The Myth of Foreign Military Bases In Eritrea

Eritrea is not for Sale!

by Ghidewon Abay Asmerom

Few accusations reveal the dishonesty of anti-Eritrean propaganda more clearly than the claim that Eritrea has granted foreign military bases to Israel, Iran, or both. At different times, Eritrea has been accused of hosting Israeli naval facilities in the Dahlak Archipelago and Massawa, an Israeli listening post on Emba Soira (Eritrea’s highest mountain), an Iranian naval base in Assab, Iranian missile installations along the Red Sea coast, and, in the most absurd version, both Israeli and Iranian military facilities simultaneously.

The narrative changes depending on the audience. For Western, Israeli, Gulf, or anti-Iranian audiences, Eritrea is portrayed as a dangerous Iranian foothold on the Red Sea, allegedly helping Tehran threaten Bab al-Mandeb, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Israel, and international shipping. For Arab, Iranian, Houthi, or anti-Israeli audiences, Eritrea suddenly becomes a secret Israeli outpost hosting naval docks, intelligence teams, surveillance stations, and listening posts.

At times, both stories are promoted simultaneously: Israel is allegedly operating from Dahlak and Massawa to monitor Iran, while Iran is supposedly operating from Assab to threaten Israel. Two sworn enemies are said to be maintaining military facilities along the same Eritrean coastline with Eritrean approval. The contradiction is obvious, yet the purpose remains the same. Eritrea is not being described; it is being assigned whatever role best serves the political narrative of the moment.

When the script requires an Israeli outpost, Eritrea becomes Israel’s secret base. When the script requires an Iranian menace, Eritrea becomes Iran’s Red Sea platform. The facts are adjusted to fit the accusation, not the other way around.

Most of these claims trace back to recycled reports from Stratfor, regional media, Eritrean opposition sources, unnamed security officials, hostile Ethiopian-linked outlets, or foreign intelligence narratives presented as analysis. The allegations may name Dahlak, Massawa, Assab, or Mount Emba Soira, but they consistently lack the one thing serious claims require: verifiable evidence.

Eritrea has repeatedly rejected these accusations as phantom bases and has consistently denied granting military facilities to either Israel or Iran. Its position has remained unchanged: Eritrea does not mortgage its land, islands, ports, or mountains to foreign powers, nor does it turn its territory into a battlefield for rival states. In the words of President Isaias Afwerki, Eritrea is not for sale—not to Israel, not to Iran, not to America, and not to any power that imagines Eritrean sovereignty can be rented, bought, or bargained away.

The Iranian Base Fantasy

The Iranian-base allegation began with claims that Iran was helping renovate the old Assab refinery. From there, the rumor mutated. Opposition websites and hostile outlets added submarines, missiles, Revolutionary Guard personnel, naval assets, arms-smuggling routes, and secret military installations. Within months, a minor claim about refinery activity had been inflated into a story about Iran controlling a strategic Red Sea base.

This is how disinformation works. It starts with a thin premise, adds anonymous sources, borrows geopolitical anxieties, and then multiplies through repetition.

The Assab refinery itself exposes the weakness of the claim. It was an old Soviet-built facility that had not been functioning as a major refinery for years. The idea that Eritrea needed Iranian missiles, submarines, or military forces to “protect” a small, outdated, non-functioning refinery is absurd. Yet that absurdity was repeated because the purpose was not to explain Eritrea. The purpose was to make Eritrea look dangerous.

In 2009, opposition-linked and anti-Iranian sources claimed that the IRGC and Qods Force were using Assab as a foothold in the Horn of Africa. Other analysts at the time described these allegations as “wild,” noting how quickly they had expanded from refinery renovation to submarines, long-range missiles, troops, and regional sabotage. That expansion itself tells the story. The accusation was not growing because evidence was growing. It was growing because the propaganda value was growing.

The Israeli Base Fantasy

The Israeli-base allegation followed the same pattern. Eritrea was accused of granting Israel naval facilities in Dahlak, docks in Massawa, surveillance stations on islands, and even a listening post on Emba Soira, Eritrea’s highest mountain.

The Emba Soira claim is especially revealing. It sounds dramatic to outside audiences because a “listening post” on a mountain has the texture of intelligence fiction. But the claim is usually repeated without technical detail, verifiable imagery, official confirmation, or direct evidence. It survives because it sounds plausible to those who already want to believe Eritrea is hiding something.

Arab News in 2006 repeated a Yemeni report claiming Israel had transferred warships from a base on Eritrea’s Dahlak Island. Later, Israeli and Western outlets repeated Stratfor-based allegations about Israeli intelligence units and naval teams in Eritrea. In 2023, Al Mayadeen claimed that an Israeli surveillance post in the Dahlak Archipelago had been attacked. Eritrea’s Information Minister publicly dismissed that report as a ludicrous story about phantom Israeli bases.

Again, the pattern is the same: unnamed sources, recycled allegations, dramatic language, and no verifiable proof.

Ethiopia’s Old Habit: Forgery and Foreign-Interest Smears

These base allegations should also be understood within a longer Ethiopian tradition of smearing Eritrea as the instrument of foreign powers. This did not begin with Israel or Iran. It dates back to the liberation struggle.

During 1990–1991, as the Derg regime was losing the war in Eritrea, Ethiopian diplomatic missions were conducting an intensive international propaganda campaign against the EPLF. Ethiopian officials accused the EPLF of obstructing relief aid, manipulating famine, serving foreign interests, and destabilizing the region. In 1990, the Ethiopian Embassy in Sweden circulated a forged letterhead falsely claiming that the EPLF supported Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait.

The timing was not accidental. After Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990, European governments and media were highly sensitive to any perceived support for Saddam Hussein. Sweden had tense relations with Iraq in 1990 after the execution of a Swedish citizen by the Iraqi regime and later joined international condemnation of Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait. To associate the EPLF with Iraq at that moment was by mistake – it was a calculated smear.

The irony was glaring: Kuwait had historically been one of the Arab states most supportive of the Eritrean cause. But truth was never the purpose. The purpose was to damage Eritrea’s reputation at a critical diplomatic moment.

The same method continues today. When Eritrea cannot be defeated politically, it is recast as someone else’s proxy. If Iraq is the villain of the moment, Eritrea is linked to Iraq. If Iran is the villain, Eritrea is linked to Iran. If Israel is the convenient target, Eritrea is linked to Israel. The enemy changes, but the smear remains the same.

Eritrea’s Actual Foreign Policy

Eritrea’s actual foreign policy has been consistent. It is based on sovereignty, non-subordination, and principled independence. Eritrea maintains relations with many states, including countries that disagree with each other. That is normal diplomacy. 

Eritrea has never subscribed to the idea of becoming a rented platform for major powers. Its political culture was forged in a liberation struggle against domination. Its foreign policy has repeatedly emphasized independence from blocs, aversion to dependency, and resistance to becoming a pawn in rivalries among larger powers.

That independence is precisely what irritates Eritrea’s adversaries. Eritrea does not fit neatly into their categories. It is not obedient to Washington. It does not subscribe to Tehran’s ideology. It is not an Israeli proxy. It is not a Gulf protectorate.  It is not a playground for NGOs, missionaries, intelligence networks, or foreign media operators.

Because Eritrea refuses to be owned, it is accused of secretly belonging to someone.

Conclusion

The allegations of Israeli and Iranian bases in Eritrea are part of a wider campaign to punish Eritrea for its independence. They belong to the same family of smears that called Eritrea the “North Korea of Africa,” accused it of being a proxy for every convenient villain, and portrayed its refusal to submit as evidence of guilt.

The pattern is old. The Derg used it. Ethiopian diplomatic missions during the TPLF reign used it. Foreign intelligence-linked outlets have used it. Missionary lobbies, hostile journalists, opposition networks, and regional rivals have used it. The content changes, but the method remains: attach Eritrea to a feared foreign power, repeat the accusation, and let suspicion do the work that evidence cannot.

But Eritrea is not Israel’s base. It is not Iran’s base. It is not both at once. It is not a rented platform for anyone’s war.

The allegation is so illogical that it collapses under the slightest scrutiny. It assumes that two sworn enemies could maintain neighboring military bases on the Red Sea without clashing; a notion that defies both common sense and geopolitical reality. Yet, the allegation survives not because the evidence is compelling, but because the narrative is useful.

Eritrea is a sovereign Red Sea state with an independent foreign policy rooted in principle, self-reliance, and non-subordination.

References:

• 2006, Aug 31. Arab News, How Israel Casts Its Dark Shadow Over Horn of Africa https://www.arabnews.com/node/288615 
• 2009, April 3. Aberfoylesecurity, Strange Days on the Red Sea Coast: A New Theater for the Israel-Iran Conflict? https://www.aberfoylesecurity.com/?p=2528 
• 2009, Nov 12. National Council of Resistance of Iran. https://www.ncr-iran.org/en/news/iran-a-world/irgc-surfacing-in-assab-in-eritrea/ 
• 2012, Dec 12. Algemeiner, Israel Monitoring Iran from Eritrea https://www.algemeiner.com/2012/12/12/report-israel-monitoring-iran-from-eritrea/
• 2012, Dec 12. Haaretz, Both Iran and Israel Have Military Bases in Eritrea, Global Intel Reports https://www.haaretz.com/2012-12-12/ty-article/.premium/israel-iran-have-bases-in-eritrea/0000017f-efe8-d497-a1ff-efe863340000 
• 2012, Dec 12. Israel National News, Report: Israel Operating Bases in Eritrea https://www.israelnationalnews.com/news/163072 
• 2012, Dec 18. Sudan Tribute, U.S. report: Israel sets up base in Eritrea to monitor Iran https://sudantribune.com/article/44140 
• 2012, Dec 27. Eritrean Center of Strategic Studies, Eritrea: Phantom Israeli and Iranian Military Bases https://www.ecss-online.com/eritrea-phantom-israeli-and-iranian-military-bases/
• 2017, Oct 2. Jerusalem Post. Rebel spokesman: Houthi missiles can hit covert Israeli bases in Eritrea https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/rebel-spokesman-houthi-missiles-can-hit-covert-israeli-bases-in-eriteria-506376 
• 2019, April. SIPRI Background Paper, THE FOREIGN MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE HORN OF AFRICA REGION 
• 2019, August. STUDIES IN AFRICAN SECURITY Middle Eastern Base Race in North-Eastern Africa https://www.foi.se/rest-api/report/FOI%20Memo%206809 
• 2023, Oct 27. Almayadeen, Israeli surveillance post in Eritrea attacked: Sources to Al Mayadeenhttps://english.almayadeen.net/news/politics/israeli-surveillance-post-in-eritrea-attacked%3A-sources-to-al