By Dr. Weldu Gebreselassie
The Horn of Africa is one of the most unstable regions in the world, shaped by a long history of conflict, geopolitical rivalry, and weak regional cooperation. Like many colonial destinations in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, the region – primarily encompassing Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan – has been a focal point of external intervention since the Berlin Conference of 1885, during which European colonial powers partitioned Africa into competing spheres of influence. That conference laid the foundation for the wholesale colonization of the continent.
Major global and regional powers, recognizing the strategic importance of the Horn—particularly during the Cold War—engaged in intense, often audacious and self-serving rivalries to exert political, economic, and social influence over the region. These rivalries further entrenched instability rather than fostering sustainable peace or development.
The historical trajectory of the Horn of Africa, both before and after the formation of modern nation-states—especially Eritrea and Ethiopia—has been marked by protracted and multifaceted conflicts. These include wars among monarchs for territorial expansion and tribute, civil wars between Ethiopia’s central government and various armed movements (such as the Tigray People’s Liberation Front and Oromo Liberation fronts), wars of national liberation (notably Eritrea’s armed struggle for independence from 1961 to 1991), and interstate conflict, most prominently the Somalia-Ethiopia war over the Ogaden in 1978 and the Eritrea–Ethiopia border war of 1998–2000.
From the consolidation of modern Ethiopia under Emperor Menelik II through World War II (1939–1945), the principal external actors in the Horn were Britain, Italy, and France. However, as World War II drew to a close and the influence of European colonial powers waned, particularly that of the British Empire, theUnited States emerged as the dominant external power shaping political and security dynamics in the region.
In recent years, regional security dynamics have been further complicated by the intervention of middle powers and intensifying geopolitical competition in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. A growing body of political analysis and empirical research suggests that the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has become a significant spoiler contributing to regional destabilization. Since the 2010s, and with increased momentum in the 2020s, the UAE has expanded its military ties with several African states, with particular focus on the Horn–Sahel corridor. This expansion reflects Emirati ambitions to project political influence through military engagement, including support for non-state armed actors in conflict zones such as Libya, Sudan, and Somalia—activities routinely denied by Emirati authorities.
The UAE’s divisive and destabilizing interventions must be understood within the context of its broader strategic objectives. The Emirates is actively competing with other regional powers to expand its influence across the Middle East and the Horn of Africa, frequently employing controversial methods. These include backing factions that challenge central governments, as seen in Sudan, in order to secure strategic leverage aligned with Emirati interests.
The UAE’s aspiration to position itself as a global commercial and logistics hub has also brought it into strategic competition with Red Sea littoral states such as Eritrea and Sudan. Their geographic proximity and potential for port development present a challenge to the dominance of Dubai and Abu Dhabi. Regional analysts argue that Eritrea’s efforts to develop its Red Sea ports and offshore islands, aimed at attracting foreign investment, could significantly reduce shipping distances and alter regional trade routes.
From this perspective, Emirati concerns appear to stem from the possibility that a stable Eritrea and Sudan could transform the Red Sea into a competitive logistics and investment corridor. This, critics argue, has motivated the UAE to undermine stability in these countries by fostering discord through support for local militias and rebel groups.
In Ethiopia, the UAE’s substantial investments across multiple sectors are widely viewed as tools to influence domestic policy and secure political alignment with Emirati regional interests. Sudan, for instance, has accused Ethiopia of permitting the establishment of training camps for the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and affiliated foreign mercenaries to launch attacks in the Blue Nile region along the Ethiopian border.
Moreover, the interplay of Ethiopian military ambitions, Emirati influence in Addis Ababa and persistent allegations of Ethiopian permissiveness toward RSF activities near Sudan’s eastern border has become a source of substantial regional tension. Ethiopian authorities and the RSF are alleged to be engaged in coordinated military activities, supported by regional actors, including the establishment of UAE-funded training facilities reportedly capable of hosting up to 10,000 RSF fighters in the Benishangul-Gumuz region, alongside the construction of airstrips and supply routes. According to multiple reports, militia-linked camps were initially established in Ethiopia’s Harari region before being relocated to Benishangul-Gumuz. These developments represent one of the gravest threats to Sudanese national security since the outbreak of the civil war and mark a significant shift in Ethiopia’s role from a covertly interfering neighbor to an overt participant, contradicting its official claims of neutrality. Internally, this posture has also generated deep concern within Ethiopia, given the fragility of the border region and its proximity to the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD).
The UAE has also faced strong criticism from international organizations over its alleged involvement in Sudan’s gold sector, including illegal mining operations. Furthermore, the Emirates is accused of playing a direct role in Sudan’s civil war, particularly through support for armed factions in Darfur, prompting allegations of complicity in atrocities and war crimes. Notably, the Sudanese army has accused Libya’s Khalifa Haftar—widely regarded as a key Emirati ally—of coordinating cross-border attacks with the RSF, marking the first instance of direct Libyan involvement in the conflict and reinforcing evidence of the UAE’s broader regional entanglements. Studies indicate that RSF exemplifies militarized fragmentation, threatening to undermine state authority, exacerbating instability, and creating opportuneconditions for divisive interventions.
Regional analysts further contend that the UAE’s fixation on Sudan is driven by several factors: access to Sudanese gold that finances the RSF; Sudan’s agricultural potential as a breadbasket for the Gulf states; control over strategic Red Sea ports; and influence over Sudan’s underdeveloped financial infrastructure, weakened by decades of U.S. sanctions that isolated the country from the global financial system.
In Somalia, the UAE’s intervention—ostensibly justified on grounds of security, counterterrorism (particularly against al-Shabaab), military training, and base construction, including in Bosaso—has increasingly brought it into conflict with the Federal Government in Mogadishu. While framed as support for stability, Emirati engagement has expanded its influence at the expense of Somali sovereignty. The UAE’s backing of regional administrations such as Jubaland, Puntland, and Somaliland directly clashes with the Federal Government’s efforts to preserve national unity. Its close ties with Somaliland—a self-declared but internationally unrecognized entity—have further fueled political fragmentation, undermined Somalia’s sovereignty, and weakened democratic processes.
In conclusion, regional integration grounded in mutual security and economic benefit is essential for sustainable development and stability in the Horn of Africa. However, external interventions carried out under the guise of security cooperation or economic partnership—such as those pursued by the UAE—appear primarily driven by the pursuit of strategic dominance. These interventions have exacerbated existing conflicts and introduced new fault lines, most notably in Sudan. As one political analyst aptly observed, “Outside powers may achieve short-term gains, but over time, everyone stands to lose from deeper instability in the Horn of Africa.”
References
- Beyan, T. (2021). A new administration in the U.S. and a new political environment in the Horn of Africa: Time to reinvent the region. In B. Wekesa (Ed.), Africa’s policy towards the U.S.: The Biden era (pp. 105–120). Good Governance Africa.
- Calvocoressi, P. (1996). World politics since 1945 (7th ed.). Longman.
- Ethiopia accused of training and arming the RSF militia. (2025, December 8). Sudan Horizon. https://sudanhorizon.com/ethiopia-accused-of-training-and-arming-the-rsf-militia/
- Haile, S. (1988). Historical background to the Ethiopia–Eritrea conflict. In L. Cliffe & B. Davidson (Eds.), The long struggle of Eritrea for independence and constructive peace (pp. 11–31). The Red Sea Press.
- insidesomalia.net. (2025, December 11). Sudan prepares for Eastern front as RSF camp in Ethiopia receives supplies from Berbera and Mombasa. https://insidesomalia.net/sudan-prepares-for-eastern-front-as-rsf-camp-in-ethiopia-receives-supplies-from-berbera-and-mombasa/
- International Institute for Political Studies. (2024, May 6). The UAE’s rising military role in Africa: Defending interests, advancing influence. https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/the-uaes-rising-military-role-in-africa-defending-interests-advancing-influence-172825
- Lefebvre, J. A. (2012). Choosing sides in the Horn of Africa: WikiLeaks, the Ethiopia imperative, and American responses to post-9/11 regional conflicts. Diplomacy & Statecraft, 23(4), 704–727. https://doi.org/10.1080/09592296.2012.736338
- Lloyd, T. (1984). The British Empire, 1558–1983. Oxford University Press.
- Mahmoud, M. A. (2025, December 9). The camouflaged eastern front: How the RSF militia is reconfiguring its threat through Ethiopia towards the heart of the Blue Nile. Sudan Horizon. https://sudanhorizon.com/the-camouflaged-eastern-front-how-the-rsf-militia-is-reconfiguring-its-threat-through-ethiopia-towards-the-heart-of-the-blue-nile/
- Mohamud, A. A. (2025). Somalia relations with the United Arab Emirates: A study of bilateral relations (2000–2022). African Journal of Arts and Humanities Studies. https://journals.e-palli.com/home/index.php/ajahs/issue/view/289
- Palmer, K., & Colton, J. (1971). Modern world(4th ed.). Alfred A. Knopf.
- People’s Dispatch. (2025, July 27). Five reasons why the UAE is fixated on Sudan. https://peoplesdispatch.org/2025/07/27/five-reasons-why-the-uae-is-fixated-on-sudan/
- Singh, N., & Parekh, H. (2025, December, 22). The Red Sea Escalation Arc: How Gulf Rivalry Is Rewiring Africa and Arabia. https://nitishastra.substack.com/p/the-red-sea-escalation-arc-how-gulf
- Welde Giorgis, A. (2014). Eritrea at the crossroads: A narrative of triumph, betrayal and hope. Strategic Book Publishing and Rights.
- Ylönen, A. (2022, December). A scramble of external powers and local agency in the Horn of Africa. Center for International Studies (CIS), ISCTE–Instituto Universitário de Lisboa. https://doi.org/10.24241/NotesInt.2022/280/en
Discover more from Red Sea Beacon
Subscribe to get the latest posts sent to your email.
