Manufacturing Continuity: Imperial Nostalgia and the Political Uses of Ethiopia’s Past

By Alula Frezghi

Abstract

This article interrogates the persistent narrative of Ethiopia as an ancient, unified, and exceptional African state and examines the political work this narrative performs in legitimizing imperial continuity in the Horn of Africa. It argues that the modern Ethiopian state emerged primarily through late nineteenth-century imperial expansion rather than organic national integration, and that post–World War II international diplomacy recast this imperial formation as an anti-colonial symbol. Focusing particularly on Eritrea, the article demonstrates how the mythology of Ethiopian exceptionalism eclipsed principles of self-determination and reshaped regional order. By disentangling empire from nationhood, the article calls for a more rigorous anti-colonial framework grounded in historical accountability rather than symbolic continuity.

Introduction

For much of the twentieth century, global understandings of Ethiopia have been shaped by a powerful and remarkably durable narrative. Ethiopia is routinely portrayed as a three-thousand-year-old, unified civilization; a state that was never colonized; and a singular symbol of African resistance and Black sovereignty. These representations have circulated widely in diplomatic discourse, Pan-Africanist thought, and popular historiography. While emotionally resonant and politically useful, they obscure the historical processes through which the modern Ethiopian state was assembled and continue to shape regional alignments, conflicts, and the marginalization of subordinate nations’ political claims.

This article contends that the prevailing narrative of Ethiopian continuity is not merely an interpretive error but a political construction with enduring consequences. By examining imperial expansion under Menelik II and the post–World War II settlement concerning Eritrea, the article demonstrates how historical mythmaking has functioned to legitimate empire under the guise of antiquity and unity.

The Limits of “Ancient Ethiopia”

There is no serious dispute regarding the antiquity of Abyssinian highland kingdoms. What remains contested, and frequently elided, is the claim that these polities constituted a continuous, multi-ethnic Ethiopian state extending organically into the present. Abyssinia was a highland monarchy with fluctuating borders and limited territorial reach; Ethiopia, as a consolidated territorial state, is largely a late nineteenth-century creation.¹

The political entity recognized today as Ethiopia took shape through rapid imperial expansion under Menelik II rather than through gradual processes of national integration. This expansion unfolded in close interaction with European imperial rivalry in the Horn of Africa. Britain, France, and Italy armed, financed, and diplomatically legitimized Menelik’s campaigns as they competed for regional influence.² With access to modern firearms, artillery, and international recognition, the Abyssinian monarchy conquered and incorporated vast territories inhabited by Oromo, Sidama, Somali, Wolayta, Afar, and other nations.³

These incorporations were neither symbolic nor consensual. They involved land expropriation, coercive labor systems, political subjugation, and the institutional elevation of a highland Christian identity as the normative standard of civilization and authority.⁴ While Ethiopian imperial expansion differed from European overseas colonialism in form and genealogy, it shared its essential characteristics: conquest, extraction, and cultural domination. To describe this process solely as “state formation” without acknowledging its imperial character risks exempting it from the analytical standards applied to colonial projects elsewhere in Africa.⁵

War, Occupation, and the Recasting of Legitimacy, 1936–1952

The Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1935–36 constituted a colonial occupation that temporarily displaced Abyssinian rule without dismantling its imperial core. Rather than undermining Ethiopian claims to sovereignty, this interruption ultimately strengthened their international legitimacy. During his exile, Haile Selassie mounted an extensive diplomatic and public advocacy campaign in Britain, presenting Ethiopia as both a victim of fascist aggression and a stabilizing force in the region.⁶ British intellectuals and activists, most notably Sylvia Pankhurst, amplified this framing and extended it to normalize Ethiopian claims over Eritrea as historically justified or strategically necessary.⁷

After World War II, this narrative converged with Allied geopolitical priorities. With Italy defeated, its former colonies in the Horn and North Africa became subjects of negotiation driven less by self-determination than by concerns over Red Sea security, Middle Eastern oil routes, and Cold War competition.⁸ Eritrea, despite its distinct colonial trajectory and comparatively developed civic institutions, was reframed from a former colony entitled to independence into a strategic asset whose disposition could serve external interests.⁹

The February 1945 meeting between Haile Selassie and U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt aboard the USS Quincy symbolized this shift. Although it produced no formal agreements, the encounter elevated Ethiopia’s diplomatic standing at a critical juncture.¹⁰ American policymakers, prioritizing access and regional stability, proved receptive to Ethiopian arguments for maritime access, while Eritrean political aspirations were increasingly marginalized.¹¹

Between 1946 and 1952, British administration of Eritrea produced a series of proposals guided by expediency rather than democratic legitimacy. The 1946 Bevin Plan, which proposed partitioning Eritrea between Ethiopia and Sudan, exemplified this approach.¹² Ethiopian demands centered on highland territory and access to the Red Sea, underscoring the instrumental nature of the claim rather than any historically coherent unity with Eritrea.

Eritrea and the Eclipse of Self-Determination

Contrary to later portrayals of Eritrea as politically fragmented or unprepared for sovereignty, the territory possessed a vibrant civic and political life in the immediate postwar period. Political parties, trade unions, religious institutions, and cross-communal coalitions articulated clear and legally grounded demands for full independence.¹³ These claims aligned closely with prevailing international norms of self-determination.

Their marginalization was not the result of incoherence or political immaturity but of strategic calculation. The UN-imposed federation of Eritrea with Ethiopia in 1952 reflected diplomatic fatigue and great-power compromise rather than popular consent.¹⁴ It marked the triumph of imperial continuity over anti-colonial principle and laid the structural foundations for prolonged conflict.¹⁵

Conclusion: Imperial Continuity and Anti-Colonial Reckoning

The mythology of an ancient, unified, and exceptional Ethiopia persists because it performs essential political work. It sanitizes imperial conquest, recasts expansion as civilizational continuity, and deploys the language of unity to delegitimize the historical experiences of subordinated nations. In doing so, it weakens rather than strengthens Pan-Africanism by substituting romantic symbolism for material historical analysis.¹⁶

A rigorous anti-colonial framework requires confronting these histories without nostalgia or defensiveness. Sovereignty cannot be meaningfully defended when it rests on the erasure of others’ self-determination. Reckoning with imperial continuity is not an act of division but a prerequisite for any durable and dignified regional order. Only by disentangling empire from nationhood can a politics grounded in justice, equality, and genuine solidarity emerge in the Horn of Africa.¹⁷

Endnotes

1. Bahru Zewde, A History of Modern Ethiopia, 1855–1991 (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2001), 1–12.
2. Harold G. Marcus, The Life and Times of Menelik II: Ethiopia 1844–1913 (Lawrenceville: Red Sea Press, 1995), 156–189.
3. Donald Donham and Wendy James, eds., The Southern Marches of Imperial Ethiopia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).
4. John Markakis, National and Class Conflict in the Horn of Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 35–58.
5. Christopher Clapham, Transformation and Continuity in Revolutionary Ethiopia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 15–27.
6. Richard Pankhurst, Sylvia Pankhurst: Counsel for Ethiopia (London: Lalibela House, 2003).
7. Ibid.
8. Jeffrey Lefebvre, Arms for the Horn: U.S. Security Policy in Ethiopia and Somalia, 1953–1991 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991), 9–24.
9. Tekeste Negash, Italian Colonialism in Eritrea, 1882–1941 (Uppsala: Uppsala University Press, 1987), Introduction.
10. Warren F. Kimball, Forged in War: Roosevelt, Churchill, and the Second World War (New York: William Morrow, 1997), 287–289.
11. Lefebvre, Arms for the Horn, 12–18.
12. Haggai Erlich, The Struggle over Eritrea, 1962–1978 (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1983), 3–18.
13. Ruth Iyob, The Eritrean Struggle for Independence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 57–71.
14. UN General Assembly Resolution 390 (V), “Federation of Eritrea with Ethiopia,” December 2, 1950.
15. Tekeste Negash and Kjetil Tronvoll, Brothers at War (Oxford: James Currey, 2000), 1–10.
16. Adom Getachew, Worldmaking after Empire (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019), 71–95.
17. Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove Press, 1963), chap.