part of the territorial sovereignty that Eritrea acquired and the international community recognized when it became an independent state.
There is, however, a more constructive way to envision the region’s future—one that requires neither the rewriting of history nor the compromise of territorial sovereignty. The Red Sea and the Indian Ocean need not become sources of division between Ethiopia and its coastal neighbors—Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia, and Kenya. Instead, they can serve as gateways to greater regional connectivity, commerce, and economic cooperation. Ethiopia can pursue reliable and mutually beneficial maritime access through its neighbors while each coastal state retains full sovereignty over its territory and coastline. Through expanded trade, integrated transportation networks, energy projects, port development, and other shared infrastructure, the countries of the region can transform their geographic proximity into economic opportunity, allowing ports to function as engines of regional development rather than sources of territorial confrontation.
The choice, therefore, need not be framed as one between Ethiopia’s economic isolation and territorial concessions by Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia, or Kenya. A more sustainable alternative is sovereignty with cooperation, in which Ethiopia’s legitimate interest in dependable maritime access coexists with the sovereign rights and territorial integrity of its coastal neighbors. Far from being an obstacle to regional integration, mutual respect for sovereignty provides the legal and political foundation necessary for durable agreements, economic interdependence, and lasting cooperation among the states of the Horn of Africa.
If the economic interests of all Ethiopians—whether they live in the north, south, east, or west—are given equal consideration, and if Ethiopia’s long-term prosperity and economic security are the central objectives, then the most practical approach would be to pursue cooperative access to the full network of ports surrounding the country rather than concentrating overwhelmingly on Eritrea’s coastline. Depending on the region of Ethiopia being served, different corridors offer distinct geographic and economic advantages: Mombasa and Lamu in Kenya; Kismayo, Mogadishu, Berbera, and Zeila along the Somali coast; Djibouti and Tadjoura in Djibouti; Assab and Massawa in Eritrea; and potentially Port Sudan in Sudan. Taken together, these ports provide Ethiopia with multiple possible gateways to the Red Sea and Indian Ocean and could support a diversified maritime strategy tailored to the needs of different parts of the country.
Viewed from this broader national perspective, the recurring emphasis on Eritrean ports raises an important question: why should Ethiopia’s maritime strategy be centered so heavily on Assab or Massawa when several coastal corridors surround the country and may serve different Ethiopian regions more efficiently? One possible interpretation is that the debate continues to be shaped by an older Abyssinian-centered conception of Ethiopia, in which the historical and strategic interests of the northern highlands receive disproportionate attention. Whether or not one accepts that interpretation, a genuinely nationwide maritime strategy would logically evaluate all available corridors according to geography, cost, infrastructure, security, and the economic needs of Ethiopia’s diverse regions rather than treating access through Eritrea as the country’s singular maritime solution.
Conclusion: Sea Access Can Be Shared Without the Map Being Redrawn
The history of Eritrea’s Red Sea coast did not begin with Ethiopia’s present search for maritime access, nor can its legal status be determined by contemporary economic necessity. Eritrea’s modern territorial boundaries emerged from identifiable historical processes, treaties, and subsequent international arrangements. Its federation with Ethiopia was established through an international framework and later dismantled; its people then fought a three-decade struggle for self-determination; independence was confirmed through the 1993 referendum; and Eritrea entered the United Nations as a sovereign state. Whatever interpretations may be advanced about earlier centuries of regional interaction, the contemporary question must begin with this historical and legal reality.
A landlocked country requires efficient connections to international markets, and expanding those connections can benefit not only Ethiopia but the entire Horn of Africa. Yet acknowledging that economic reality does not require converting a question of access into a question of territorial ownership. International commerce provides numerous mechanisms through which landlocked states can reach the sea without acquiring the territory of their coastal neighbors. Port agreements, transit guarantees, railway and highway corridors, customs arrangements, logistics zones, energy networks, and joint infrastructure investments can all provide reliable access while leaving sovereignty undisturbed.
Indeed, Ethiopia’s geography points toward diversification rather than territorial confrontation. The country is surrounded by potential maritime corridors stretching from the Indian Ocean to the Red Sea that offer different possibilities for trade and connectivity. A long-term maritime strategy centered on multiple corridors could reduce dependence on any single route while distributing the benefits of regional commerce more broadly across Ethiopia and its neighbors.
Seen in this wider context, the question facing the region is not whether Ethiopia should have access to the sea. The more consequential question is how that access should be obtained. One approach treats geography as a grievance, historical association as territorial entitlement, and the coastline of a neighboring state as the remedy for landlockedness. The other accepts existing sovereignty and asks how geography can be transformed from a constraint into an opportunity for cooperation. The second approach does not require anyone to surrender territory or reinterpret history; it requires negotiation, investment, reciprocity, and political imagination.
For Eritrea, safeguarding sovereignty over its Red Sea coastline is entirely compatible with expanding economic cooperation with Ethiopia and the wider region. Indeed, respect for sovereignty and regional integration can be mutually reinforcing: clearly recognized and respected borders provide the stability necessary for states to enter long-term commercial arrangements without concern that economic access might eventually be transformed into territorial claims. Eritrea’s sovereign ports of Massawa and Assab have the potential to serve not only Ethiopia but, with the development of appropriate transportation and logistics corridors, markets across Sudan, South Sudan, Chad, and the Central African Republic. Over the longer term, improved trans-African infrastructure could extend this commercial reach farther west into the Sahel, including Niger and Mali, providing an additional route for goods moving between the Middle East and Asia and the African interior. Such connectivity could strengthen Eritrea’s role as a strategic maritime gateway linking the Red Sea with inland markets across northeastern and central Africa.
Within such a framework, Ethiopia could secure dependable and diversified maritime services without acquiring sovereignty over the coastline through which those services are provided. The same principle can guide Ethiopia’s relationships with Djibouti, Somalia, Kenya, Sudan, and other coastal partners. Rather than concentrating maritime strategy on ownership of a particular coastline, Ethiopia could participate in a network of complementary trade corridors connecting different regions of the country to the ports best suited to serve them. Such an approach would transform the region’s geography from a source of territorial contention into an opportunity for economic integration, grounded in commerce, mutual benefit, and respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of every participating state.
This is why the distinction between access and ownership must remain at the center of the discussion. Access is not ownership. Commercial dependence is not sovereignty. Geographic proximity is not legal title. Historical association is not a perpetual territorial deed. None of these propositions denies Ethiopia’s economic interests; they simply place those interests within the framework of relations among sovereign states.
The Horn of Africa has already paid an extraordinary price when questions of identity, borders, and territory have been pursued through confrontation rather than political settlement. Reopening settled territorial questions risks returning the region to arguments for which generations have already borne the consequences. The alternative is not Ethiopian isolation. It is a regional order in which landlocked Ethiopia recognizes that cooperation does not require the erasure of borders and that economic integration does not require political ownership.
The Red Sea and the Indian Ocean should therefore be understood not as prizes to be possessed, but as commercial spaces through which neighboring states can prosper together. Ethiopia’s future as a landlocked country need not be defined by exclusion from the sea, just as Eritrea’s future as a coastal state need not be defined by perpetual anxiety over its coastline. The region possesses enough ports, corridors, markets, and economic complementarities to accommodate both maritime access and territorial sovereignty.
Ultimately, Eritrea’s independence did not deprive Ethiopia of something that international law now requires Eritrea to surrender. It established Eritrean sovereignty over the territory within its boundaries, including its Red Sea coastline. Ethiopia’s economic interests can be accommodated without undoing that sovereignty, just as the interests of landlocked states elsewhere are accommodated through agreements with their coastal neighbors.
The durable path forward is therefore neither historical revisionism nor territorial entitlement, but negotiated cooperation among sovereign equals. Ethiopia does not need to own a coastline in order to reach the sea, and Eritrea does not need to surrender sovereignty in order to participate in Ethiopia’s economic development. What both countries—and the wider Horn of Africa—need is a political vision capable of distinguishing possession from access and borders from barriers.
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