by Abdulqadir Osman
Ambassador General Bacha Debele’s October 31, 2025, article titled “The Red Sea: The Imperative of Pragmatic Cooperation between Ethiopia and Eritrea,” offers a highly tendentious and historically flawed account of Eritrea, its government, and its leadership. Rather than presenting an objective analysis, the piece reflects the author’s unresolved personal and political grievances overshadowing a sober engagement with regional realities. His writing revives the same expansionist mindset that once cost countless lives and resulted in his own capture and imprisonment as a POW.
It bears remembering that Ambassador-General Bacha Debele was once a junior officer in the Ethiopian army of occupation during Eritrea’s thirty-year war of liberation. Captured in 1981, he spent a full decade, until 1991, as a prisoner of war under humane treatment by the EPLF, alongside tens of thousands of other Ethiopian soldiers. When Eritrea was finally liberated, he and roughly 110,000 POWs, including senior generals of the defeated army, were released and repatriated without harm. Seven years later, Bacha Debele returned to Eritrean soil not as a diplomat, but as a field commander leading an infantry division in Ethiopia’s failed bid to seize the port of Assab. That attempt collapsed spectacularly; his army could not advance even a single inch into Eritrean territory, let alone capture Assab or any meaningful strategic position.
Against this backdrop, his recent veiled threats against Eritrea’s sovereignty ring less like statesmanship and more like the lingering frustration of a man whose military ventures against Eritrea ended in failure—multiple times.
His suggestion that Ethiopia must “re-engage” with the Red Sea through “assertive measures” is not a strategic insight but a rhetorical echo of past aggression, one that dismisses both history and international law. Eritrea’s territorial integrity and independence are neither contested nor negotiable. Eritrea’s belated right to decolonization was secured through three decades of determined struggle of national liberation and endorsed by an internationally supervised referendum in 1993, where more than 99.8 percent of Eritreans voted for independence. That result, recognized by the United Nations and the African Union, firmly established Eritrea’s statehood as a matter of historical and legal fact. To question it now amounts to a deliberate act of revisionism and an outright denial of the Eritrean people’s will. The author’s repeated disparagement of President Isaias Afwerki further illustrates the lack of analytical depth in his argument. President Isaias is a historic leader who has devoted his life to Eritrea’s liberation, sovereignty, and self-reliance. Under his stewardship, Eritrea has remained stable, secure, and independent in one of the world’s most volatile regions. His government’s resilience and consistency in policy, however misunderstood or misrepresented are the result of strategic discipline rather than irrational obstinacy, unlike the approach of the PP’s government policy in Ethiopia, which is often marked by reactive measures and incoherent decision-making.
The current Ethiopian regime is obviously bent on changing the country’s landlocked reality and rejects, within that mindset – to seek normative maritime access through peaceful, good-faith diplomacy used by other landlocked countries. Eritrea understands that geography is destiny, and that landlocked countries may seek access to the sea only through peaceful means and with the full consent of the neighboring coastal state. Any illegitimate attempt to overturn this well-established geographic fact and diplomatic norm risks opening a Pandora’s box and creating dangerous instability, ultimately harming all involved, including the very actors who seek to instigate such a crisis. For Eritrea, sovereignty over its maritime domain, coastal territory, or any integral part of its national territory is not a negotiable asset but a defining element of nationhood. To defend that sovereignty is not an act of isolationism, but the highest expression of self-respect and national integrity. At the same time, Eritrea acknowledges that complementarity created through good-faith diplomacy, rather than saber-rattling or unhinged belligerence, is the only way for any landlocked state to secure access to the sea.
This principled approach distinguishes Eritrea from the parasitic, externally dependent model long pursued by previous Ethiopian regimes and continued by the Prosperity Party (PP). A model that has come to define Ethiopian statecraft. The author misinterprets Eritrea’s strategic restraint and disciplined diplomacy as isolationism. Indeed, when it comes to isolationism, Ethiopia under the current PP leadership remains largely estranged from its neighbors. It is widely considered by observers to be a proxy and, often, a mere errand agent for an external actor. In fact, it is a proxy for the single most destabilizing force in the Horn of Africa; one whose disruptive influence extends from Sudan to Somalia and even within Ethiopia itself. This is no secret to any serious observers of regional dynamics and therefore needs no further elaboration. By contrast, Eritrea’s foreign policy is guided by clarity, consistency, and respect for sovereignty. Its independent diplomacy seeks cooperation based on mutual respect rather than expedience. The accusation of “self-isolation” collapses when viewed in this context: Eritrea engages constructively with all actors, guided by the principle that sovereignty should never be sacrificed for temporary convenience or external approval.
Moreover, Ambassador Bache Debele has also made thinly disguised threats against Eritrea. However, Eritrea will not be coerced into any negotiation. His threats are merely an attempt to project out his country’s intractable domestic problems. If he believes Eritrea will ever negotiate to relinquish its sovereign territory, he will be waiting in vain. Indeed, Eritrea’s resolve to defend its territory is perhaps best understood by Bacha himself, who commanded the Ethiopian military forces tasked with seizing Assab and parts of Eritrean land during the 1998—2000 border conflict. In a chilling interview, he recounted the staggering losses his troops suffered in one of the battles around Bure. His army, advancing in relentless human waves, failed to gain even an inch of ground, as Eritrean troops bravely repelled them, leaving a scene of devastation that highlighted the skill and unwavering determination of Eritrea’s defense forces. Here his own words both the Amharic and the English translation. The Amharic word he used: “ተጨፈጨፍን” means (we were wiped out, massacred, annihilated).
“በኢትዮ-ኤርትራ ጦርነት እኔ ቡሬ ነው የነበርኩት። ቡሬ ለእኔ የተሰጠኝ ግዳጅ ፡ ከኔ ፊት ለፊት ያለው የኤርትራ ሰራዊት ክፍለጦሮች ስምንት ነበሩ። 525ን ጨምሮ ማለት ነው። ለኔ የተሰጠኝ ግዳጅ በዛ በኩል ማጥቃት ስለ ማንችል ፡ የሄን ስምንት ክፍለጦር ለሶስት ቀን ማቆየት ነው። ጦርነት ተጀመረ። ተጨፈጨፍን። ኣንድም ቦታ ፈቀቅ ማድረግ ኣልቻልንም። ኣንድ ክፍለጦር ያመጣል ፡ ያስገባል ፡ ይጨፈጨፋል። ሌላ ክፍለጦር ያመጣል፡ ያስገባል ፡ ይጨፈጨፋል። ኣንደኛው ይሄው ነው። ሁለተኛ ከዚህ በፊት ፡ ኣይጋ** የሚባል ወጊያ ነበረ። ያ ባድመ የተለቀቀበት ግዜ ። [ጀነራል ጻድቃን] ትእዛዝ ሰጥቶ በኣይጋ በኩል እንዲገባ ተደረገ። አንደ ቄራ ከብት ነው የገባነው። ታንኩ ፡ ለገበያ እንደሚሄድ በጎፍ ነው የነዳው። ቄራ ገባን። ተጨፈጨፍንና ተመለሰ የኛ ሰራዊት።”
“During the Ethio-Eritrea war, I was stationed at Bure. Bure was the mission assigned to me. There were eight Eritrean army divisions in front of me. That is, including their 525th Division. My mission was to hold off those eight divisions for three days, since an offensive from that front was not possible. The war started. We were Massacred. We could not push a square inch. Ethiopia would bring one division and it would be Massacred. It would bring another division, and it would be Massacred. This is the first instance. The second instance was, before this [the Bure war], there was a battle at a place called Aiga**. It was after they left Badme. He [General Tsadqan] gave an order to enter through Aiga. We were driven like cattle into a slaughterhouse. The tanks were driven en masse as if they were going to the market. We entered the slaughterhouse, we were Massacred and our army was forced to return.”
It is increasingly evident that Ambassador Bache Debele’s government has already exhausted much of the political capital needed to maintain its hold on power. Their only remaining strategy is to externalize problems and blame Eritrea for domestic chaos and unrest. Yet, any superficial or bad-faith diplomacy achieves little beyond provoking confrontation and needless bloodshed, outcomes that Eritrea has consistently sought to avoid.
To be clear, Eritrea’s principal concern at this point is not the veiled threats of Ambassador Bacha Debele and his prime minister, but the looming internal unraveling of Ethiopia, where a deeply divisive leadership has normalized manufactured crises and perpetual conflict as instruments of governance. It is high time that the government of Ethiopia stops acting as the “bully boy” in the neighborhood and ends its criminal acts at home, including the merciless use of drones against its own people. By now, it is abundantly clear that the ruling Prosperity Party (PP) has effectively declared war on Eritrea for nearly two years, openly seeking “access to the sea by any means”, including military force, while challenging its independence and illegally claiming parts of its sovereign territory. Despite this, Eritrea remains steadfast in its longstanding policy of restraint and non-interference in the domestic affairs of neighboring countries. However, it is essential to remember that Eritrea has the legitimate right and the full capacity to defend its independence and territorial integrity by all necessary means.
Debele’s government has been openly hosting and sponsoring fringe irredentist organizations that seek to destabilize the entire Horn of Africa, a region in which the same communities of Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Djibouti coexist across historically sensitive borders. BY encouraging such irredentist agendas, Debele’s Prosperity Party (PP) government is undermining the peace and security of the entire region. Above all, it is undermining the foundational principles of African statecraft enshrined in the 1963 OAU Cairo Declaration, which firmly rejected border revisionism. In a nutshell, Debele’s administration is charting a path defined by manufactured instability, a steady erosion of the rule of law, and a revisionist political posture. These Policies are steadily deepening its isolation within both African regional institutions and the wider international community.
The future of the Horn of Africa will not be shaped by revisionist rhetoric or revived hegemonic ambitions. It will depend on mutual respect, adherence to established borders, and recognition of the sacrifices that have already secured independence and peace. Eritrea has paid a high price for its freedom, and it will continue to safeguard that legacy with vigilance and dignity. Rather than attempting to rewrite history or reassert failed dominance, figures like Ambassador General Bacha Debele should confront the lessons of the past: that stability in this region will come only through justice, equality, and an honest acceptance of geopolitical reality.
**Note: The battle General Bacha alludes as Aiga is the March 14–16, 1999, Battle of Igrī Mekel (እግሪ መኸል), fought along the Tserona Front. Some accounts indicate that up to ten Ethiopian divisions were put out of service, with an estimated 30,000 soldiers killed. In the span of three days, about 70 modern Ethiopian tanks were destroyed. Eritrean air defenses also brought down seven aircraft, including a MiG-23, a Sukhoi-27, and a military helicopter, together with their pilots. Hundreds of civilian “aglay” (ኣግላይ) conscripts, sent to collect and bury the corpses, were themselves killed or taken prisoner.
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