Eritrea – Ethiopia’s Raiding Zone Exposes: Ethiopia’s Manufactured Victimhood

by Debessai

Ethiopian regime media and its affiliates are on overdrive these days, promoting revisionist history and manufacturing victimhood through fabricated external conspiracies. The transparent goal is to repackage and legitimize their expansionist agenda. Weaving victimhood and conspiracies has long been the favored toolkit of successive Ethiopian regimes. Whether it is blaming Egypt or touting an infamous 1879 quote of Alula, it is not a justification to violate the sanctity of sovereignty and territorial integrity of a neighboring country. So, I am not here to debate Eritrea’s right of self-determination and decolonization. But let’s go down to their level for a moment and review these preposterous claims. Did Alula attempt to achieve his dreamdespite having an overwhelmingly superior army? Was Ethiopia a perpetrator or victim of conspiracies as it relates to Eritrea? I address these topics using two authors that are considered Ethiophiles, with superb hostility towards Eritrea – it would be hard for Ethiopians to dismiss them as Eritrean agents! But even the work of these two authors show that Ethiopia has been the purveyor, not victim, of violence and conspiracy against Eritrea!

Haggai Erlich, in his “Ras Alula and the Scramble for Africa: A Political Biography”, chronicles how Eritrea primarily served as a raiding zone for Alula and other Ethiopian warlords. To be clear, Haggai views Ras Alula positively, as a great general for having achieved great success against Europeans. To Haggai, the constant raids and reign of terror on the population are immaterial in evaluating greatness, even if that monstrosity negatively impacted relations for over a century! Also, in a recent interview with a Tigrayan supporter of the Agazianmovement—an agenda that essentially entails the erasure of Eritrea—Haggai appeared to embrace that same agenda. In the preface to his book, he even refers to EPLF as the Eritrean-Tigrean EPLF.  

The second book, which I will cover in part 2, is authored by John H Spencer, a powerful advisor of Hailesilase from late 1935 to 1974 and the chief architect of Ethiopian claims on Eritrea. John, in his memoir titled “Ethiopia at Bay: A Personal Account of the Haile Selassie Years”, supplies details of the conspiracies that resulted in the sham federation. They are obviously not conspiracies to him, given that his singular goal was to secure a coastline for Ethiopia at all costs. 

Expansionist forces conveniently ignore that it was the incessant, savage reign of terror and conspiracies emanating from the south that forced the Eritrean population to view their southern neighbors with deep suspicion, sometimes necessitating alliances for the sake of their survival. And since they twist Eritrean defensive measures into conspiracy and treachery, suffice it to point out, as John noted, that Hailesilasieused “the Italian underground to undermine the hated British occupation forces in Ethiopia”. No one should blame Hailesilasie for his temporary alliance with the Italians, even if it came immediately after the end of the Fascist invasion that killed hundreds of thousands of Ethiopians. Nor should anyone blame Eritrea for entering into alliances to counter aggression, plunder and destruction!

Abiy, Mengustu and Alula 

Haggai draws on a trove of documents and sources, including exchanges of letters between Alula and various Europeans. It presents an incredible amount of documentary evidence attesting to the devastating raids and the barbaric level of violence Alula inflicted upon the Eritrean tribes. It clearly shows, as well, how Alula favored a European neighbor (at various times oscillating between France, Italy and Britain) to occupy the coastal areas of Eritrea. In what is a recurring theme for Ethiopian regimes, Haggai almost immediately starts with a story that links Alula, Mengistu and Abiy together. He recounts how Mengistu Hailemariam particularly honed in on the 1887 battle of Dogali, using it to fashion himself as Alula “the conqueror of enemies”. Today, we keep hearing Abiy and his minions invoking Alula to rally support for their dangerous, annexionist agenda. 

Eritrea: Ethiopia’s raiding zone

The violent history of Alula gets very little acknowledgement, especially from the so-called Ethiopian scholars and Ethiophiles. So, it is no surprise that Haggai uses positive-sounding adjectives in describing what was clearly savage and genocidal actions. Before going to specific incidents involving Alula, let us first see how raids were generally viewed at the time. Speaking of failure to negotiate a defined Egyptian-Ethiopian frontier, Haggai explains that “while a common commercial interest necessitated some agreement about caravan routes, the Ethiopian taxing and raiding system contradicted any concept of a boundary.” In other words, the raids were not incidental but systematic, much like a budget plan in today’s world. An Egyptian commission report also highlights how seriously they took Alula’s raids due to their impact on various tribes under Egyptian sphere. Haggai notes that “in late 1882, a commission of four Egyptian officers was sent to study the border problems. In a long report submitted in early 1883, they suggested a reorganization of the frontier in order to prevent Ras Alula and Belata Gabru from pillaging our tribes” in Bogos and surrounding areas.

These systematic raids had an unprecedented impact, as the people were also suffering from natural disasters. This convergence of devastating famine and Ethiopian raids endured by the Eritrean population is brilliantly captured in Tesfaye Gebreab’s book, The Nurenebi Files (original in Amharic but translated into English by Alemseged Tesfai and into Tigrigna by Solomon Berhe). Tesfaye makes a compelling case that the Eritrean population put up little resistance to the Italians, seeing them as the lesser evil compared with the monstrosity coming from the south. It was no conspiracy, but a matter of survival.

Haggai’s book is consistent with what is narrated in Tesfaye’s The Nurenebi Files. As Haggai notes, “the Muslim tribal zones later contained in Eritrea, Assawurta, Habbab, Beni Amir…etcduring Alula’s time were actually part of the raiding zone. They were not directly governed by Asmara and naturally resisted any central government, especially Alula’s which only taxed and raided them.” Yes, Alula only taxed and raided them! This being the broad aspect of Alula’s rule, several incidents stood out to highlight Alula’s penchant for raiding and pillaging Eritrean tribes. For example, Haggai mentions that “on 9 August, 1886, Alula led his followers to Habbab for the most effective raid he had ever launched on that tribe: he confiscated about two-thirds of their cattle and camels.” It is strange that Haggai uses “most effective” to describe Alula’s catastrophic action. Moreover, readers are left to their imaginations as far as how the Habbab people survived the loss of two-thirds of their cattle and camels! 

Alula’s greatest crime took place in late November 1886, on the backdrop of his inability to attack the well-fortified garrison in Kassala. After being ordered by emperor Yohannes to march on Kassala in early October, Alula sent envoys to the Nara and Kunama tribes (Haggai uses the derogatory term Baria but I have replaced it with Nara), ordering them to provide cattle and supplies for his troops. Dissatisfied with the inadequate supplies brought by the tribe’s Sheikh Arey, “on 22 November, 1886, the Ras ordered his army to march some eight miles southwards to the spring of Magalo. There he camped again, became frustrated with his inability even to contemplate an attack on Kassala, and therefore ordered the greatest plunder in the history of the [Nara] and Kunama tribes. During the last week in November, two-thirds of the people and cattle of the Nara and Kunama north of the Gash were destroyed.” Alula marched back his troops on December 1st without any attempt on Kassala. This ghastly genocide was ordered merely out of frustration. As Haggai put it, “Alula’s return [i.e. without attacking Kassala] is better explained by intelligence received from Kassala that the town was fortified and ready for the invaders…frustrated and in order not to return empty handed, he destroyed the long-suffering and unlucky [Nara]”. Haggai also quotes Alula’s own biographer as bragging that Alula “destroyed all the rebels and apostates of that place, and took much spoil and captured many men and women, young men and virgins; he did not leave any cattle, goats or sheep”. 

Reading Haggai’s book, one is struck by how deeply intertwined raids, violence and plunder were with Ethiopian expeditions into Eritrea. A few more examples suffice to illustrate the point:

• Early 1888, Yohannes assembled over 40K soldiers in Mereb Melash, in preparation to go to war with the Italians. “To supply the huge armies, Alula ordered the people of the Mereb Melash to bring cattle to Asmara while disarming its Muslim inhabitants.”

• “In the third week of May 1889, Alula sent a detachment of his best troops to raid and feed themselves beyond the Mereb.”

• As part of a letter asking for Italian friendship that Alula sent to Major Piano in August 1889, “Alula’s courier also asked, in his master’s name, for Italian permission to raid Akeleguzay and Seraye.”

• “Alula spent the months of September and October 1889 camping in Kohayn trying to keep his small army together and fed. At the end of August his force had been estimated at 2000, of whom 500 were armed with rifles. He managed to maintain that number by raiding various regions of Saraye and Akeleguzay. In late August, he confiscated the food stores of Meraguz.” 

• In early September 1890, as Ras Mengesha and Alula prepared to go to war with Ras Sebhat of Agame, “General Antonio Gandolfi, the new governor of Eritrea, was asked by Mengesha and Mashasha to close the border of Agamewith Akeleguzay in order not to let Sebhat supply himself by raiding in that direction.”

• Upon Baratieri’s refusal to provide cartridges and grain to the Tigrean chiefs (to please Menelik), in May 1892 “Alula suggested he would raid the Nara tribes with the dual aim of obtaining the needed food supplies and of putting pressure on the Italians.”

In the near 10 years that Alula occupied Mereb Mlash, there was little governing beyond steep tax collection and raids, amid fierce opposition from the inhabitants. In fact, “Yohannes authorized Alula to confiscate one-tenth of the Mereb Melashfor himself and for his officers but this effort to create large gults(territorial fiefs) was fiercely and successfully opposed by the local inhabitants.” It wasn’t because of conspiracy that the inhabitants opposed him, but the sheer level of violence and plundering that he came to represent.

Haggai’s own assessment of Alula’s actions with respect to Massawa is quite telling insofar as it focuses on the “sphere of raids”. Haggai reflected that “had [Alula] been able to permit Italian participation in governing what he regarded as his territorial sphere of raids, Asmara could well have become a flourishing commercial centre. But Alula was too proud to compromise; he wanted to raid the peripheral tribes, to limit the Italians to the port of Massawa and he sought an active and peaceful commercial contact with the port.” The Italian General Oreste Baratieri, who replaced Gandolfi as the new governor of Eritrea in February 1891, wrote on 18 August 1891, that he considered Alula as an enemy of even “the Tigreans themselves, whom he does not let have even one quiet hour.” Over a century later, this description perfectly captures Abiy as enemy of all Ethiopians for he has engulfed them in constant wars and mayhem, with not even one quiet hour ever since he came to power eight years ago. The same could be said of Hailesilasieand Mengistu Hailemariam too!

All bark and no bite

During seasons of expansionism and irredentism, the warmongering forces in Ethiopia love to quote that Alula line from July 1879 where he is said to have told a French missionary that “I have come to retake Massawa from the Egyptians. I will not go away until my horse has drunk from the Red Sea.” Thankfully for the horse, it did not have to drink salt water! By all accounts, Alula had the numeric advantage to advance towards Massawa at the exact time he was utteringthose words: his army alone (i.e. excluding troops commanded by emperor Yohannes’ other chiefs) numbered 25,000 – 40,000whereas there were only about 3000-4000 Egyptians in total at the Keren and Massawa garrisons. So, what did Alula do? Well, Alula’s army entered Bogos (area in and around Keren) only to tax the various tribes and European colonialists and missionaries. But Alula “refrained from sending troops towards Massawa”, and instead used the time to treacherously plot the downfall of his deputy, the Eritrean Raesi Woldemikael. 

That was the end of Alula’s braggadocio on Massawa! Contrary to what Ethiopian scholars and politicians would like us to believe, Alula never repeated the goal to control Massawa after this period. It almost seemed as though he was posturing when he said that famous line. Because, as Haggai documented, Alula from this period onwards consistently demonstrated that he desired a friendly European neighbor controlling the coastal territory with the condition that they allow free transit of weapons shipments! This is even reflected their response to the Sudanese request for alliance in early 1884 where “the Mahdist leader of the eastern Sudanese marches, Uthman Diqna, had written to Yohannes and Alula suggesting common action” against the Egyptian occupying forces. However, this call was rejected in favor of helping the Egyptians under what came to be known as the Hewett Treaty of 1884, for which Alula was the chief architect from the Ethiopian side.

For love of European neighbors

The Hewett Treaty, which did not award Ethiopia control of a coastline but only “a free transit through Massawa under British protection”, makes Alula’s stance abundantly clear. While thehorse’s chance of drinking from the Red Sea vanished with that treaty, nevertheless “Alula was proud of the diplomatic achievement” that was previously considered infeasible: a treaty guaranteed by Britain. But why was Alula in favor of the agreement? As Haggai explains, “his main interest was the highly profitable arms trade [that] was but a part of the commercial life stimulated by Alula, who was accordingly anxious to have the port of Massawa protected and managed by the British.” This didn’t last long, however, as control of the port changed hands soon. Following the entrance of Italian troops into Massawa in 1885 and after hearing the Italian envoy’s assurances that they would respect the Hewett Treaty, Alula sent a calming letter to emperor Yohannes as he “was undoubtedly relieved to learn from the envoys that Rome would function in Massawa as the long desired European neighbor.”

Haggai does argue here, though in fairness it is with the benefit of hindsight, that perhaps “the desire, which especially motivated the Ethiopian architect of the treaty, to have a European partner in international affairs rather than an African neighbor, was based on harmful naivete.” Also in fairness, this penchant for western “partners” is not exclusive to Alula. Sadly, all Ethiopian leaders are afflicted with this predisposition. 

Did Alula and Yohannes intend Eritrea as a buffer zone? There are several indications of this purpose found within Haggai’s book. For instance, he notes that “Alula had hoped the Italians would limit themselves to Massawa and facilitate trade (as he had thought that the British would do, or planned that the French would do at Zula); but once they started interfering in internal politics they had to be countered”. Emperor Yohannes himself, worried about Italian expansion from Massawa and towards his territory, wrote to Queen Victoria in April 1886, saying “we had no quarrel before because you told me to be in friendship with the Italians. Now I do not know how to be in friendship with them. Write to me explaining how to do it.”

Alula’s state of mind immediately before the battle of Dogoli of January 25-26, 1887 is even a clearer indication of the buffer zone intention. Days before the battle, on January 12th, Alula told his Italian prisoners that “he still hoped that the Italians would peacefully return to Massawa where he would like them to stay.” His ambush of the Italians at Dogoli, therefore, was not motivated by a desire to go all the way to Massawa; it was merely to prevent Italy from pushing further inland. This is further illustrated by what Alula wrote the Italian General Carlo Gene, chief of the Italian forces in Massawa, just a week after the battle. On February 2, 1887, Alula “resumed correspondence with Gene emphasizing an interest and will for peace but only if the Italians limited themselves to Massawa.” Favoring the buffer, Emperor Yohannes wrote to Menelik in November 1887 that “for my part, if the Italian government does not come to take possession of my country and allows the free passage of goods at Massawa, I am disposed to make peace and come to an agreement.”

After the death of emperor Yohannes, Alula tried, in vain, to get closer to the Italians. For instance, in May 1891, he appealed tothe Italian L. Mercantelli that “if he [Menelik] gives as a present what is out of his door [the Mereb Melash] the present is of no value. You want the country to the Mereb to cultivate your gardens, to build your houses, to construct your churches…? We can give it to you. [And not Menelik]. Let the Italian soldiers come to Adwa, I shall come to meet them like a friend. You want the road open and I want the road open. You should guard it to the Mereb and I shall guard it to Gonder and even beyond Gonder.” To be clear, much like his untenable promise of his horse drinking from Massawa, Alula is here promising Italysomething that was not his to give. Just as Mereb Mlash was not Meneliks’s to give away, neither was it Alula’s to offer or bargain away. Besides, the Italians had already set it up as their colony in January 1890 so they didn’t need his help in 1891! But as history is a witness, Ethiopian leaders have no qualms about making claims or promises they cannot substantiate.

Returning to the theme of Ethiopian leaders’ love affair with westerners, the closest company to Abiy from Alula’s period is actually another Tigrayan warlord. In striking similarity to what Abiy told the New Yorker journalist – that he would die for America – Dabab (the cousin of emperor Yohannes and Alula’s nemesis and brother-in-law), in late 1888, wrote to British diplomat in Aden “if, with the help of Jesus Christ, I secure your goodwill, I shall have no more troubles. I have given my heart to you. Love me. I love you. It is you who have put King John upon the throne, consequently, after Jesus Christ, I look to you for support”. Dabab did not succeed in convincing the Brits to put him on the throne. Abiy seems to have found the love in the UAE and its affiliates whereas the US and EU, at least publicly, have not reciprocated.

The Eritrean population naturally tired of living under constant raids and pillage. To the Eritreans, the Ethiopian troops, like the Italians, were foreign invading forces. So, at least initially, the Italians offered an escape from the devastating confluence of Ethiopian raids and famine. It was a matter of survival, not conspiracy! Ignoring this inconvenient fact and plucking out one infamous line of Alula does injustice to the future interaction of the two countries’ peoples.