by David Yeh
Few geopolitical questions in the Horn of Africa generate as much confusion, myth-making, and politicized reinterpretation as the issue of Ethiopia’s access to the sea. Today, Ethiopia claims itself as a landlocked nation “unjustly” deprived of its historical coastline, while Eritrea insists that its sovereignty is non-negotiable. Ethiopia’s Hot air is full of widespread public misconceptions, especially in Ethiopia, where modern political rhetoric frequently collapses millennia of regional history into a single narrative: that “Ethiopia once owned the sea.”
A closer examination reveals a different reality. The state known today as Ethiopia did not exist before the late-19th century, and the pre-modern kingdom of Abyssinia, its claimed historical predecessor, never exercised, any form of sovereignty over the Red Sea coast after the 7th century. Ethiopia’s only maritime period emerged from a UN-imposed federation with Eritrea (1952–1962) and a subsequent illegal occupation and annexation (1962–1991). Understanding this trajectory is essential to assessing modern claims and avoiding historical arguments that heighten regional tensions.
This article examines the evolution of coastal claims through historical fact, international law, and the present-day political context, in order to provide a rigorous foundation for evaluating Ethiopia’s current demand for “sea access.”
A) Abyssinia and the Myth of Ancient Maritime Sovereignty
Abyssinia vs. Ethiopia: two historically distinct entities
A recurring misunderstanding is the conflation of the ancient/medieval kingdom of Abyssinia with the modern multinational state of Ethiopia.
Before the late 19th century Abyssinia referred primarily to highland Christian polities centered in Shewa, Tigray, and Amhara (Gojjam and Begemder). Its boundaries were non-frozen, expanding and contracting with the fortunes of competing dynasties. However, it did not include the vast territories that constitute modern Ethiopia (Oromia, Somali region, Afar, Sidama, Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambella, etc.).
The adoption of the name “Ethiopia”, a term with ancient Greek, for biblical Kush, was a 20th-century political project, not a continuation of a fixed state. Internationally, until the mid-1900s, the recognized polity was still commonly called “Abyssinia.”
The only period in which Abyssinia appears on the Red Sea littoral in the historical record is during the Aksumite era. Between the first and seventh centuries CE, the Kingdom of Aksum controlled territories that now form northern Ethiopia, eastern Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti, and parts of Yemen. After Aksum’s decline, successive powers governed the Red Sea coast: the Umayyads and Abbasids, followed by the Fatimids and Ayyubids, the Ottoman Empire from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century, the Egyptian Khedivate in the nineteenth century, and finally Italian colonial administration from 1882 onward. At no point did Abyssinia reestablish a sovereign presence on the coast. The last military incursions toward the littoral—most notably that led by Ras Alula—never succeeded in reaching or holding the shoreline.
To summarize it: Abyssinia never possessed a legally recognized Red Sea territory, and therefore cannot confer such “historical rights” to the modern Ethiopian state.
B) The Formation of Modern Ethiopia (1896–1945)
Menelik II’s southern and eastern conquests (1870s–1900s):The territorial foundation of today’s Ethiopia was laid through large-scale imperial conquest under Menelik II, who annexed: Oromo regions, Sidama, Wolayta, Somali lowlands, Afar territories, Gambella, and Benishangul-Gumuz. These incorporations were the result of internal empire-building, not ancient continuity. Beginning in 1882 (Gojjam), 1886 (Arsi Oromo), 1887 (Harar), 1894 (Wolaita), 1896 (Tigray), 1897 (Kaffa), late 1890s (Jimma, Illubabor, Welega, Benishangul-Gumuz, and significant parts of the Ogaden and the Somali lowlands). Between 1896 and 1902—after the Battle of Adwa and through a series of treaties with Italy, Britain, and France, these conquests were internationally recognized and effectively sealed as the borders of what became modern Ethiopia..
Italian occupation and the creation of “Italian East Africa” (1936–1941): When Fascist Italy invaded in 1935 and conquered Abyssinia in 1936, it unified: Eritrea, Italian Somaliland, and Abyssinia into a single administrative entity: Italian East Africa. However, this unification was created by colonial force, not by Ethiopia’s pre-existing sovereignty.
1941–1945 British Administration and the redefinition of borders. After Italy’s defeat in WWII, Britain occupied and governed: Eritrea, Somaliland, and significant portions of Menelik’s Ethiopia. During this period, international borders were reassessed, and Ethiopia was reconstituted as a sovereign entity under Haile Selassie.
1945: Ethiopia enters the United Nations. This moment marks the birth of Ethiopia as a modern, internationally recognized state with defined boundaries. Its borders at this time did not include: Massawa, Assab, Dahlak, islands, and Any coastline.
Thus: Modern Ethiopia as constituted by Menelik or before him didn’t own a coastline and as country liberated from the Italian occupation and (recognized in 1945 as sovereign) had no coastline and did not inherit one from Abyssinia.
C) The Eritrean Question and the UN Federation (1952–1962)
UN Resolution 390(A) and the creation of the federation: After the Second World War, the future of Italian-administered Eritrea became a major subject of international deliberation. The United States, prioritizing its strategic interests in the Red Sea and its broader Cold War calculations, pushed for a federation between Eritrea and Ethiopia. This arrangement was designed not to reflect historical ties, but to secure Ethiopia as a reliable client state while preserving America’s military and intelligence foothold in Eritrea, particularly the communications base it had assumed after Italy’s defeat in 1941.
The United Nations’ 1950 resolution recognized Eritrea as a distinct political entity, affirmed its sovereignty, and guaranteed a high degree of internal autonomy. It established a federation with Ethiopia, but crucially did not dissolve Eritrea’s statehood or its internationally recognized colonial treaty borders. Ethiopia’s subsequent access to the Red Sea was therefore not a product of historical inheritance or legal entitlement; it was the outcome of geopolitical bargaining among the postwar victors who prioritized strategic alignment over the aspirations and rights of the Eritrean people.
Ethiopia’s dismantling of Eritrean autonomy: By the late 1950s, Haile Selassie’s government had begun systematically dismantling the very foundations of the UN-mandated federation. Eritrea’s autonomous parliament was dissolved, its political parties were outlawed, and its official languages were removed from public administration. Key civil, judicial, and security positions were gradually taken over by Ethiopian appointees, while military and administrative authority was centralized in Addis Ababa and imposed directly on Asmara. Each of these steps constituted a clear violation of the UN resolution that had established the federation and guaranteed Eritrea’s internal autonomy and constitutional integrity.
1962: Annexation of Eritrea: Ethiopia proceeded to unilaterally dismantle the federation and annex Eritrea as a province. International legal scholars overwhelmingly view this act as a breach of the UN General Assembly resolution that established the federal arrangement, a violation of international law, and the direct catalyst for the 30-year Eritrean War of Independence. From 1962 until 1991, Ethiopia’s presence on the Red Sea was maintained not through legal entitlement or historical right, but solely through coercion and military occupation.
D) Independence, International Law, and Uti Possidetis (1991–1993)
Eritrea’s military victory and referendum: In 1991, the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) decisively expelled the Ethiopian army and assumed full control over Eritrea, including its land territory and entire coastline. In 1993, honoring the commitment it had made in November 1980, the EPLF organized a free and fair UN-supervised referendum, in which the Eritrean people voted overwhelmingly, 99.8 percent, in favor of independence.
Legal implications: Uti Possidetis Juris: The modern African state system is governed by the principle of uti possidetis, which upholds colonial boundaries at the moment of independence as the foundation of sovereign territorial borders. For Eritrea, this principle is clear and straightforward: the borders established under Italian colonial administration constitute Eritrea’s lawful international borders, and the coastal territories defined during that period form Eritrea’s internationally recognized Red Sea coastline.
Accordingly, international law affirms these borders as inviolable. Ethiopia, therefore, has no legal basis, historical, colonial, or otherwise, for claiming Assab, Massawa, or any portion of Eritrea’s Red Sea coast.
This means that Ethiopia did not become landlocked as a result of Eritrea’s independence; it was landlocked from the moment the modern Ethiopian state emerged in the late nineteenth century. It is also important to note that Ethiopia is neither unique nor exceptional in this regard. Many countries around the world are landlocked, and several African states (16/54 or 30% of them) function successfully without coastlines.
Ethiopia’s status is not the result of Eritrea “taking” the sea, but of the simple historical fact that Ethiopia never possessed legitimate, internationally recognized ownership of any Red Sea coastline.
E) Contemporary Claims and Political Motivations (2018–2025)
Abiy Ahmed’s rhetoric and the revival of territorial narratives: Starting in 2023 Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has described access to the Red Sea as: an “existential” need, a matter of “historical justice”, and something Ethiopia “deserves” or “has a right to”. This rhetoric frequently conflates the following: Aksumite history, Abyssinian highland politics, Italian colonial boundaries, and Modern Ethiopian nationalism. The political utility is clear: mobilizing nationalist sentiment during periods of internal economic and political instability.
The Somaliland MoU (2024): Ethiopia’s signing of a port-access agreement with Somaliland potentially recognizing Somaliland as an independent state has generated major diplomatic backlash from Somalia and the African Union. The deal represents: an effort to circumvent Eritrea and Djibouti, a gamble with regional stability, and a precedent-breaking challenge to African territorial norms.
Eritrea’s response and the risks of escalation:
F) International Law: Why Ethiopia Has No Territorial Claim to the Red Sea
International law makes Ethiopia’s position clear:
Historical claims are irrelevant: Modern borders are governed by legal continuity, not ancient kingdoms.
Uti possidetis locks Eritrea’s borders: Italian colonial boundaries = legally binding modern borders.
Sovereignty cannot be undone by “historic use”: Ethiopia’s use of Eritrean ports during the federation and annexation period gives no legal rights today.
Landlocked states have rights to access—but not own—foreign ports: Under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), landlocked countries can negotiate: transit access, port agreements, and trade corridors for the right payment. But they cannot demand sovereignty over another state’s coast.
Thus: Ethiopia may ask access to the sea only through a mutually negotiated bilateral agreement grounded in international law. What it cannot do, and has no legal, historical, or moral basis to do, is claim Eritrea’s sovereign coastal territory. Before any meaningful discussion can occur, Ethiopia must first publicly and unequivocally disavow the reckless statements and irredentist rhetoric it has advanced over the past two years. Eritrea cannot and will not entertain delusional assertions over its internationally recognized territory.
The histories of certain regions within Abyssinia and parts of Eritrea contain cultural, linguistic, and religious intersections, much like the relationships shared by countless neighboring peoples across Africa. Eritrea and Djibouti overlap culturally; Eritrea and Sudan share deep historical ties; Ethiopia and Somalia have intertwined communities; Ethiopia and Kenya share cross-border identities. There is nothing uniquely “exceptional” about the Eritrea–Ethiopia colonial boundary when viewed in this broader African context.
What is clear, however, is that the two countries followed fundamentally different political trajectories. The modern state known as Ethiopia did not emerge from ancient continuity, as its nationalist mythology claims, but from late-19th-century imperial conquest and early-20th-century international diplomacy. And at no point in that process did Ethiopia possess lawful, sovereign territory on the Red Sea.
Eritrea’s coastline is anchored not only in its long struggle for self determination but also in clear international legal principles that affirm its sovereignty. Eritrea’s coastline rests not on sentiment or narrative, but on the hard foundations of international law, the incontrovertible legitimacy of its colonial-era borders, and the immense human sacrifice of its thirty-year struggle for self-determination. Its sovereignty is settled, recognized, and non-negotiable. Efforts to resurrect long-discredited territorial fantasies through selective history, political theatrics, or rhetorical inflation are more than intellectually dishonest— they are a direct threat to regional peace.
Stability in the Horn of Africa will only come from policies anchored in lawful borders, respect for sovereignty, and an honest reckoning with historical fact. Anything less invites chaos and undermines the very principles upon which the international system rests.
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