Somalia Betrayed: Sovereignty on the Auction Block

by Ghidewon Abay Asmerom

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The recent recognition of the breakaway region of Somaliland by Israel is best understood as the latest extension of an earlier illegal trajectory.¹ Two years ago, the Ethiopian government pursued an arrangement to establish a military base on Somalia’s Gulf of Aden coastline in exchange for recognizing Somaliland as an independent entity.² That move, a flagrant violation of Somalia’s territorial integrity, drew universal condemnation.³ Ethiopia’s intentions are clear: the occupation of Somalia and, by extension, the coercive reshaping of the Horn of Africa. It is therefore vital to situate the present crisis within the Somali people’s century-old quest for self-determination against European and Abyssinian occupation.⁴,⁵

Modern African boundaries were drawn by European colonial powers with little regard for ethnicity or religion. Though some followed physical geography, many were arbitrary and artificial. In many cases, ethnic groups were divided across multiple colonies; in others, peoples with limited historical or social ties were merged into a single colonial administration.⁴

Among the most consequential victims of this process in the Horn of Africa were the Somalis, a Cushitic people native to the region. Colonialism divided them among five political units: Djibouti (French Somaliland), British Somaliland, Italian Somaliland, Ethiopia (in what is today the Somali Regional State, called Western Somalia by some and Ogaden by others), and Kenya (in the Northern Frontier District).⁴

Today, it is estimated that there are about 18 million Somalis in Somalia, 6 million in Somaliland, 5 million in Ethiopia’s Somali Regional State, 3 million in Kenya, and half a million in Djibouti. The Somali diaspora is estimated at 1.5 million, with roughly one-third living in Yemen. The five-point star on Somalia’s flag reflects the five territories into which Somalis were divided. Somalia also has Africa’s longest coastline, approximately 3,000 kilometers.⁶

Ethiopian leaders and elites who decry colonial borders for dividing Tigrigna and Afar speakers rarely admit that Menelik II, acting as a dependent colonial collaborator, worked with European powers to occupy Western Somalia. That region, approximately 328,068 square kilometers, constituted about 29.5 percent of Menelik’s empire. This is more than half the combined area of British Somaliland (176,120 square kilometers) and Italian Somaliland (461,585 square kilometers).⁷

The Making of the “Five Somalias”

Djibouti (French Somaliland) was established as a French colony in 1894, based on treaties signed between 1883 and 1887. A British protectorate was then declared on the Somali coast opposite South Yemen between 1884 and 1886. It was first administered as part of the British Indian Empire; by 1898 it came under direct London administration.⁴,⁸

Between 1887 and 1896, the protectorate and later Italian colony of Somalia took shape through a series of treaties signed between Italy, Britain, and Menelik II. The southern part of Somalia, today’s Jubaland, was acquired by Italy through a treaty in 1924. By 1927, Italy asserted authority over the entirety of Italian Somaliland.⁴,⁸

In 1935, Italy occupied Ethiopia. Emperor Haile Selassie lost the war, fled to England with his family, and lived in London in a luxury villa throughout Italy’s five years of occupation. Italy created Italian East Africa, comprising Eritrea, Ethiopia, British Somaliland, and Italian Somaliland. Italian East Africa was divided into six governorates. Eritrea and Somalia, Italian possessions since the 1880s, were enlarged with captured Ethiopian territories to form the Eritrea and Somalia Governorates. The remaining “Italian Ethiopia” was divided into the Harar, Galla-Sidamo, Amhara, and Shoa Governorates.⁹

In August 1940, Mussolini boasted to a group of Somalis in Rome that with the conquest of British Somaliland, which he annexed to Italian Somaliland, nearly all Somalis were united, fulfilling their dream of a single Somali union. In September 1940, he announced to Somalis in Italy that he had created an Italian Grande Somalia within his empire.⁹

Postwar Settlements and the Betrayal of Somali Claims

The British, with other Allied powers, launched the East African Campaign of 1941, defeating Italy and forcing it to relinquish its African colonies. Eritrea was placed under British Military Administration from 1941 to 1952 while its fate was debated first among the Four Allied Powers (France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union) and later in the United Nations General Assembly.⁵,¹⁰

In 1942, Ethiopia and the United Kingdom signed the first Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement, ending British military occupation in Ethiopia except in the Ogaden (Western Somalia). Somalia, meaning the Ogaden, British Somaliland, and Italian Somaliland, remained under British control until 1948. Britain intended to unite Western Somalia (Ogaden) with British Somaliland, the former Italian colony of Somalia, and Kenya’s Northern Frontier District. Ethiopia, meanwhile, demanded Eritrea and Italian Somaliland as war reparations.⁴

In 1948, under pressure from their allies and to Somali dismay, the British “returned” part of the Ogaden to Ethiopia. Although there was a provision that Somalis would retain their autonomy, Ethiopia immediately asserted sovereignty over the area.⁴ In 1950, Italian Somaliland was transferred back to Italy as the Trust Territory of Somaliland, on the condition that it achieve independence within ten years.¹¹ British Somaliland remained a British protectorate until the end of June 1960.¹²

The Second Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement of 1954 again shocked Somalis. When Britain announced that it was giving Western Somalia (Ogaden) to Ethiopia, violent protests and insurgencies erupted. Under treaties of the 1880s, Somali residents were promised autonomy and Britain had committed that it would never cede, sell, mortgage, or otherwise give for occupation any portion of Somali-inhabited territory under its control. The 1954 agreement was therefore experienced as an unmistakable betrayal. Britain intended in 1956 to buy back the Somali lands it had handed to Ethiopia, but did not succeed.⁴

British Somaliland became independent on June 26, 1960, and former Italian Somaliland followed five days later. On July 1, 1960, the two were united as the Somali Republic.¹² The Northern Frontier District, overwhelmingly Somali-inhabited, was nevertheless handed to Kenyan nationalists despite an informal plebiscite showing the population’s desire to join Somalia, killing the Greater Somalia vision at birth.⁴,¹²

Somalis in the Ogaden repeatedly demanded self-determination, but were ignored by both Ethiopia and the United Nations. In August 1960, one month after the Somali Republic’s creation, Ethiopia established military bases in the Ogaden, displacing and killing hundreds of Somalis.⁴

Greater Somalia and the OAU Border Doctrine

Greater Somalia was the project of reunifying all Somalis of the Horn into a single nation.⁴ One of the principal agenda items during the founding session of the Organization of African Unity in May 1963, and during its first Ordinary Session in Cairo in 1964, was whether to accept colonial boundaries. Somalia was one of only two African countries, alongside Morocco, that opposed accepting inherited boundaries as final. Somalia sought to reunite the Somali people under one state. Most African leaders opposed redrawing borders, fearing that it would be too difficult and would invite larger states such as South Africa, Ethiopia, Sudan, or Nigeria to absorb smaller ones.¹³

President Philibert Tsiranana of Malagasy, now Madagascar, gave a famous warning:

“It is no longer possible, nor desirable, to modify the boundaries of Nations, on the pretext of racial, religious or linguistic criteria . . . Indeed, should we take race, religion or language as criteria for setting our boundaries, a few States in Africa would be blotted out from the map.”¹⁴

During the same debates, Aklilu Habtewold, former Prime Minister of Ethiopia, repeated an Abyssinian fiction and insulted Somalia:

“Ethiopia has always existed in history for centuries as an independent state and as a nation for more than 3000 years. That is a fact. Second fact: the historical frontiers of Ethiopia stretched from the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean, including all the territory between them. Third fact: there is no record in history either of a Somali State or a Somali nation. That too is a fact.”⁴,⁵

In the end, the OAU adopted Resolution AHG/Res.16(I), the Cairo Declaration, in July 1964. It declared that “the borders of African States, on the day of their independence, constitute a tangible reality” and that all member states pledge to respect the borders existing at independence.¹³

Ogaden Insurgency and the First Ethio-Somali War

In April 1961, the Ethiopian army surrounded Degehabur in the Ogaden and machine-gunned residents, killing over 150 Somalis. This was retaliation for a petition by local Somali leaders demanding self-determination. The situation worsened as Somali district commissioners were replaced by Abyssinian officials, part of a wider strategy to displace Somalis from their own land.⁴

In June 1963, Ethiopia demanded taxes from Ogaden Somalis, incensing a population that had lived without taxation for centuries. That year, the first major rebellion broke out: Nasrallah, also known as the Ogaden Liberation Front. Three hundred men at Hodayo, north of Werder, began an insurgency against Ethiopia.⁴ Their leader, Mukhtal Dahir, was quoted in the New York Times:

“We wanted our freedom. It was impossible to seek it through democratic means in a country where there is no free speech and no political party machinery, where expeditions are sent to collect taxes by force — seizing camels and millet crops. …”⁴

As Ethiopian reprisals intensified, the Ogaden Liberation Front grew to as many as 12,000 fighters, attracting neutral Ogaden Somalis alienated by the loss of relatives, herds, and homes. At its peak, insurgents controlled nearly 70 percent of the Ogaden. Ethiopia responded with brutal crackdowns, including destruction or confiscation of livestock of nomadic pastoral communities. The most infamous reprisal was the bombardment of Degehabur, remembered locally as the Kanone Massacre: artillery fire from nearby high ground followed by killings as troops entered the settlement. After rebel activity in Shilabo, the Ethiopian army blockaded and shelled the town to punish residents.⁴

These crackdowns worsened relations between Somalia and Ethiopia, with clashes in late 1963 and early 1964. The first Ethio-Somali war erupted after Ethiopian airstrikes escalated into large-scale fighting in early 1964. On January 15, 1964, Ethiopian aircraft bombed multiple Somali border police posts in the Upper Jubba region. The Ethiopian Air Force conducted a six-hour attack that destroyed the posts. Harold Marcus noted: “The American-equipped Third Division moved into Ogaden in full strength and in mid-January 1964 attacked Somali border posts and adjacent towns to warn Mogadishu to cease supporting the rebels. Instead, the Somali government declared an emergency and moved its army to the frontier.”⁵ Ethiopia prevailed, aided by its larger and more experienced army and massive U.S. arms supplies.⁵

From Nasrallah to the WSLF and the Second Ogaden War

In the early 1970s, the Ogaden liberation movement regained momentum, though the original Ogaden Liberation Front began to disintegrate. Veteran insurgents and Ogaden intelligentsia within Siad Barre’s government lobbied Somalia to resume support for armed struggle. After the Derg overthrew Haile Selassie in 1974, conditions in the Ogaden deteriorated. A severe drought brought mass suffering. The Derg suppressed news rather than provide relief, while military oppression increased. By 1975, Somalia agreed to aid the movement. Major reorganizations followed, including adopting a new name. In January 1976, the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) was established.¹⁵ Beyond Somalis under Ethiopian occupation, the WSLF won widespread support among Muslim Harari and Oromo communities. By the end of 1976, the WSLF had spread across southeastern Bale and Sidamo. Guerrillas moved rapidly, dismantling Ethiopian administration by destroying offices and targeting police and civilian structures.¹⁵

In 1976, the Somali Abo Liberation Front (SALF) was also established to fight in Oromo areas of Bale, Sidamo, and Arsi. It advocated union with Somalia or the creation of an independent Oromo state, competing with the Oromo Liberation Front. Somalia equipped both WSLF and SALF with Soviet arms and in early 1977 sent 3,000 Somali National Army soldiers to fight alongside WSLF guerrillas.¹⁵

By early 1977, except for towns on vital routes, WSLF had effectively liberated most Ogaden lowlands. Hit-and-run tactics eroded Ethiopian morale and forced troops into garrison towns. Guerrillas also sabotaged the economy. In summer 1977, WSLF fighters destroyed key installations, and in June they disabled the Addis Ababa–Djibouti railway for three months.¹⁵

In June 1977, thousands of Somali National Army soldiers crossed the border to join WSLF in coordinated attacks in Degehabur, Gode, and Kebri Dahar. In July 1977, the Somali National Army invaded Ethiopia, beginning the Second Ethio-Somali Ogaden War.¹⁵ By August 1977, Somali and WSLF forces had encircled Dire Dawa, Ethiopia’s second-largest air force base and the crossroads to the Ogaden. The Djibouti rail line ran through the city. If Dire Dawa fell, Ethiopia would have struggled to continue the war. By October 1977, Somali and WSLF forces had liberated up to 90 percent of Ogaden territory, about 320,000 square kilometers.¹⁵

In early 1978, Ethiopia was rescued from the brink of defeat by a massive Soviet airlift of supplies worth roughly $1 billion, more than 12,000 Cuban soldiers and airmen, and 1,500 Soviet advisers led by General Vasily Petrov. Cuban armored brigades were critical in reversing Ethiopian collapse. The Cuban-Ethiopian force, equipped with 300 tanks, 156 artillery pieces, and 46 combat aircraft, prevailed at Harar and Jijiga and began pushing Somali forces out of the Ogaden.¹⁵

After the war, Ethiopia held full control only briefly. Months later, the WSLF controlled most countryside again, while Ethiopian forces remained confined to towns and roads. In August 1980, the Derg launched “Operation Lash,” deploying six divisions totaling 60,000 men to disperse, encircle, and if possible liquidate WSLF and SALF. SALF disintegrated. WSLF persisted by retreating to northwestern Somalia.¹⁵

From WSLF to ONLF and the Secession of Somaliland

In 1981, Ethiopia began supporting the Somali National Movement (SNM) to fight WSLF, exploiting clan divisions within Somali society. This division delivered the final blow to WSLF. From 1982 to 1984, SNM, backed by Ethiopia, engaged in intense clashes with WSLF in northwestern Somalia. In December 1984, SNM launched an offensive that forced WSLF out of rear bases in northern Somalia. WSLF effectively ceased to exist as early as 1985 and was officially disbanded in 1988.¹²

By 1984, however, disaffected members of WSLF had already formed the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF).¹⁶ On May 18, 1991, the SNM, having played a key role in the collapse of the Siad Barre regime in Mogadishu, unilaterally declared the former British Somaliland independent of Somalia.¹²

ONLF, Ethiopian Counterinsurgency, and the Somali Regional State

By the time the Derg collapsed, ONLF had consolidated its position among ethnic Somalis in the Ogaden and was prepared to join Ethiopia’s Transitional Government. ONLF contested the December 1992 elections for District Five, later the Somali Regional State, and won 80 percent of seats in the local parliament. ONLF officials governed until the transitional period ended with the adoption of a new constitution.¹⁷

The Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) dominated EPRDF sought to curb Somali demands for self-determination by influencing regional politics and pushing for a new partner organization, leading to the formation of the Ethiopian Somali Democratic League (ESDL) in 1993. The TPLF promoted ESDL as a pan-Somali alternative to the Ogaden clan-dominated ONLF. Many Somalis saw ESDL as an extension of the central government, and the strategy increased pressure on ONLF. Despite agreements to cooperate on security and administration, mutual suspicion remained. The majority of ONLF boycotted the 1995 general elections. Following the boycott, the government created a “New ONLF.” The New ONLF and ESDL won the elections and merged into the Somali People’s Democratic Party (SPDP).¹⁷

In 1994, fighting between Ethiopian forces and ONLF began at Werder. After 1995, armed conflict sharply increased. During confrontations, Ethiopian forces used brutal measures: summary executions, detentions without prosecution, disappearances, and torture in an effort to crush the insurgency.¹⁸

Despite intensive campaigns between 1994 and 1996, ONLF survived and expanded. Political interference and harsh counterinsurgency pushed many Ogaden Somalis toward ONLF, reducing internal fractures and producing a more cohesive organization.¹⁷

Over the early 2000s, ONLF’s military capabilities expanded and it intensified attacks, with major escalation in 2005. Ethiopia accused ONLF of terrorism and links to Al-Qaeda, as it had previously accused Al-Itihaad Al-Islamiya. In May 2006, ONLF entered an alliance with five Ethiopian opposition groups, including the Ethiopian People’s Patriotic Front, Oromo Liberation Front, and Sidama Liberation Front, to strengthen resistance to the TPLF-dominated state. Meanwhile, Ethiopian forces continued to commit war crimes and crimes against humanity: burning villages, pushing nomads off lands, and choking off food supplies in a campaign of collective punishment against a restive Somali population in the Ogaden.¹⁸

In 2018, the TPLF was pushed out of power and a new prime minister, Abiy Ahmed Ali, came to office promising reforms and releasing political prisoners. In that context, ONLF declared a unilateral ceasefire in August 2018 and decided to pursue self-determination of the Somali Regional State by peaceful means.¹⁹

As of late 2025, the ONLF–Ethiopian government relationship is marked by formal peace but substantive dispute. The 2018 peace deal brought an end to decades of insurgency, yet frictions over political inclusion, economic rights (especially resource governance), and respect for the Somali Region’s autonomy have intensified. ONLF officials have accused Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s government of bad faith implementation and suppression of Somali political voices. While no large-scale resumption of armed conflict has occurred, the ONLF’s warnings and deteriorating trust suggest the peace agreement’s durability cannot be assumed. Internal splits within the ONLF further complicate the landscape. Sustained political reform, genuine inclusion, and implementation of peace commitments remain essential to prevent renewed hostilities.¹⁹

Conclusion

In the 34 years since Somaliland broke away from Somalia, the only sovereign country that recognized its independence is the State of Israel.¹ If Ethiopia follows through on the promise embedded in its January 1, 2024 MOU and recognizes Somaliland, it will be the second state in the world to do so.²,³ This could set a dangerous precedent. For example, Ethiopia’s Somali Regional State could invoke Article 39 of Ethiopia’s 1995 constitution to declare independence and could receive immediate recognition from Somalia, creating a domino effect that could accelerate the disintegration of both Ethiopia and Somalia as they are currently constituted.¹³

With Ethiopia’s prime minister Abiy Ahmed Ali morphing into an increasingly absolute ruler, and with his declared ambition to be crowned “the 7th King of Ethiopia,” as foretold to him by his mother when he was seven, and with his prosperity gospel politics, he is pushing Ethiopia into another confrontation with Somalia. Will a third Ethio-Somali war erupt? Will Ethiopia balkanize like the former Yugoslavia? Only time will tell.

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Endnotes

1. Prime Minister’s Office (Israel), “Prime Minister’s Office Announcement” (Facebook post), December 26, 2025; Somalia Ministry of Foreign Affairs (official social media), joint statement on Israel’s “illegal recognition,” December 2025; African Union Commission, “The Chairperson of the African Union Commission rejects any recognition of Somaliland,” December 26, 2025; Al Jazeera, “Somalia condemns Israel’s recognition of Somaliland as ‘naked invasion’,” December 28, 2025; Reuters, “Israel recognises Somaliland, Somalia’s breakaway region, as independent state,” December 26, 2025.
2. Reuters, “Ethiopia signs pact to use Somaliland’s Red Sea port,” January 1, 2024.
3. Associated Press, “Somalia dismisses Ethiopia-Somaliland coastline deal, says it compromises sovereignty,” January 2, 2024.
4. Ioan M. Lewis, A Modern History of the Somali: Nation and State in the Horn of Africa, rev. ed. (Oxford: James Currey, 2002); Mark Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland (Oxford: James Currey, 2008).
5. Harold G. Marcus, A History of Ethiopia (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994); Lewis, A Modern History of the Somali.
6. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: Somalia (Washington, DC: CIA, current/most recent edition consulted).
7. Bahru Zewde, A History of Modern Ethiopia, 1855–1991, 2nd ed. (Oxford: James Currey, 2001); Marcus, A History of Ethiopia.
8. Lewis, A Modern History of the Somali (on late nineteenth-century treaty making and protectorate formation in the Somali coastlands and interior).
9. Angelo Del Boca, The Ethiopian War 1935–1941, trans. P. D. Cummins (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969); Del Boca, Italiani in Africa Orientale (Rome: Laterza, 1976–1984) (for Italian East Africa’s creation and administrative structure).
10. Marcus, A History of Ethiopia; Lewis, A Modern History of the Somali.
11. United Nations, Trusteeship Council documentation on the Trust Territory of Somaliland (Italian Somaliland), 1950–1960; Lewis, A Modern History of the Somali.
12. International Crisis Group, Somaliland: Time for African Union Leadership, Africa Report no. 110 (2006); Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland.
13. Organization of African Unity, Resolution AHG/Res. 16(I) (“Cairo Declaration” on borders), July 1964; African Union, Constitutive Act of the African Union (adopted July 11, 2000; entered into force May 26, 2001).
14. Dipo Faloyin, Africa Is Not a Country: Notes on a Bright Continent (New York: W. W. Norton, 2022), 60 (quoting President Philibert Tsiranana’s warning in the OAU-era border debates).
15. Gebru Tareke, The Ethiopian Revolution: War in the Horn of Africa (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009).
16. Human Rights Watch (Africa Watch), Somalia: A Government at War with Its Own People (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1990).
17. (For ONLF formation, early 1990s participation, and Somali Region party-state reconfiguration, see specialized studies of Ethiopian federalism and Somali Region politics; a consolidated monograph citation should be inserted here consistent with the specific work used.)
18. Human Rights Watch, Collective Punishment: War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity in the Ogaden area of Ethiopia’s Somali Region (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2008).
19. (For ONLF’s 2018 ceasefire/transition and subsequent dispute claims, cite the specific ONLF communiqués and Ethiopian government statements used; in a publishable version these should be replaced with the exact primary documents and at least one high-quality secondary report corroborating the timeline.)

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Bibliography

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• Al Jazeera. “Somalia condemns Israel’s recognition of Somaliland as ‘naked invasion’.” December 28, 2025.
• Associated Press. “Somalia dismisses Ethiopia-Somaliland coastline deal, says it compromises sovereignty.” January 2, 2024.
• Bradbury, Mark. Becoming Somaliland. Oxford: James Currey, 2008.
• Central Intelligence Agency. The World Factbook: Somalia. Washington, DC: CIA. (Most recent edition consulted.)
• Del Boca, Angelo. The Ethiopian War 1935–1941. Translated by P. D. Cummins. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969.
• Del Boca, Angelo. Italiani in Africa Orientale. Rome: Laterza, 1976–1984.
• Human Rights Watch (Africa Watch). Somalia: A Government at War with Its Own People. New York: Human Rights Watch, 1990.
• Human Rights Watch. Collective Punishment: War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity in the Ogaden area of Ethiopia’s Somali Region. New York: Human Rights Watch, 2008.
• International Crisis Group. Somaliland: Time for African Union Leadership. Africa Report no. 110. 2006.
• Lewis, Ioan M. A Modern History of the Somali: Nation and State in the Horn of Africa. Revised edition. Oxford: James Currey, 2002.
• Marcus, Harold G. A History of Ethiopia. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994.
• Organization of African Unity. Resolution AHG/Res. 16(I) (“Cairo Declaration” on borders). July 1964.
• Prime Minister’s Office (Israel). “Prime Minister’s Office Announcement.” Facebook post. December 26, 2025.
• Reuters. “Ethiopia signs pact to use Somaliland’s Red Sea port.” January 1, 2024.
• Reuters. “Israel recognises Somaliland, Somalia’s breakaway region, as independent state.” December 26, 2025.
• Tareke, Gebru. The Ethiopian Revolution: War in the Horn of Africa. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009.
• United Nations. Trusteeship Council documentation on the Trust Territory of Somaliland (Italian Somaliland), 1950–1960.
• Zewde, Bahru. A History of Modern Ethiopia, 1855–1991. 2nd ed. Oxford: James Currey, 2001.