Old Lies, New Ties: Eritrea, Once Again the Convenient Scapegoat

by Ghidewon Abay Asmerom

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There is a familiar ritual in Ethiopian politics: when the center cracks, blame Eritrea. When agreements fail, blame Eritrea. When Ethiopian factions betray one another, blame Eritrea. When the Red Sea obsession alarms the region, blame Eritrea. When Addis Ababa and Tigray cannot honor their own commitments, blame Eritrea again. This is the oldest trick in the Ethiopian political playbook: externalize the crisis, invent a foreign hand, and hide domestic failure behind the convenient shadow of Eritrea.

The latest performance comes from Getachew Reda, now serving as Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s adviser on East African affairs. In a June 11, 2026 Al Jazeera opinion article, Getachew and Redwan Hussein, the director general of Ethiopia’s intelligence and security services, attempt to portray Eritrea as the principal source of danger to Ethiopia’s fragile peace. Their argument is simple: “the Pretoria Agreement is under threat because Eritrea is allegedly backing ‘hardliners’ and pushing Ethiopia toward another war.” But this claim collapses under the weight of Ethiopia’s own record.

The Uncertainty Principle of Ethiopian Elite Politics

Getachew Reda is not an accident. He is the latest incarnation of a familiar Ethiopian ruling-class habit: treachery dressed as strategy, deception packaged as diplomacy, and flip-flopping elevated into statecraft. In the political culture of Ethiopia’s Abyssinian elite, yesterday’s enemy can become today’s patron, yesterday’s accusation can become today’s slipup, and yesterday’s principle can be sold by evening for a seat at the palace table.

Getachew’s career seems designed to outdo even the uncertainty principle of quantum mechanics. With some politicians, one may not know both position and momentum at the same time. With Getachew, Abiy, and their circle, one cannot know whether a position taken in the morning will still exist by lunchtime, let alone by evening. Their politics has no fixed moral location. It moves with office, opportunity, and survival.

If Meles Zenawi was the arch-deceiver who turned tactical ambiguity into a governing method, Abiy Ahmed, Getachew Reda, and Tsadkan Gebretensae represent a more shameless generation of the same tradition: men of shifting loyalties, convenient memories, and selective outrage. They speak of peace while preparing for war. They speak of accountability when out of power and forget it when near power. They speak of sovereignty when it protects them and dismiss it when it belongs to Eritrea.

This is why Getachew’s latest attack on Eritrea must not be read as serious regional analysis. It is the speech of a man who has changed camps without changing habits. Once Abiy’s loud accuser, he is now Abiy’s adviser. Once a voice claiming to speak for Tigrayan suffering, he now echoes the very political center he condemned. Once a critic of betrayal, he has become one of its most polished practitioners.

The issue, therefore, is larger than Getachew himself. He is merely the newest face of an old political disease: the refusal of Ethiopian elites to own their failures, honor their agreements, respect their neighbors’ sovereignty, or tell the truth when blaming Eritrea is more convenient. The Eritrea scapegoat myth survives because men like Getachew need it. It gives them cover. It gives them a script. It allows them to escape the wreckage of their own contradictions by pointing south, north, east—anywhere but inward.

Blaming Eritrea for Ethiopia’s Own Broken Agreements

The first deception must be confronted at the source: the Pretoria Agreement was not an Eritrean agreement, and its failures cannot honestly be placed at Eritrea’s door.

Eritrea was not a party to the Pretoria agreement. Eritrea did not write Pretoria, sign Pretoria, administer Pretoria, obstruct its implementation, or control the parties responsible for carrying it out. The agreement was between the Ethiopian federal government and the TPLF. Its failure belongs to those who negotiated it, signed it, manipulated it, delayed it, and weaponized it against one another. To drag Eritrea into the matter is naked evasion.

The failure of Pretoria must be understood within a wider Ethiopian pattern: agreements made and then evaded, promises issued and then betrayed, solemn commitments signed and then treated as tactical pauses. From the era of Abyssinian imperial rivalries to the modern border dispute, Abyssinian and Ethiopian political history contains repeated examples of power holders breaking understandings when convenience demanded it.

Thus, Pretoria belongs to that same pattern. Eritrea did not create it. Eritrea did not break it. Eritrea did not prevent its implementation. Yet Getachew Reda now wants Eritrea to carry the blame.

When Promises Become Tactics: The Abyssinian/Ethiopian Pattern of Betrayal

This pattern of betrayal or broken promises is not new. It runs like a dark thread through Abyssinian political history: Ras Mikael Sehul’s betrayal of Eritrean Ra’esi Andehaimanot of Tseazega; Ras Alula’s betrayal of Eritrean Ra’esi Woldemichael Solomon of Hazega, despite having sworn in the name of St. Mary of Aksum; Yohannes IV’s betrayal of Emperor Tewodros II, and of his own brother-in-law, Emperor Tekle Giyorgis; Menelik II’s betrayal of Emperor Yohannes IV; Ras Tafari Makonnen’s betrayal of his cousin, Emperor Lij Iyasu, by orchestrating the 1916 coup against him; Haile Selassie’s betrayal of Empress Zewditu through the killing of her husband, Gugsa Wolle, followed by her suspicious death two days later; The Shoan nobles who served as Italian agents, betraying Haile Selassie and exposing Eritreans who were passing information from Somalia about the imminent Italian invasion; and, later, the many betrayals within Mengistu’s Derg.

Fast forward to the modern era, and the same pattern continues: Meles Zenawi’s betrayal of Eritrea through his refusal to implement the final and binding EEBC decision, followed by Abiy Ahmed’s own reversal against Eritrea. Taken together, these episodes point to a long political culture in which solemn commitments are too often treated not as binding obligations, but as instruments of temporary advantage.

Eritrea’s Position: Stability, Sovereignty, and Shared Regional Security

Against this manufactured accusation stands Eritrea’s consistent regional outlook: Ethiopia’s peace is not a threat to Eritrea; Ethiopian expansionism is.

Eritrea has no interest, in principle or in practice, in seeing Ethiopia “bleed to death.” Eritrea’s outlook is not zero-sum. It is shared-sum. A stable Ethiopia that respects the sovereignty of its neighbors serves Eritrea’s interests, the Horn of Africa’s interests, and Africa’s interests. What Eritrea rejects is not Ethiopian stability. What Eritrea rejects is Ethiopian expansionism, Ethiopian entitlement, and the dangerous fantasy that Ethiopia’s internal failures can be solved by reaching for Eritrean or Somali coastlines.

This distinction is essential. Eritrea does not fear peace inside Ethiopia. It fears the recurring habit of Ethiopian ruling elites using “peace,” “access,” and “regional integration” as softer words for pressure, encroachment, and territorial appetite.

The historical record is public. The EPLF did not encourage the TPLF to remain a narrow regionalist movement. It encouraged it to think beyond Tigray and participate in the transformation of Ethiopia as a whole. President Isaias Afwerki also warned early, as far back as 1994, that ethnic federalism would become a ticking time bomb. That warning was not born of hostility to Ethiopia. It was born of hard historical understanding: states built on ethnic fragmentation, elite manipulation, and constitutionalized suspicion do not easily produce durable peace. Today, the warning has become Ethiopia’s daily reality.

Getachew Reda: From Abiy’s Accuser to Abiy’s Adviser

If the accusation is weak, the accuser makes it even weaker. Getachew Reda’s present posture cannot be understood without recalling what he once said about the very man he now serves.

If Ethiopian politics has produced spectacular flip-floppers, Getachew Reda and Abiy Ahmed now stand near the top of the list. Meles Zenawi was the original master of political reversal, but Getachew and Abiy have refined the art into open theater. Getachew is now living on crumbs from Abiy’s palace, but only a few years ago he threw every insult under the sun at the same Abiy Ahmed. His current attack on Eritrea should therefore surprise no one. It is simply the latest costume in a career built on shifting camps and changing slogans.

Here is a sample of the many insults Getachew Reda once directed at Abiy Ahmed:

• “Now, the way Ethiopia can be saved from the trouble that has befallen it is that liars like Abiy must be told: enough is enough. If I am asked to present a serious and undeniable example, if someone wants to see what treason against a country looks like, there is no need to study anyone else. Study Abiy. He is a prime example of treason against a country.
• “Abiy Ahmed calls us “weeds.” It will be seen who the weed is. Abiy is the weed. The weed that has grown in this country is Abiy. Abiy Ahmed is a dwarf—a political dwarf. Abiy Ahmed is a dwarf in everything. If this was in a normally healthy country, he is a person who should have been sent either to holy-water treatment, or to a mental  hospital.
• “To sit and negotiate in any way, for any purpose, with the government led by Abiy is shameful. More than shameful—it is disgrace upon disgrace.
• “Abiy’s style of leadership, what foreigners call his modus operandi—the way Abiy leads is through deception. Abiy has no substance at all. Beginning with his educational credentials, everything is based through deception. Therefore, if you take time, calmly, and ask him, “Where did you study?” he has no answer to give you.
• “Erdogan will not save Abiy. Saddam Hussein will not save him. Vladimir Putin will not save him. If anyone can save him, it is Joe Biden—if he pushed him by saying, “Accept peace.”
• “There is a Michael Jackson song that says, “They don’t care about us.” That is what Amhara youth should be saying. Abiy does not really care about you. He has no concern for you.
• “Even treachery itself gets a bad name from people like Abiy. If you want an example of small people who, little by little, by chance and by mistake, reach a high position and then lead others into great danger, it is Abiy.
• “There is a saying: ‘After I die, let no grass grow,’ said the donkey. But this saying fits Abiy Ahmed best.”

These are not the words of a mild critic. They are the words of a man who once portrayed Abiy Ahmed as a liar, a traitor, a danger, a fraud, and a disgrace. Yet today, that same Getachew sits inside Abiy’s political house and speaks as if he has discovered a new gospel of federal responsibility. This is not political maturity. It is political laundering.

During the Tigray war, Getachew was one of the TPLF’s most visible wartime spokesmen. He spoke the language of resistance, victimhood, accountability, and survival. He accused Abiy’s government of grave crimes against the people of Tigray. He presented himself as a defender of Tigrayan suffering against the very state he said had unleashed devastation on his people. Today, he serves the same political order he once denounced. That is not a minor adjustment. It is a moral collapse.

The man who once called negotiation with Abiy’s government “disgrace upon disgrace” now works for that government. The man who once accused Abiy of treason now advises him. The man who once demanded accountability now hides behind ambiguity. When pressed on responsibility for crimes committed during the war, he no longer speaks with the certainty he once displayed. He retreats into legal caution, selective memory, and political convenience.

This is why Getachew’s latest attack on Eritrea must be read through the full history of his own reversals. He was once a defender of the Ethiopian federal order under the TPLF when that order served TPLF supremacy. Later, he became the voice of the TPLF’s war against the federal government. Then he became interim president of Tigray. After falling out with sections of the old TPLF leadership, he became useful to Abiy. Now, from inside the Prosperity Party’s circle, he recycles the old accusation that Eritrea is the destabilizing force in the Horn.

One thing can be said with near certainty: Getachew Reda, shifty as ever, will change camps again and turn on Abiy Ahmed when the political winds shift. If the Fano wave grows stronger and Abiy finds himself cornered, Getachew will abandon him in the blink of an eye. Do not be surprised if he suddenly pulls the Raya/Wollo card and tries to reposition himself closer to the Amhara side. His loyalty is as thin as his principles, and in that regard he resembles his current boss.

As for his foul mouth, it remains completely unbridled. He claims to have studied law, though he never truly practiced it, and he speaks with no regard for the weight, consequence, or decency of his own words. He does not argue; he spits. He does not reason; he lashes out. His political method is opportunism, and his language is the vomit of that opportunism.

The pattern is unmistakable. Every time Getachew changes camp, his moral vocabulary changes with him. Yesterday’s enemy becomes today’s patron. Yesterday’s accusation becomes today’s inconvenience. Yesterday’s principle becomes today’s bargaining chip.

Eritrea as Ethiopia’s Convenient Scapegoat

The real source of instability in the Horn is not Eritrea’s defense of its sovereignty, but the repeated refusal of Ethiopian elites to confront their own crises without exporting them. Ethiopia’s internal wars, constitutional fractures, ethnic conflicts, elite rivalries, broken federalism, and dangerous seaport rhetoric are not Eritrean inventions. They are Ethiopian political failures. Yet rather than face them honestly, figures like Getachew, Tsadkan and Abiy Ahmed turn outward, searching for a foreign culprit to explain a domestic breakdown.

The most revealing feature of Getachew’s political journey is not merely how often he changes sides, but how little his anti-Eritrean reflex has changed. As a Johnny-come-lately to the TPLF, and as a product of the political school shaped by Sebhat Nega, Gebru Asrat, Abay Tsehaye, Seyoum Mesfin, and Meles Zenawi in the first decade of the 2000s, Getachew appears to have absorbed one lesson about Eritrea: cast it as the villain whenever convenient.

He also appears not to know, or chooses not to learn, that Eritrean tanks helped carry his EPRDF bosses all the way to Arat Kilo. Tsadkan, of course, would not be eager to tell him that part of the story.

Thus, whether speaking as an EPRDF official, a TPLF spokesman, an interim Tigray leader, or now as an adviser to Abiy Ahmed, Getachew repeatedly casts Eritrea as the useful enemy. When Ethiopia’s contradictions become too large to manage, Eritrea is presented as the explanation. When Tigray fractures, Pretoria stalls, the Prosperity Party’s regional adventures provoke alarm, or Ethiopia’s Red Sea rhetoric raises the temperature, Eritrea is blamed again. One can say Eritrea occupies rent-free real estate in Getachew’s mind.

Yet no one should mistake Getachew’s hostility for principle. If tomorrow he believed it would serve him personally, he would likely be the first to show up in Asmara, cap in hand, ready to reinvent himself once more. If for nothing else to get money for his bottles. Such is the man: loud in accusation, thin in conviction, and always available to the next opportunity and the highest bidder. By his own public admission, he had already been involved in the trafficking and smuggling of Eritrean youth, as well as the forging of documents used to send relatives or well-paying Ethiopians—particularly Tigrayans—to the West by stealing Eritrean refugee identities.

Red Sea Entitlement and the Dangerous Language of Pressure

The danger in Getachew’s argument is not merely personal hypocrisy. It is that his accusations against Eritrea now serve a broader and more dangerous agenda: Ethiopia’s revived Red Sea entitlement.

This is precisely why the June 2026 Al Jazeera article deserves scrutiny. It presents Eritrea as a destabilizing actor while avoiding the Prosperity Party’s own provocative regional agenda: the illegal memorandum of understanding with Somaliland, allegations of logistical and military support to the RSF under external bidding, and repeated pronouncements that Ethiopia must acquire access to Assab or other Eritrean coastal lands “through negotiations if possible and force if necessary.” Such rhetoric does not produce peace. It normalizes pressure. It prepares public opinion for confrontation.

Getachew’s own interview remarks reveal the same danger. While he claims to oppose war, he describes Ethiopia’s need for sea access as a combustible matter where “something got to give.” This is the language of pressure disguised as realism. It reduces sovereignty to a negotiable inconvenience and treats the territorial rights of neighbors as problems to be managed by demographic weight. A country’s population size does not create entitlement to another country’s coast. Need is not title. Access is not ownership. Geography is not a legal claim.

Eritrea understands war too deeply to romanticize it. No people who endured thirty years of armed struggle, occupation, displacement, and sacrifice can treat war as a game. Since independence, Eritrea has consistently emphasized sovereignty, negotiation, arbitration, regional balance, and African-led solutions. It accepted binding arbitration in its border dispute with Yemen and Ethiopia. It has warned against reckless militarization of the Red Sea question. It has maintained internal stability in one of the world’s most volatile neighborhoods.

Whatever disagreements others may have with Eritrea’s political system, the claim that Eritrea is the principal engine of regional chaos does not withstand the historical record.

What threatens the Horn is not Eritrea’s refusal to submit. What threatens the Horn is the habit of Ethiopian political actors treating Eritrean sovereignty as unfinished business.

Getachew Reda’s current posture is therefore not an act of regional statesmanship. It is political repositioning. Having crossed from the TPLF camp into Abiy’s circle, he now performs usefulness by adopting the federal government’s external narrative. He attacks Eritrea, distances himself from former comrades, and presents alignment with Addis Ababa as realism. But realism without consistency is opportunism. Peace language without accountability is theater. Warnings against war while endorsing coercive sea-access logic are not diplomacy. They are preparation for future confrontation.

The tragedy is that Getachew knows better. He knows the cost of war in Tigray. He knows what happens when leaders gamble with civilian lives. He knows how quickly rhetoric can become mobilization, and how quickly mobilization can become mass suffering. Yet instead of restraining dangerous narratives, he now helps circulate them. That is the most damning contradiction.

A man who once accused Abiy Ahmed’s government of devastating Tigray now serves that same government. A man who once claimed to speak for Tigrayan victims now blurs the demand for accountability. A man who says he wants peace now lends his voice to a narrative that paints Eritrea as the convenient enemy. A man who claims to fear another war now speaks in the vocabulary of pressure, demographic entitlement, and geopolitical inevitability. This is not leadership. It is political survival dressed as strategy.

The people of Tigray deserve better than leaders who trade memory for office. The people of Ethiopia deserve better than elites who change flags but keep the same destructive habits. The people of Eritrea deserve better than endless demonization by those who use Eritrea as a mirror to avoid facing their own failures. And the Horn of Africa deserves better than recycled myths that turn every Ethiopian crisis into an Eritrean conspiracy.

Getachew Reda’s contradictions are his own burden. But when those contradictions are used to vilify Eritrea and justify dangerous regional narratives, they must be exposed.

Eritrea is not the source of Ethiopia’s internal fragmentation. Eritrea did not create the Prosperity Party’s Red Sea obsession. Eritrea did not fracture the TPLF. Eritrea did not prevent full implementation of the Pretoria Agreement. Eritrea did not create Ethiopia’s wars in Oromia, Amhara, Tigray, or elsewhere. Eritrea did not write Ethiopia’s constitutional crisis. Eritrea did not manufacture Ethiopia’s elite rivalries.

The myth of Eritrean destabilization survives because it is useful. It gives Ethiopian power brokers an external enemy. It gives failed leaders an excuse. It gives opportunists a new script when their old one collapses.

Conclusion: Political Acrobatics Are Not Statesmanship

After all the reversals, evasions, and accusations, the issue returns to a simple truth: peace in the Horn will not come from blaming Eritrea for Ethiopia’s unresolved crises.

Getachew Reda has become one of the loudest readers of that script. But the script is old, the accusation is hollow, and the contradiction is impossible to hide.

The Horn of Africa does not need more political acrobats. It needs leaders with memory, consistency, humility, and respect for sovereignty. Peace will not come from blaming Eritrea for Ethiopia’s unresolved crises. It will come only when Ethiopian elites stop treating Eritrea as a scapegoat, stop treating the Red Sea as an entitlement, and start confronting the failures inside their own political house.