From Demonization to Rapprochement and Back: Ethiopia’s Recurring Use of Eritrea as a Scapegoat

By: B. Tekle

The relationship between Ethiopia and Eritrea, two nations bound by geography, history, and culture, has been a defining feature of the Horn of Africa’s volatile political landscape for over three decades. Since Eritrea’s formal independence in 1993, the dynamic has been characterized by a cycle of intense conflict, protracted stalemate, and brief, fragile rapprochement. Beneath this surface tension, however, lies a deeper, more consistent pattern: the recurring use of Eritrea—and particularly its leadership—by successive Ethiopian regimes as an external scapegoat. This tactic serves to deflect domestic discontent, unify fractious internal coalitions, and divert attention from governance failures and escalating ethnic conflicts. This pattern is not unique to any single administration but reflects a deeply ingrained, and increasingly dangerous, tactic in Ethiopian politics.

The Roots of Enmity and the Scapegoating Pattern

Eritrea’s independence in 1993, following a thirty-year war, was initially peaceful, a testament to the close ties between the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), which dominated the ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) coalition. This fraternity, however, quickly dissolved. The devastating 1998–2000 border war, triggered by a minor territorial dispute but rooted in deeper economic and political rivalries, claimed an estimated 70,000 to 100,000 lives and cemented a bitter, seemingly irreparable enmity.

The war concluded with the Algiers Agreement, which established a Boundary Commission whose ruling Ethiopia initially refused to implement. This refusal led to a prolonged “no war, no peace” stalemate that lasted nearly two decades. During this period, the TPLF-led EPRDF government in Addis Ababa began to systematically weaponize the conflict. The narrative of an external, existential threat from Asmara became a powerful tool to justify the massive militarization of the border, suppress internal dissent, and maintain a state of national emergency. The scapegoating of Eritrea became a consistent political tool, a reliable mechanism for the EPRDF to consolidate power and deflect scrutiny from its own authoritarian tendencies and the growing ethnic tensions within its federal structure.

The EPRDF Era: Demonization and Consolidation of Power (1991–2018)

For the better part of two decades, the TPLF-dominated EPRDF systematically demonized Eritrea and its President, Isaias Afwerki. This campaign was crucial for the coalition’s survival. By portraying Eritrea as an irrational, aggressive, and destabilizing force, the EPRDF could:

• Justify Internal Repression: Any domestic opposition could be easily dismissed as being “in league with the enemy” or “Eritrean proxies,” thereby legitimizing the state’s tight control over civil society and media.
• Consolidate Coalition Cohesion: The external threat provided a common enemy, helping to paper over the deep-seated ideological and ethnic differences within the EPRDF’s four-party structure (TPLF, ANDM, OPDO, SEPDM).
• Divert Attention from Governance Failures: The vast resources poured into the military and the border standoff were framed as necessary for national survival, distracting from widespread poverty, lack of political freedom, and the structural flaws of the ethnic federalism model.

Ethiopia’s influential position as the host of the African Union headquarters and a key Western security partner—particularly in the fight against terrorism in Somalia—amplified its anti-Eritrea narratives across Africa and beyond. The narrative of a rogue state sponsoring terrorism gained significant international traction, setting the stage for a major diplomatic victory for Addis Ababa.

The 2009 UN Sanctions: A Diplomatic Weapon

The scapegoating campaign reached its zenith with the imposition of United Nations sanctions on Eritrea. Ethiopia played a key, active role in pushing for UN Security Council Resolution 1907, which was adopted on December 23, 2009. The resolution imposed an arms embargo, travel bans, and asset freezes on Eritrea’s political and military leadership. The stated justification was Eritrea’s alleged support for the militant group al-Shabaab in Somalia and other armed groups seeking to destabilize the region.

However, the legal and factual basis for these sanctions was weak and became increasingly contested over time. While initial reports from the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea (SEMG) suggested some support, subsequent reports repeatedly failed to find conclusive evidence of ongoing Eritrean support for al-Shabaab. For instance, reports from 2011 onward consistently noted the lack of proof. A 2017 report by the SEMG explicitly stated that it had not found conclusive evidence of Eritrean support for al-Shabaab for four consecutive mandates. Despite this lack of conclusive proof, the sanctions persisted for nearly a decade, causing significant harm to Eritrea’s economy and international standing. The longevity of the sanctions, long after the evidence had evaporated, underscored the political nature of the measure, which had effectively isolated a small nation based on allegations strongly promoted by its larger, more influential neighbor.

The 2018 Turning Point: A Short-Lived Rapprochement

The political landscape shifted dramatically in 2018 with the rise of Abiy Ahmed to the Ethiopian premiership. Facing a wave of popular protests and a crumbling EPRDF coalition, Abiy’s administration sought to dismantle the old political order. His dramatic peace initiative with Eritrea was the centerpiece of this effort. In July 2018, Abiy and President Isaias Afwerki signed the Joint Declaration of Peace and Friendship in Asmara, officially ending the “no war, no peace” status.

The breakthrough was genuine and transformative, raising hopes for regional cooperation. Borders, embassies, and flights rapidly reopened, leading to emotional reunions between families separated for two decades. Abiy was subsequently awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2019, largely for this bold move. For a brief moment, the scapegoat narrative was shelved, replaced by a vision of mutual prosperity and regional integration. The lifting of the UN sanctions on Eritrea in November 2018, following the peace deal, was a direct consequence of this rapprochement, acknowledging the new political reality and the long-standing absence of evidence for the original charges.

Eritrea’s Decisive Role in the Tigray War (2020–2022)

The fragile peace was shattered in November 2020 with the outbreak of the Tigray War between the Ethiopian federal government and the TPLF. In a stunning reversal of alliances, Eritrea was brought in as a military partner. At Ethiopia’s explicit request, Eritrean forces intervened alongside the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) and Amhara regional militias.

This intervention was pivotal. By late 2021, the TPLF’s forces (the Tigray Defense Forces, or TDF) had made significant advances, pushing deep into the Amhara and Afar regions. The TDF had reached towns like Kombolcha and Dessie, and their advance guard was reported to be as close as Debre Sina, a mere 190 kilometers from the capital, Addis Ababa. Many analysts believed the collapse of the central government was a distinct possibility. Eritrea’s entry into the conflict, driven by a shared existential threat from the TPLF and a desire for retribution, helped reverse these advances. Their forces secured key supply lines and engaged the TDF on the northern front, preventing what could have been the disintegration of the Ethiopian federal state.

Eritrea’s intervention was not an act of aggression but a response to an invitation from the internationally recognized government of Ethiopia, making it a legitimate, if controversial, act of collective defense against a common enemy. Regardless, Eritrea’s intervention was militarily decisive in preserving the Ethiopian state.

The Reversal Under Abiy and the Prosperity Party (2023–2025)

Following the cessation of major hostilities in Tigray, the Prosperity Party (PP) government under Abiy Ahmed began to face mounting internal crises. Economic hardship, a spiraling insurgency in the Amhara region, and political fragmentation across the Oromia region created a familiar political pressure cooker. In a move that shocked regional observers, the PP government reverted to the old scapegoating playbook, this time targeting its former ally, Eritrea.

The new narrative centered on the issue of Red Sea access. In late 2023 and throughout 2024, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed began to frame Ethiopia’s landlocked status as an “existential” issue, repeatedly hinting at the need to regain access to the sea, specifically mentioning the Eritrean port of Assab. Statements by senior Ethiopian officials, including military leaders, weaponized Ethiopia’s massive population of over 120 million against Eritrea’s approximately 3.6 million, suggesting that the sheer demographic and economic weight of Ethiopia made its claim for sea access an inevitability.

This rhetoric was quickly followed by a PP-led propaganda campaign. It featured dehumanizing rhetoric against Eritreans, irredentist claims disguised as historical rights, and a concerted effort to whip up nationalist fervor. The primary goal of this campaign was clear: to distract the Ethiopian public from the government’s profound domestic failures—the inability to quell the Amhara insurgency, the economic crisis, and the failure to deliver on post-war stability. Eritrea, having served its purpose in the Tigray War, was once again cast as the convenient external threat, a necessary foil to unify a rapidly fragmenting domestic political base.

Comparative Propaganda: Restraint vs. Orchestration

The contrast between the scale and intensity of Ethiopia’s state-sponsored, media-amplified anti-Eritrea campaign and Eritrea’s official response is stark. The Ethiopian campaign has been a massive, coordinated effort, utilizing state media, government-affiliated social media accounts, and a network of political commentators to push the “existential” sea access narrative. This orchestration is designed to manufacture consent for a potentially aggressive foreign policy shift.

In contrast, Eritrea’s official responses have been far more measured, infrequent, and restrained. Official statements from Asmara have typically rejected the provocation, reaffirmed Eritrea’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and warned against the dangers of war, but they have consistently avoided matching the inflammatory rhetoric emanating from Addis Ababa. This restraint suggests a strategic calculation: Eritrea, as the smaller nation, understands that escalating the war of words only plays into the hands of the larger power seeking a pretext for conflict.

The Eritrean Diaspora’s Grassroots Counter-Efforts

Unlike the Ethiopian campaign, which is largely government-orchestrated, the counter-efforts challenging the scapegoating narrative have been driven by the Eritrean diaspora. These activists, operating independently of the Eritrean government, have organized online and in public forums to provide context, challenge the irredentist claims, and highlight the historical pattern of Ethiopian aggression and diplomatic manipulation.

This grassroots activism is a critical, albeit under-resourced, check on the state-led propaganda machine. Operating across social media platforms and through independent news outlets, they have worked to inform the international community about the dangers of the renewed scapegoating, often at personal risk to themselves and their families. Their efforts underscore the deep concern within the Eritrean community that the current rhetoric is not merely political posturing but a genuine precursor to renewed conflict.

Conclusion: The Peril of a Recurring Tactic

The history of Ethiopia-Eritrea relations is a tragic loop, where periods of conflict and tension are punctuated by the Ethiopian state’s reliance on Eritrea as a political scapegoat. From the TPLF-led EPRDF using the “no war, no peace” stalemate to justify authoritarianism, to the current Prosperity Party using the “existential” need for sea access to distract from domestic instability, the tactic remains the same. It is a tired but, in the short term, effective domestic strategy for unifying a fractious populace and deflecting blame.

However, this recurring tactic risks catastrophic long-term consequences. Any new war between the two nations would be devastating. For Ethiopia, a conflict would open a new, costly front at a time when its federal structure is already fragile and its military is stretched thin by insurgencies in Amhara and Oromia. For Eritrea, it would be an existential threat. For the entire Horn of Africa, it would be profoundly destabilizing, threatening to draw in other regional powers.

The only sustainable path forward remains genuine diplomacy, mutual economic projects, and an unwavering respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of both nations. The cycle of scapegoating must be broken, not just for the sake of Eritrea, but for the stability and future of Ethiopia itself. Until the Ethiopian government finds a way to address its internal crises through good governance and political inclusion rather than external deflection, the shadow of renewed conflict will continue to loom large over the Horn of Africa.