Ethiopia’s Secret War: The Hidden Hand in Sudan’s Conflict and the Crisis at Home

Ethiopia’s Secret War: The Hidden Hand in Sudan’s Conflict and the Crisis at Home

By B. Tekle 

In a stunning revelation that challenges Ethiopia’s diplomatic posturing, a recent Reuters investigation has exposed a clandestine military operation within its borders, aimed at bolstering the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Sudan’s devastating civil war. This discovery not only implicates Addis Ababa in a conflict it publicly claims neutrality on but also starkly contradicts its accusations against neighboring Eritrea regarding regional destabilization. Compounding this external entanglement is Ethiopia’s own simmering internal turmoil, a complex web of ethnic tensions and government crackdowns that threatens to unravel the nation from within, even as it contemplates further aggression against Eritrea.

The Reuters Report: A Secret Training Ground for Sudan’s RSF

The Reuters investigation, published on February 10, 2026, details the existence of a secret military camp in Ethiopia’s remote Benishangul-Gumuz region. Here, thousands of fighters for Sudan’s RSF are reportedly undergoing training. As of early January 2026, approximately 4,300 RSF combatants were being prepared for deployment, with recruits drawn not only from Sudan but also from within Ethiopia and South Sudan, alongside various Sudanese rebel groups.

Further evidence points to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) as a key financier of this covert operation, allegedly providing both funds for the camp’s construction and military trainers, as well as logistical support. This information, gleaned from internal Ethiopian security memos and diplomatic cables, paints a picture of a sophisticated, internationally backed effort to influence the Sudanese conflict.

The strategic implications of this camp are profound. Located just 63 miles from the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), its proximity raises serious concerns about the potential for the Sudanese conflict to spill over, possibly targeting this vital Ethiopian infrastructure. Moreover, significant infrastructure development at the nearby Asosa airport, including new hangars and a ground control station for unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), suggests a concerted effort to establish a robust logistical and aerial support hub for the RSF.

A Pattern of Allegations: Ethiopia’s Deepening Involvement

The Reuters report is not an isolated incident but rather the most concrete evidence to date of Ethiopia’s deepening involvement in the Sudanese civil war. For months, whispers and unofficial reports have circulated regarding Addis Ababa’s support for the RSF. In December 2025, a senior Sudanese official publicly accused Ethiopia of facilitating the training of RSF fighters on its territory. These earlier allegations, often met with official Ethiopian denials, now gain significant credibility in light of the Reuters investigation. The contrast between Ethiopia’s public stance of non-interference and the emerging evidence of active military support highlights a profound disconnect in its foreign policy.

The Irony of Accusations: Ethiopia vs. Eritrea

Adding a layer of profound irony to this situation are Ethiopia’s recent accusations against Eritrea. Just days before the Reuters exposé, on February 7, 2026, Ethiopian Foreign Minister Gedion Timothewos vehemently accused Eritrea of “outright aggression,” alleging that Eritrean forces had occupied Ethiopian territory and were actively supporting armed groups within Ethiopia.

Addis Ababa demanded an immediate withdrawal of Eritrean troops and an end to their alleged collaboration with rebels. Yet, as Ethiopia levels these serious charges against its neighbor, it is simultaneously engaged in precisely the kind of external military intervention it condemns, by hosting and training a foreign paramilitary force on its own soil.

This diplomatic double standard is further complicated by the long-standing tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea, particularly concerning Ethiopia’s desire for access to the Red Sea. Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s repeated assertions of his landlocked nation’s “right” to sea access have been consistently interpreted by Eritrea as a direct threat to its sovereignty, especially regarding the port of Assab.

The current revelations about Ethiopia’s involvement in Sudan, coupled with its aggressive rhetoric towards Eritrea, paint a picture of a nation willing to engage in risky external ventures while simultaneously accusing others of similar transgressions.

Internal Turmoil: A Nation on the Brink

Beneath the surface of Ethiopia’s external military maneuvers lies a deeply fractured nation grappling with intractable internal conflicts. The Amhara region, for instance, has been plagued by ongoing clashes between federal government forces and Fano militias throughout 2025 and into 2026, with reports of widespread war crimes and severe human rights abuses. Similarly, the Oromia region continues to battle a persistent insurgency by armed groups, leading to significant instability. Even the Tigray region, despite a 2022 peace deal, remains a volatile area, with recent military movements in border zones signaling unresolved tensions. These internal conflicts have exacted a heavy humanitarian toll, with over 3.3 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) recorded by late 2025.

The constant state of unrest, coupled with government crackdowns and economic strain, creates a precarious domestic environment. It is within this context of profound internal fragility that Ethiopia’s government chooses to engage in external military adventurism and threaten war with Eritrea. This simultaneous pursuit of external aggression and struggle with internal strife highlights a dangerous miscalculation, risking a multi-front conflict that could have catastrophic consequences for the entire Horn of Africa.

Implications and Conclusion: A Call for Transparency and Accountability

Ethiopia’s covert involvement in Sudan’s civil war, juxtaposed with its accusations against Eritrea and its own severe internal conflicts, carries grave implications for regional stability. The support provided to the RSF is likely to prolong the Sudanese conflict, exacerbating an already dire humanitarian crisis and further destabilizing the region. The UAE’s role in financing and supporting this operation introduces a proxy dimension, escalating the potential for broader international entanglement.

The irony of Ethiopia’s position is undeniable: a nation grappling with its own internal demons and accusing a neighbor of aggression is simultaneously engaging in covert military operations in another sovereign state. This dangerous trajectory, marked by a lack of transparency and accountability, threatens to plunge the Horn of Africa into deeper turmoil. A miscalculation in its aggressive stance towards Eritrea, while simultaneously embroiled in Sudan and battling internal insurgencies, could ignite a regional conflagration with devastating human and geopolitical costs.

For the sake of peace and stability in an already fragile region, there is an urgent need for transparency from the Ethiopian government regarding its actions in Sudan and its intentions towards Eritrea. The international community must demand accountability for these covert operations and press for a diplomatic resolution to the escalating tensions. The path Ethiopia is currently treading is fraught with peril, and without a fundamental shift towards peace and genuine regional cooperation, the consequences could be catastrophic.

References

1. Reuters. (2026, February 10 ). Ethiopia builds secret camp to train Sudan RSF fighters, sources say.
2. The Africa Report. (2025, December ). Is Ethiopia’s Abiy helping RSF in Sudan’s civil war?.
3. Al Jazeera. (2026, February 8 ). Ethiopia demands Eritrea ‘immediately withdraw’ troops from its territory.
4. Human Rights Watch. (2026 ). World Report 2026: Ethiopia.
5. Ethiopian Human Rights Commission. (2026, January 30 ). Human rights concerns related to the conflict and military movements in some areas bordering the Tigray, Amhara, and Afar regions.
6. International Organization for Migration. (2025, December 10 ). Ethiopia Crisis Response Plan 2026.