By ALULA FREZGHI
As 2025 ends, Sudan’s civil war is no longer a contained national tragedy. It has metastasized into a regional emergency with the potential to destabilize the entire Red Sea corridor from Port Sudan to the Bab el‑Mandeb strait. What began as a power struggle between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has now spilled toward Ethiopia’s western frontier, threatening to ignite a conflict between two of the Horn of Africa’s most pivotal states.
The stakes extend far beyond land borders. The Red Sea a maritime artery carrying nearly 10 percent of global trade is already strained by Houthi attacks, great‑power naval deployments, and the militarization of the Gulf of Aden. A direct Ethiopia–Sudan confrontation would push this fragile ecosystem toward collapse, with the Bab el‑Mandeb chokepoint emerging as the epicenter of a new geopolitical storm.
A War Creeping Toward Ethiopia’s Border
In late December, Sudanese officials accused Ethiopia of allowing RSF fighters to establish training camps and logistical hubs inside Benishangul‑Gumuz, the sensitive region that hosts the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). According to SAF intelligence, RSF units are regrouping on Ethiopian soil before launching operations toward Kurmuk and Geissan.
More alarming are claims that “massive military hardware” from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) is being flown into Assosa airport in Ethiopia and then transported to RSF units across the border. Khartoum has warned that it may strike preemptively if these activities continue.
Ethiopia denies the allegations, calling them “baseless propaganda.” But in Port Sudan, the SAF leadership increasingly views Ethiopia not as a neutral mediator but as a silent facilitator of the RSF’s war machine.
The UAE Factor and Ethiopia’s Strategic Calculus
The accusations cannot be separated from the broader geopolitical contest over Sudan’s gold, its strategic geography, and the ambitions of external actors. The UAE has long been accused by Sudanese officials and UN experts of backing the RSF. If Ethiopia is indeed enabling RSF logistics, analysts argue it is likely acting as a conduit for Emirati interests rather than pursuing an independent ideological agenda.
Ethiopia’s motivations may be transactional. Facing economic collapse, post‑Tigray reconstruction, and diplomatic isolation, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed relies heavily on Emirati investment and political cover. A weakened Sudan, distracted by internal conflict, may also appear preferable to Addis Ababa than a strong Sudan aligned with Egypt — Ethiopia’s historic rival over Nile waters.
But such calculations, if true, risk catastrophic blowback.
A Fragile Ethiopia Risks Importing Sudan’s War
Benishangul‑Gumuz is already volatile, plagued by ethnic insurgencies and the immense security burden of the GERD. Allowing Sudan’s conflict to seep into this region risks igniting local rebellions and destabilizing Ethiopia’s western frontier.
Reports suggest the RSF has formed alliances with Ethiopian separatist groups and Sudanese rebel factions such as the SPLM‑N (Joseph Touka faction). If the SAF retaliates by arming anti‑Ethiopian proxies or launching cross‑border strikes, the region could spiral into a multi‑layered conflict.
Meanwhile, the unresolved Al‑Fashaga dispute, the fertile border triangle seized by Sudan in 2020 remains a dormant flashpoint. Any deterioration in relations could reopen the front, stretching the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) at a moment of acute internal fragility.
Eritrea’s Position: Sovereignty, Stability, and Red Sea Security
Amid the uncertainty, Eritrea has emerged as the region’s most consistent actor. Asmara recognizes only the Sudanese state embodied by the Sovereignty Council and General Burhan as legitimate. President Isaias Afwerki’s visit to Port Sudan in November was framed as an act of solidarity rooted in decades of “brotherly ties.”
But Eritrea’s position is also strategic.
Asmara has long warned that Sudan’s dual‑army structure the SAF and RSF was an existential threat. Eritrea views the RSF not as a political faction but as a foreign‑backed militia designed to fracture Sudan’s sovereignty. It rejects the “internationalization” of the conflict and insists that Sudan’s stability depends on a unified national army and a political process free from external manipulation.
Crucially, Eritrea’s stance is shaped by its role as a guardian of the Red Sea’s western flank. With Yemen’s Houthi movement destabilizing the eastern shore and great‑power navies crowding the waters, Eritrea sees Sudan’s collapse as a direct threat to Red Sea security and by extension, to the Bab el‑Mandeb chokepoint.
The Red Sea and Bab el‑Mandeb: A Maritime Zone Under Siege
The Red Sea is no longer a passive trade route. It is a contested security zone where:
- Houthi missile attacks threaten commercial shipping
- U.S., Chinese, Russian, and European navies operate in close proximity
- Gulf states compete for influence along the African coast
- Non‑state actors exploit weak borders and collapsing states
The Bab el‑Mandeb, the narrow strait linking the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden is the most vulnerable point in this chain. Any Ethiopia–Sudan conflict would send shockwaves through this maritime corridor, disrupting global trade and inviting further militarization.
Sudan’s collapse has already weakened the western shore. A wider war involving Ethiopia would destabilize the entire Red Sea basin, from Eritrea’s Dahlak Archipelago to Djibouti’s naval hubs.
A Humanitarian Catastrophe Deepens
More than 12 million Sudanese are displaced. Famine conditions are spreading across RSF‑held areas. Aid corridors are routinely blocked or weaponized. The fall of El Fasher in October and the RSF’s grip on Darfur and Kordofan have left millions trapped between hunger and violence.
Prime Minister Kamil Idris’s “Sudan Peace Initiative,” presented at the UN Security Council, offers a roadmap for RSF disarmament and integration. But Burhan’s accompanying warning to neighbors to “stop meddling” underscores the fragility of the moment.
A Region on the Brink
A direct Ethiopia–Sudan conflict would be catastrophic. It would almost certainly draw in Eritrea and Egypt, transforming Sudan’s civil war into a regional conflagration and destabilizing the entire Red Sea corridor.
The Horn of Africa now stands at a precipice. The question is no longer whether Sudan’s war will spill over, but whether the region can prevent the flames from reaching the Bab el‑Mandeb, the narrow strait upon which global commerce depends.
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