The EU Must Name Ethiopia as the Source of Chaos in the Horn
by David Yeh

Whether it is the U.S. State Department, the European Union, or the African Union, international diplomacy has developed an unfortunate habit: refusing to call wrongdoing by its proper name. From Palestine to Iran, statements are carefully engineered to avoid identifying who did what to whom. Aggression becomes “tension.” Threats become “rhetoric.” Violations become “disputes.” And the aggressor and the threatened are routinely placed in the same diplomatic sentence and instructed to exercise equal restraint. The result is not neutrality. It is impunity disguised as diplomacy.
That failure is now on display in the Horn of Africa. The destabilizing pattern is increasingly difficult to ignore: Ethiopia is engulfed by internal wars, embroiled in disputes with its neighbors, and openly asserting a supposed entitlement to sovereign access to the Red Sea. Yet instead of confronting Addis Ababa directly, international institutions retreat into the familiar language of “regional tensions,” “all parties,” and “de-escalation.”
For a government already testing how far it can go, such ambiguity does not restrain aggression. It risks encouraging it.
The European Union says it is alarmed by escalating violence in Ethiopia and rising regional tensions, particularly between Ethiopia and Eritrea. In that formulation lies much of what is wrong with European policy toward the Horn. It sounds balanced precisely because it avoids the harder question: Who is actually doing what? There is no equivalence here.
Eritrea did not start the war in Amhara. Eritrea did not start the war in Oromia. Eritrea did not abandon Ethiopia’s obligations to address the political questions left unresolved after the Pretoria Cessation of Hostilities Agreement and Eritrea is not responsible for the war in Tigray. These are Ethiopian crises, unfolding within Ethiopia and rooted in Ethiopia’s own unresolved political contradictions. To insert Eritrea into this catalogue of failures without presenting credible evidence of Eritrean responsibility is not serious analysis; it is reckless diplomacy bordering on outright hypocrisy. Worse, it reinforces an alibi repeatedly manufactured in Addis Ababa: whenever Ethiopia’s internal political order fractures, shift the blame outward, manufacture an external culprit, and make Eritrea the convenient scapegoat.
Externalizing an Internal Crisis
For years, the government in Addis Ababa has increasingly externalized the consequences of its domestic failures. The end of the 2020–2022 Tigray war did not resolve Ethiopia’s political crisis. Conflict migrated.
The methods are familiar: mass arrests, communications restrictions, drone warfare, sweeping terrorism accusations against armed opponents, and the reduction of complex political grievances to security problems. The geography changed, from Tigray to Amhara, Oromia and elsewhere, but the underlying crisis of political legitimacy remained. A government cannot indefinitely bomb its way toward national consensus.
Nor can the Pretoria agreement be invoked selectively whenever convenient. The Pretoria agreement to begin was engineered to save the TPLF, not to help the people of Tigray or to bring peace in Ethiopia. Its military provisions were implemented to fundamentally alter the balance of power in Tigray, while fundamental political questions involving accountability, reconciliation, constitutional order and inclusive national dialogue remained unresolved. Europe knows this. It supported the peace process. Yet European statements continue invoking the agreement as though repeating its name can substitute for confronting the political failures that followed it. And whenever those failures become impossible to conceal, Eritrea reappears in the narrative.
Eritrea Is Not the Cause
Eritrea has no army fighting in Tigray, Amhara or Oromia and it has made no territorial claim against Ethiopia. Eritrea’s fundamental position is considerably simpler: its sovereignty and internationally recognized territory are not negotiable. Its boundary with Ethiopia was adjudicated through the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission under the Algiers Agreement. Its Red Sea coastline is Eritrean territory. Neither Ethiopia’s population, economic ambitions, historical narratives nor dissatisfaction with being landlocked alters that fact. The dangerous rhetoric has flowed in the opposite direction.
It is Ethiopia’s leadership that elevated access to the Red Sea into an existential national question. It is Ethiopia that has increasingly blurred the distinction between commercial access to ports and sovereign possession of coastline. Ethiopia already enjoys maritime access through neighboring states, particularly Djibouti. What it does not possess is sovereignty over another country’s coast. That distinction is everything.
When the leadership of a landlocked country suggests that the existing territorial order must somehow be corrected because access to the sea is supposedly an existential necessity, neighboring coastal states have every reason to take notice. Yet instead of telling Addis Ababa unequivocally that another state’s sovereign territory cannot become the remedy for Ethiopia’s geographic circumstances, Europe tells “both sides” to de-escalate. Both sides from what?
What Eritrean statement has claimed Ethiopian territory? What Eritrean leader has demanded ownership of an Ethiopian strategic asset? What Eritrean government document has declared Ethiopia’s geography an injustice that Eritrea is entitled to correct? False equivalence becomes especially dangerous when one side is making the demand and the other is simply refusing to surrender what already belongs to it.
Neutrality That Rewards the Provocateur
This is why the EU’s posture deserves scrutiny. Diplomatic symmetry may sound responsible, but when responsibility itself is asymmetrical, symmetrical language distorts reality. Europe invokes civilian protection, humanitarian access, sovereignty and territorial integrity. Those principles should indeed guide policy. But they must be applied consistently rather than ceremonially.
The catastrophic human cost of the Tigray war should have taught precisely this lesson. International hesitation, strategic calculation and carefully calibrated language did not prevent escalation. Nor will endless appeals to “all parties” solve Ethiopia’s current conflicts if international institutions refuse to identify the decisions and policies driving them.
The same contradiction appears in Europe’s broader Red Sea policy. European governments speak of regional sovereignty while participating in a geopolitical architecture that has steadily militarized the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. They speak of African-led solutions while frequently treating the African Union as useful only when its processes coincide with outside priorities. And they continue treating Ethiopia as an indispensable regional anchor even as Ethiopia itself becomes an increasingly significant source of regional instability. That approach is no longer sustainable.
Calling on everyone to exercise restraint when responsibility can be identified is not sophisticated diplomacy. Sometimes it is simply an unwillingness to offend the actor whose behavior most requires restraint.
Follow the Pattern
Look at the Horn without diplomatic euphemism and a striking pattern emerges. Ethiopia faces major armed conflicts within its own territory. It has a longstanding and unresolved border dispute with Sudan. Its January 2024 memorandum with Somaliland triggered one of the gravest crises in Ethiopia-Somalia relations in decades because Mogadishu regarded the agreement as an assault on Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. And Ethiopia’s Red Sea rhetoric has generated understandable alarm in Eritrea. Different disputes have different histories, and they should not be mechanically conflated. But one fact cannot be wished away: Addis Ababa appears at the center of every one of them. Eritrea does not.
Eritrea is not at war with Amhara. It is not at war with Oromia. It does not claim Sudanese territory. It did not negotiate for a military foothold on Somali territory over Mogadishu’s objections. And it has not demanded Ethiopian territory. Yet international statements repeatedly drag Eritrea into Ethiopia’s crises and then describe the resulting anxiety as “Ethiopia-Eritrea tensions.” That reverses cause and effect.
There is a profound difference between threatening to alter a territorial status quo and insisting that the existing internationally recognized territorial status quo remain intact. The former creates the crisis. The latter responds to it.
The EU Should Name the Problem
A credible European policy therefore requires something more difficult than another carefully balanced communiqué. It requires attribution. The EU should condemn abuses against civilians wherever they occur in Ethiopia and demand independent scrutiny. It should insist that Ethiopia’s internal political conflicts be addressed politically rather than endlessly militarized. It should defend Somalia’s territorial integrity without ambiguity. It should insist that disagreements with Sudan be resolved peacefully. And it should state unequivocally that Eritrea’s internationally recognized sovereignty and coastline are not subjects for Ethiopian territorial bargaining.
Most importantly, Europe should stop inserting Eritrea into Ethiopia’s domestic conflicts. Eritrea should not be casually placed alongside Ethiopia whenever Addis Ababa’s internal wars are discussed. Diplomacy does not become fair merely because every sentence contains two names.
There are moments when refusing to identify responsibility does not prevent war but makes war more likely. Governments learn from the reactions of the international system. If threats are answered with generic appeals for restraint, if violations are transformed into “tensions,” and if the threatened state is admonished alongside the state making the threat, the lesson received by the provocateur is obvious: push further and the outside world will divide the blame. That is precisely the wrong message for the Horn of Africa.
Leave Eritrea Out of Ethiopia’s Failure
The European Union does not need inflammatory language. It does not need to choose enemies or abandon diplomacy. It simply needs to apply its own principles consistently and describe events according to the conduct that produced them.
Ethiopia’s internal wars are Ethiopia’s responsibility to resolve. Ethiopia’s disputes with Sudan must be resolved without force. Somalia’s sovereignty must be respected. Eritrea’s territorial integrity must be respected. And being landlocked, however economically difficult, creates no entitlement to another country’s coastline.
Those principles are neither anti-Ethiopian nor pro-Eritrean. They are the minimum requirements of an international order supposedly based on sovereign equality and territorial integrity.
The Horn does not need another statement distributing blame so evenly that responsibility disappears altogether. It needs diplomacy capable of distinguishing between the state making a territorial demand and the state rejecting it, between the country fighting wars inside its own borders and the neighbor being blamed for them, and between genuine neutrality and diplomatic cowardice.
Until the European Union is prepared to acknowledge that distinction, its calls for “de-escalation” will continue to miss the central problem.
The fires consuming Ethiopia were not started in Asmara. Eritrea should not be made the diplomatic scapegoat for them. And if Addis Ababa threatens the sovereignty of its neighbors while struggling to contain crises of its own making, Europe should have the courage to say so plainly.
Peace is not served by splitting the difference between the aggressor and the threatened. It begins with the courage to call aggression by its proper name and to hold the aggressor accountable.
Discover more from Red Sea Beacon
Subscribe to get the latest posts sent to your email.