Foreign Powers’ Role in Sudan’s Crisis: Regional Players Fuel the Conflict

By David Yeh

The civil war in Sudan has become one of the defining humanitarian and geopolitical crises of the early 21st century. What began in April 2023 as a bitter power struggle between two factions within the Sudanese security establishment the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has metastasized into a sprawling conflict with repercussions that stretch far beyond Sudan’s borders. Millions of civilians have been displaced or killed, entire cities have been destroyed, and the prospects for peace seem ever more remote. Yet this catastrophe is not merely the product of internal rivalry. It is also a testament to how a fragile state, beset by internal tensions and regional vulnerabilities, can become the locus of broader geopolitical contestation. In this arena, external powers especially the United Arab Emirates (UAE), but also neighboring states, private military actors, and regional institutions have played profound and often devastating roles.

Sudan’s strategic importance cannot be overstated. Positioned at the crossroads of North Africa, the Horn of Africa, and the Middle East, it controls access to critical waterways, fertile land, and mineral resources. It also borders a roster of states with their own internal pressures and rivalries: Egypt to the north, Ethiopia to the east, South Sudan to the south, Chad to the west, and Libya beyond. These neighborhood relationships have been colored by historical conflicts, competition for resources, border disputes, and, increasingly, foreign intervention. The result is a combustible mix in which the suffering of the Sudanese people has become a secondary casualty to geopolitical ambition.

The UAE, in particular, has emerged as a central external actor in Sudan’s war, operating through a complex web of influence that stretches across Africa and the wider Middle East. The Emirati state has established political, economic, and military ties in countries from Kenya and Chad to South Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Libya. In each case, it has sought to exploit vulnerabilities ethnic tensions, border disputes, weak central governance, and resource wealth to insert itself into strategic decision‑making processes. These interventions have often been cloaked in the rhetoric of security cooperation or economic development, yet beneath the surface lies a pattern of engagement that has fueled local conflicts and undermined sovereign governance.

In Sudan itself, the UAE’s presence and influence have been longstanding. Sudan’s transitional government prior to 2023 had pursued closer ties with Gulf states, including Abu Dhabi, seeking investment and strategic backing. But with the eruption of full‑scale conflict, these links have taken on a far more troubling dimension. The Sudanese military has repeatedly accused the UAE of arming and funding the RSF, allegations that have been echoed by U.N. experts and some U.S. lawmakers who described them as credible. The Emiratis have consistently denied these charges, insisting they are not a party to the conflict and have no role in any way in the fighting. Yet reports from independent investigations, satellite imagery analyses, and diplomatic sources have painted a different picture: one of clandestine support networks, secret training facilities, and military logistics operations that span continents.

Perhaps the most significant of these revelations is the existence of a secret RSF training camp in Ethiopia’s remote Benishangul – Gumuz region, not far from the Sudanese border. According to officials, diplomats, and satellite imagery reviewed by Reuters, this facility appears to be designed to train thousands of RSF fighters, many of whom are expected to be deployed into Sudan to bolster paramilitary operations. The camp’s construction began in April 2025, with initial clearing of forest land followed by the erection of permanent structures. By late November, hundreds of tents, heavy machinery, transport vehicles, and rows of shipping containers ringed the compound, suggesting a highly organized facility capable of housing and sustaining large numbers of recruits. An image captured on January 22 shows further expansion and new earthworks, indicating active development and preparation for continued operations.

Defense analysis firm Janes estimated that the camp could shelter several thousand fighters, though it noted that imagery alone could not determine its precise purpose. Ethiopian security documents reviewed by Reuters suggested that as many as 4,300 RSF fighters were undergoing training there as of early January, with the potential for far more. According to multiple sources, those being trained included not only Sudanese but also South Sudanese and Ethiopian nationals, hinting at a broader recruitment strategy. Convoys of long trucks were observed in November heading toward the compound, each believed to carry dozens of recruits destined for training. Diplomats and analysts have interpreted this as evidence of a direct and deepening involvement by Ethiopia in a conflict that, on paper, is Sudan’s own.

The role of the UAE in establishing and financing this camp, according to eight sources including a senior Ethiopian government official appears to have been significant. They allege that the Emiratis underwrote construction costs, provided trainers, and offered logistical support, though Reuters could not independently verify the precise details. Both the Ethiopian government and the RSF have declined to comment publicly, and Sudan’s army did not respond to requests for information. Nonetheless, the emerging picture suggests that Addis Ababa has permitted or facilitated the development of a foreign‑backed paramilitary training facility on its soil, in direct contravention of the notion that the Sudan conflict is an internal affair.

The geographic placement of the camp in Benishangul – Gumuz is itself telling. The region lies near the contested borders of Sudan and Ethiopia and has long been a point of tension, with disputes over migration, ethnic affiliations, and resource claims. By hosting a facility that trains combatants to be deployed across an international border, Ethiopia has effectively blurred the lines between defensive posture and active engagement in foreign conflict. Officials claim the development of nearby infrastructure particularly at Asosa airport, roughly 53 kilometers away, is intended to bolster Ethiopia’s own strategic defenses, including protecting critical projects like the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) from spillover instability. But outside experts have noted that upgrades resembling drone ground‑control infrastructure, new hangars, and expanded paved areas at Asosa could just as easily function as logistical hubs for the movement of trained forces and materiel into Sudan.

These developments raise urgent questions about sovereignty, regional security, and the shifting alliances in Africa’s Horn. If the RSF’s operational capabilities are being enhanced through foreign‑supported training on Ethiopian territory, the conflict in Sudan has moved well beyond an internal struggle. It has evolved into a conflict with transnational backing, deepening ethnic divides, and a growing roster of external parties with strategic stakes in the outcome.

This interconnectedness of interests is further underscored by evidence that the UAE has leveraged international air logistics networks to support its regional objectives. Flight tracking data analyzed in recent reports reveals that a cargo plane, an Antonov An‑124 with the tail number UR‑ZYD operated by Maximus Air, a UAE‑based carrier, has made repeated flights between Abu Dhabi and locations across the Middle East, Horn of Africa, and beyond. These include military airbases in Israel, Bahrain, and Ethiopia. While the exact contents of these flights remain unverified, analysts have raised alarms that the repeated nature of the sorties and the significant cargo capacity of the aircraft could indicate strategic supply runs for paramilitary groups such as the RSF.

Maximus Air, part of Abu Dhabi Aviation (ADA) and majority owned by an investment fund chaired by UAE national security advisor Sheikh Tahnoon bin Zayed Al Nahyan, bills itself as a provider of cargo services, including for government and military entities. But its operations have previously attracted international scrutiny. A 2021 U.N. panel of experts accused the airline of violating sanctions by facilitating the supply of weapons to Libyan warlord Khalifa Haftar’s forces, which have themselves been implicated in supporting the RSF in Sudan. The panel identified a series of suspicious flights forming a covert “airbridge” that delivered weapons across conflict zones, a charge flatly denied by UAE representatives at the U.N.

Open source monitoring of UR‑ZYD further suggests that the aircraft has been active in multiple theaters. Shortly before its flights into Ethiopia beginning on January 3, it made several round trips between military bases in Bahrain and Israel’s Ovda Airbase in the Negev desert. It has also flown routes to Marseille, France; Taraz, Kazakhstan; Guangzhou, China; and U – Tapao in Thailand. This pattern of global movement, timed against increased RSF activity near Sudan’s borders, has fueled speculation about its role in supplying equipment, fighters, or materiel in support of paramilitary operations. Analysts from Yale’s Humanitarian Research Lab noted that if these flights are indeed supplying RSF forces, it would constitute a matter of global concern, underscoring the sprawling reach of foreign involvement in what is nominally Sudan’s internal war.

The geopolitical stakes are high. The civil war in Sudan has become a proxy battlefield in a larger regional contest between Gulf states. Saudi Arabia and Egypt have sided with the SAF, offering military support intended to counterbalance the UAE’s backing of the RSF. In Yemen, similar Gulf rivalries have played out bitterly, with Saudi‑led forces clashing with UAE‑aligned groups. The fallout from those campaigns appears to have spilled into the Horn of Africa, where shifting alliances, strategic partnerships, and longstanding rivalries now define how states engage with Sudan.

Israel’s recognition of Somaliland and the UAE’s control of strategic coastal bases in Berbera and Bosaso further complicate the regional landscape. These developments have prompted speculation that Ethiopia closely aligned with Abu Dhabi might pursue comparable strategic advantages, potentially in exchange for support in Sudan. The broader effect is a recalibration of power in the Horn, where states are forced to choose between competing Gulf patrons, often with little regard for local stability or civilian welfare.

Amid these geopolitical machinations, Sudanese civilians remain trapped in a spiral of violence, deprivation, and fear. In North Darfur, for example, reports from human rights groups describe horrific conditions in RSF‑controlled facilities such as Shala prison, where up to 9,000 civilians are believed to be held under brutal circumstances. Outbreaks of cholera, lack of medical care, and widespread denial of basic necessities have resulted in hundreds of deaths. Survivors describe pervasive violence, including executions, rape, and looting, while entire urban centers like El‑Fasher have seen their populations decimated, with tens of thousands trapped under siege and subjected to systematic abuses.

These atrocities are part of a broader pattern of human rights violations linked to paramilitary conduct, ethnic targeting, and unchecked violence in conflict zones. The international community has expressed concern, yet the heavy footprint of external actors complicates efforts to deliver aid, negotiate ceasefires, or impose accountability. Regional organizations such as the African Union (AU) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) have struggled to respond effectively. Critics argue that by including representatives from the UAE and Israel in peace dialogues, these institutions undermine the sovereignty and political interests of African states, inadvertently reinforcing the influence of foreign powers over regional affairs.

The central question looms large: what have the Sudanese people done to warrant such deep and destructive foreign intervention? The tragic answer lies not in any failing on their part but in the geopolitical value of their country. Sudan’s strategic position, natural resources, and porous borders have made it a target for influence by states seeking advantage in a volatile region. External powers have exploited internal divisions and state weaknesses, turning what should be a domestic struggle for political ascendancy into a wider proxy conflict with deadly consequences.

In the end, the Sudan crisis stands as a stark testament to how fragile states can be consumed by forces far beyond their control. The humanitarian cost marked by death, displacement, and social collapse is borne overwhelmingly by ordinary Sudanese families, while foreign interests jockey for strategic leverage. The UAE’s clandestine networks, Ethiopia’s complicity in hosting paramilitary training facilities, Saudi Arabia’s shifting alliances, Egypt’s strategic ambitions, and the global logistics chains that ferry equipment and fighters all converge on Sudan’s battlefields. This convergence has transformed a national tragedy into a regional catastrophe, with repercussions that will resonate across Africa and beyond for years to come.